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MYSTICISM AND MODERN LIFE[1]

FRANCIS G. PEABODY

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

This College cherishes the memory of its founder, whose benefactions were untrammelled by denominational conditions, but whose faith in the principles of his communion was lifelong and profound. It is therefore appropriate to set apart one day in the year when some aspect of these principles shall be presented to the College, not only as a tribute to the founder, but as a recognition of the religious comprehensiveness and ecclesiastical catholicity which it is the privilege of students here to enjoy.

What, then, are the dominating traits which mark the Society of Friends, and which determine its place in the history of religion? What are the principles which issue into that spiritual serenity and assurance, which no experience is severe enough to disturb and no persecution has been merciless enough to destroy? The Friends, we must answer, offer a distinguished illustration of that type of religious life which in many forms, ancient and modern, Christian and extra-Christian, is defined as mysticism, or that illumination of the spiritual nature which proceeds from immediate communion of the soul with God. The word "Mysticism" has become so loosely applied to whatever is obscure or esoteric that it suggests to many minds, not the most certain and

[1] An address on Founder's Day at Bryn Mawr College, May 13, 1914.

compelling of realities, but that which is merely mysterious or misty. The Germans meet this misapprehension by discriminating between two words: "*Mystizismus*," or the cult of the supernatural, as in Oriental theosophy or Occidental spiritualism; and "*Mystik*," or a spiritual faith in the immediate revelation, the doctrine of the Inner Light. A touch of "*Mystizismus*," it must be admitted, was often betrayed in the visions and ecstasies of the earlier Friends; but Quaker mysticism has been, in the main, singularly restrained and tranquil, consistent with prudent business, practical politics, and sober common sense. The central movement of religious life among the Friends has been a pure stream of living faith, transmitting from age to age the Master's parting promise that when the Spirit of Truth was come, it should guide men into all truth. Mysticism assumes the essential integrity of the human soul, its affinity with the Eternal, its partaking of the Divine nature, its capacity to break the chains of sin and attain the freedom of the spirit. Mysticism universalizes religious experiences which to other habits of mind are occasional or intermittent—worship, prayer, inspiration, faith, sacraments. It is difficult even for the most convinced of sacramentalists to condemn the doctrine of a continuous sacrament expressed by an English Friend—"I very much doubt," he writes, "whether, since the Lord by his grace brought me into the faith of his dear Son, I have ever broken bread or drunk wine, even in the ordinary course of life, without the remembrance of, and some devout feeling regarding, the broken body and the blood-shedding of my dear Lord and Saviour."

Nor is the company of such believers limited to the communion of Friends, or to any single period of Christian history. On the contrary, the mystical conception of the religious life, the supreme and convincing assurance that the soul of man has the capacity to respond to the

spirit of God, and is freed by this communion from all dependence on external authority, runs like a golden thread through the dark texture of Christian doctrine and binds together centuries and creeds which have little else to share. Across the Christian centuries speaks the Jew Philo: "God has breathed into man from heaven a portion of his own divinity"; "The soul of man is an indivisible portion of that divine and blessed spirit." A century passes, and Plotinus bears witness: "The wise man recognizes the idea of the good within him; this he develops by withdrawal into the holy places of his own soul." Other centuries pass, and Bernard of Clairvaux, preacher, administrator, and saint, gives his testimony: "It is in the spirit, not of sound but of penetration, not talkative but effective, that union with God occurs." Still other centuries pass and the Dominican Tauler preaches: "Revelation must take place in the spirit, for God is a spirit, and our created spirits must be lost in the uncreated." Thus through the ages this serene message is renewed. "Madam," said the Franciscan to Madame Guyon, "you are disappointed and perplexed because you seek without what you have within; accustom yourself to seek God in your own heart and you will find him." The Quakers, in short, whom the provincial theologians of England in the seventeenth century fancied were intolerable heretics, and four of whom Puritan New England hanged for pestilential nonconformity, were one link in a long chain of witnesses of the spirit, which runs all the way from the Gospel of John to the poetry of Emerson, and whose continuity justified the New England mystic in his faith that

> "The word by seers or sibyls told
> In groves of oak, or fanes of gold,
> Still floats upon the morning wind,
> Still whispers to the willing mind.
> One accent of the Holy Ghost
> The heedless world hath never lost."

Such is the spiritual pedigree of Quakerism, or rather such is the unexhausted and perennial life of the Spirit from whose abundance the stream of Quakerism, like many another movement of mysticism, flows. At this point, however, one is confronted by a further and practical question. What place has this life of the spirit among the needs and problems of the modern world? Are not these beautiful traits of quietism—detachment of mind, the surrender of silence, the waiting for God, which have adorned the history of the Friends—inappropriate, not to say impracticable, under the conditions of modern life to which one must now inevitably conform? Is not this a time of action, initiative, service; a time to look out and not to look in; an age when not even the silence of a Friends' Meeting can shut out the appealing call of an unredeemed and inequitable world? Is not the mystic, like the monk of the Middle Ages, saving his own soul, instead of setting his soul to save the world? Is he not tempted by the self-indulgence of meditation, when he should be stirred to the heroism of self-sacrifice? Longfellow's monk, walking on the terrace of Amalfi, looks down upon the town below:—

> "Wondering unto what good end
> All this toil and traffic tend,
> And why all men cannot be
> Free from care and free from pain
> And the sordid love of gain,
> And as indolent as he."

May there not be something of this self-deception in spirituality, the mistaking of laziness for holiness, the withdrawal from others for one's own sake, instead of the sanctifying oneself for others' sakes?

There are many circumstances of modern life which might reasonably encourage this impression that mysticism and efficiency are mutually exclusive. A mind

profoundly concerned with communion with God might, it would seem, fail to hear the call to the service of man. Quakerism, like the monastic system, might appear to be a beautiful survival of an age which is gone. The conspicuous and pretentious organizations of ecclesiasticism, the increasing use of ceremony, ritual, art, and music as handmaids of religion, and the persistent substitution of doctrinal conformity for spiritual faith—all these characteristics of modern Christianity might seem to set the religion of the mystic in an eddy of the present age, where the elect few might move in their little circle of emotion while the current of the time swept by to other ends.

Yet this impression is in fact as superficial as it is common. One has but to recall the history of philosophy to be assured of the fundamental place which emotion must always hold in a genuine and effective religious life. A century ago the greatest of modern theologians, in the first expression of his mind, defined in epoch-making phrases the nature of religion. It was, he said, not knowledge, "for the measure of knowledge is not the measure of piety"; nor was it action, for behind all action lay a region of passive acceptance and contemplation. Religion thinks, but it is not the thought; it acts, but it is not the action. And if neither thought nor conduct, neither the reason nor the will, reveals the nature of religion, then its primary organ of expression must be sought within that third region of human experience which is occupied by the emotional life. "Your feeling," taught Schleiermacher, "in so far as it expresses the universal life you share, is your religion." "It is to be one with the Infinite, and to share in every moment the life of the Eternal." This sense of dependence is absolute, not to be balanced against any reaction of thought or deed; and in it is the source of the piety of the race. The feeling of absolute dependence leads us

past the region of inter-working causes and effects, and into the presence of the Power which controls the whole. It is but another name for our consciousness of God. In this philosophical justification of mysticism the history of modern theology began. The emotional life had found a place in philosophy. The sphere of feeling lay deeper in the religious consciousness than either doctrine or action could penetrate. The mystical experience might utter itself in theology, or in service, or in both, but these more conspicuous streams of consciousness, if they ran full and free, reported the hidden source from which they sprang, high up among the hills of God. The mystic in his search had pushed up the stream of faith to the spring from which it flows. He had entered the central shrine, which is hidden from logic or from effort, but lies open to the receptive heart when the spirit of surrender meets the Spirit of Grace.

All this the Quakers, though often in untutored ways, have seen and taught. The philosophy of religion confirms their intuitive faith. Yet this appreciation of the place of feeling is not the end of the philosophy of religion. A stream is not completely traced when one has discovered its source. A lake which has no outlet, even though it lie on a mountain top and reflect an unclouded sky, becomes a brackish pool. It is the same with the mystic's communion if it does not flow down into the channel of thought and will. Religious feeling becomes morbid, introspective, and even poisonous, if it be left to sun itself on the heights. "Master, it is good for us to be here," said Peter to Jesus on the Mount of Transfiguration, "Let us make three tabernacles"; not knowing what he said. But the Master's ear heard the cry of the demoniac boy at the mountain's foot, and the white and glistening raiment was cast aside that the work of healing might be done, and the vision above justified by the task below.

"Not always on the mount may we
Wrapt in the heavenly presence be.
The shores of thought and feeling know
The spirit's tidal ebb and flow.
The mount for vision—but below
The paths of daily duty go;
And nobler life therein shall own
The pattern on the mountain shown."

Here, then, is the first test which the mystic has to meet. He is tempted by the very vision which he so distinctly sees. The sufficiency of the communion may alienate him from the task of life. The common duty may seem flat and colorless after the shining of the upper air. Yet, on the other hand, if it should happen that the mystic, instead of being content with detachment and quietude of soul, descends from the height to the task, then he comes with a rare endowment of power. The vision has idealized the world. The healing of the boy is in the strength of the Mount. If the spring, which might linger in the hills above, hastens to the plains below, then it brings them refreshment and verdure. A curious dilemma therefore confronts the mystic's faith. He has discerned the source of all vitalizing religion, but this discovery is unavailing unless the feeling in which religion rises flows down to spend itself in ways which are often remote from the mystic's habit of mind. To have no touch of mysticism in one's religion, to be content with an external, doctrinal, superimposed tradition instead of a vital experience, is to live on a left-over faith, to borrow or inherit instead of discovering and owning. But, on the other hand, to have no outlet for one's mysticism is as when a sacred Jordan ends in a Dead Sea, on whose surface one may float, but from whose waters one may not drink. Two solemn alternatives, therefore, meet the mystic's experience. Either it is the most sterile of meditations or it

is the most productive of inspirations. The mystic can do nothing by halves. If he retreats from the world, it is with a lofty indifference which may reach even a mood of scorn; if, on the other hand, he serves the world, it is with the irresistible power of a living faith. He must do nothing or much. If he uses his talent, more is added to it; if he hides it, there is taken away even that which he hath.

If this is the philosophy of mysticism, it becomes most interesting to inquire how far the Quakers have met the test. Have the satisfactions of Quietism made them indifferent to the cry of the modern world, or have they turned the stream of their mysticism into the fields of service, as modern science turns an idle river to irrigate a barren plain? What do we owe, in modern thought or in modern service, to the Society of Friends? It must be admitted that few modern thinkers of the highest rank are the direct product of Quakerism. The classic expressions of its literature move for the most part within the limited circle of their own ideals, and are contributions to spiritual autobiography rather than explorations of philosophy or nature. A faith, however, cannot be called intellectually sterile which can claim the two most permanent narratives of the life of the soul—the Journal of George Fox and the Journal of John Woolman—with which documents of confession nothing in Christian literature can be compared except the Confessions of Augustine and the Thoughts of Pascal. And even if it be admitted that the practice of piety has been the dominating theme of Quaker literature, it does not follow that religious mysticism is in its nature intellectually unfruitful. On the contrary, the two most important influences on the theology of the nineteenth century have their origins in this consciousness of communion with the Eternal, and still carry to multitudes of students the authority of this personal assurance.

Schleiermacher became in turn preacher, professor, philosopher, and theologian, the most versatile and masterful of German teachers, of whom every serious student of ethics, aesthetics, Greek philosophy, or Christian history must still take account; yet Schleiermacher was bred within the circle of Moravian piety. It was, as he said, the maternal womb in which his faith first woke to consciousness. Not his erudition only, or his eloquence, or his administrative skill, have given him his permanent place in the history of theology, but the association of these varied activities with the mystic's faith, and the solution of doctrinal problems by the test of the Christian consciousness.

Even more impressive is the case of the one American contribution to philosophy which by general consent is accepted as original, typical, and permanent—the consistent and confident mysticism of Emerson. Argument, demonstration, even discussion, seemed to him superfluous. "If any one asks me for my reasons," he said, "I am helpless." He had but to report what the Oversoul whispered to him. The mind was, according to his teaching, primarily not an instructor, but a listener. "He on whom the Soul descends, alone can teach." "Within man is the soul of the Holy, the wise silence, the universal beauty, the Eternal one." What his followers called transcendentalism, appropriating inaccurately a phrase of Kant, was but the mystical assurance which transcended proof, and which sang with Jones Very:

> "In finding Thee are all things round us found,
> In losing Thee are all things lost beside."

The unparalleled illumination and insight which give to Emerson his quality of timelessness is but an illustration of the truth which George Fox, in unstudied eloquence, taught in his Journal: "As people come into subjection

to the Spirit of God and grow up into the image and power of the Almighty, they may receive the word of wisdom that opens all things, and come to know the hidden unity of the Eternal Being."

It would appear, therefore, that the transition from mysticism to lucid and epoch-making thought is not only practicable, but may even reach the loftiest expression. When, on the other hand, we turn to the world of action the evidence becomes much more convincing. One of the facts which must suggest some self-reproach to the conscience of those Christian communions which claim the largest numbers and authority, is the modest part which they have taken in the great social movement of the modern world as compared with those whose opinions have seemed unsound or whose practices have been unecclesiastical. Wherever Christian teaching has been dominated by supreme concern for salvation in another life, there the habit of other-worldliness has tended to induce a depreciation of the vicissitudes of this world, and has accepted present evils as a preparation for eternity. Wherever, on the other hand, the worth and dignity of the individual soul have been deeply realized, and its immediate and personal communion with God has been the supreme desire, there the sins and wrongs of society which obstruct that communion have been the natural object of attack. The curious consequence has been that many of the greatest names in the history of social reform and redemption are those of men and women whom the theologians of the Church might describe as heretics. The anti-slavery cause, the reformation of prisons, the care of the insane and the feeble-minded, the beginnings of scientific charity, and the securing of political rights for the masses of the people—all these crusades, in which the new spirit of social service began, call to mind personalities in whom the spirit of Christian consecration was more conspicuous

than the habit of ecclesiastical conformity. Samuel Gridley Howe, in whom, his biographer said, were combined the spirit of Sir Galahad and the Good Samaritan; Joseph Tuckerman, the first American to formulate the doctrines of modern charity; Dorothea Dix, the frail young school-teacher who revolutionized the care of the insane—all these were devoted to the social salvation of others on earth rather than to their own personal salvation in heaven. All confessed themselves unable to meet the tests of Christian dogma which prevailed in their time, but all were ready for the welcome of Christ: "Come ye blessed of my Father. . . . For inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of these least, ye have done it unto me."

Of this practical obedience to the call for Christian service the Society of Friends has been a distinguished example. From this unassuming and often despised communion, rooted in the faith of mysticism, there has grown an almost unparalleled efflorescence of applied Christianity. No other Christian body was so soon or so consistently committed to the cause of anti-slavery. In 1688 the Friends of Germantown offered the first official protest presented by any religious body on this subject. In 1783 the first English petition for the abolition of the slave-trade was laid by Quakers before the House of Commons. The same sense of humane responsibility has led the Friends to their conspicuous service of the Negro, the Indian, and the Oriental; to the free and undenominational education of both sexes in schools and colleges; and to leadership in the movement, now at last world-wide, for the abolition of war, and of the almost equally ruinous wastefulness of the preparation for war—a wastefulness which now, it is said, involves the six Great Powers of Europe in an expenditure of more than one and one-half thousand millions of dollars a year. A communion whose cornerstone is the essential integrity and spiritual potentiality

of the humblest human soul, cannot view without protest this degradation of humanity, or surrender its faith in the final triumph of reason even among the ruthless ambitions of political affairs.

Among such witnesses of mysticism in action there are two of such pre-eminence that they must be specially recalled. The work of Elizabeth Fry in the prisons of England was equally remarkable for what it found, for what it accomplished, and for the agent of reformation. It found a condition both of law and of discipline incredibly mediaeval and shocking; a law prescribing no less than three hundred crimes, even such as the robbing of a hen-roost or the larceny of five shillings, as punishable by death; and a conduct of prison discipline so incredibly brutal and debasing that jail-fever and jail-madness were almost equally familiar. It accomplished the transformation of the law of England from one of revenge to one of reformation; rescuing from the gallows all offenders except those guilty of another's life or treason to the State; ending the disgraceful history of England's convict-ships and convict-settlements, and converting the behavior of women in prison from that of brawling mendicants to that of restrained and self-governed penitents. Most remarkable of all was the personality through whom this epoch-making work was done. Mrs. Fry was bred in the tranquil environment of English affluence, a Gurney of Earlham, descended from Friends through both parents, the great-granddaughter of Robert Barclay. She became the wife of a wealthy merchant and the mother of twelve children. No circumstances could have appeared less suggestive of heroism or sacrifice. Her life seemed completely preoccupied by maternal obligations and by devotion to the stricter practices of the Society of Friends. Publicity offended her taste and enthusiasm was foreign to her habit of mind. Yet the call to service was irresistible and the word of

her Master was in her ears: "I was in prison and ye visited me." The filthy wards of Newgate became the scene of her cleansing ministries, and the Inner Light which illuminated her face shone into the hearts of the depraved and condemned. Mysticism was not only consistent with action, but gave to it a composure, fortitude, and assurance which made their impression equally on the felon in her cell and the Queen on her throne.

Even more notable in its fusion of feeling and action was the work of John Bright. Up and down Great Britain he preached the gospel of popular liberty, the rights of the plain people, the iniquity of a tax on bread, the extension of the franchise, and the cause of the North in our Civil War; and unlike most agitators and reformers he lived to see all the causes which he loved triumphant, and to receive the almost universal admiration of a career which had begun amid the clamor of opposition and contempt. Yet throughout all those years of unremitting contention and protest, Bright was sustained by the habits and instincts bred in the Society of Friends. "He always remained a Friend," says his biographer, "both in his heart and his life." "Religious feeling was the very basis of his life." "He practised the silence of his sect and drew thence the strength of his soul, the purity of his heart, and the quality of his speech." Lord Morley said that "the most impressive and pure piece of religion he ever witnessed was John Bright reading a chapter of the Bible to his maid servants, shortly after his wife's death, in his beautiful and feeling voice, followed by the Quaker silence." What a revelation is here of the source of Bright's political wisdom, and even of his unrivalled eloquence! Behind the stream of his argument lay the fountain of his feeling. Through his work as agitator was revealed his detachment from self-interest and pride. His invective was tempered by quietude of spirit. His social programme expressed

his faith in the capacity of each humble human soul. His politics were the flower of his religion.

These indications of the nature and possibilities of mysticism are not without instructiveness, even for those whose religious habits may be very remote from that of the Society of Friends. Mysticism as a religious practice has proved itself unadapted to many, probably to most, Christian lives. The average experience cannot rise into this high region unaided, and demands the spiritual support of external, visible, and authoritative standards or forms. Priesthoods, rituals, ceremonies, and creeds sustain many a life which cannot trust itself. Mysticism is thus a faith for the elect, adequate for those only who need no support but God. To these the unbroken silence is more eloquent than the most stately ritual, the presence of God more convincing than any creed concerning him, and the Quaker Meeting, not bare and empty, but rich and full with the Eternal Presence. Yet, even for those not disciplined in this surrender of silence, the mystic's faith must remain the beginning of spiritual efficiency. Nothing can be a sufficient substitute for this personal assurance of the Inner Light. All the externalities of religion are scaffoldings which steady the structure while it is building, but other foundation can no man lay than the life of God in the soul of man. It is not an accident that in many Anglican churches, and this year in a cathedral of the Protestant Episcopal Church, provision has been made for a Friends' Meeting, that amid the elaboration of ritual which to many minds is the best interpreter of Christian faith, there may be the even more profound appeal of silence, simplicity, and self-surrender. By so much as the religious life is a tradition or a dictation instead of an experience, by so much it remains a shaky, tremulous, and temporary possession. By so much as any life attains this personal communion, by so much is its faith secured against the

storms of change, and as the scaffoldings of authority or conformity fall away the simple stability of the Christian character is revealed. On this foundation one may build as he please, wood, stubble, or precious stones, and each man's work will be tested by the fire of experience; but beneath all diversities of Christian ministrations lies this fundamental fact of the need of man for God and the answer of God to man. The Apostle says that in the Jewish Law a veil was interposed between the soul and God; "which veil was taken away by Christ." That is what happens when one passes from conformity to communion, from the external authority to the inward witness. A veil is taken away, and with unveiled face the worshipper beholds the glory of God and may be changed into the same image.

Here, then, is the place of mysticism in modern life. It does not satisfy the common and legitimate desire for intellectual definiteness or for aesthetic persuasion. A reasonable, prosaic, work-a-day religion, adapted to a practical world, may have in it little of mysticism, and may even view the mystic's practices of piety with an amused contempt. Mysticism, either in its passionate fervor or its silent restraint, is likely to remain a privilege of the initiated, an inner shrine of confidence which many do not presume to enter. It is not every one who can satisfy his piety with Whittier's confession:

> "In calm and cool and silence once again
> I find my old accustomed peace among
> My brethren, where perchance no human tongue
> Shall utter words; where never hymn is sung,
> Nor deep-mouthed organ blown, nor censer swung,
> Nor dim light falling through the pictured pane.
> There, syllabled by silence, let me hear
> The still small voice which reached the prophet's ear."

Yet, when it comes to those conclusive evidences of character and completely generous types of service, where

utility, expediency, and even obligation, halt and nothing is effective but a sheer self-effacing committal of life to its best, then that complete quietude of spirit which steadies and lifts conduct out of self-consideration and pride can be derived from nothing but the habitual consciousness of a Divine will to which one habitually submits the problems of life.

"The true mystic quest," it has been lately pointed out in a most erudite and brilliant study of Mysticism, "may as well be fulfilled in the market as in the cloister; by Joan of Arc on the battle-field as by Simeon Stylites on his pillar"; by "energetic no less than contemplative powers." "The real achievements of Christian mysticism are more clearly seen in Catherine of Siena regenerating her native city, Joan of Arc leading the armies of France, Ignatius creating the Society of Jesus, Fox giving life to the Society of Friends, than in all the ecstasies and austerities of the Egyptian 'fathers in the desert.'"[2]

That fusion of mystic communion with ethical passion, of the energetic and the contemplative powers meets us in its purity when we trace the spiritual experience of Jesus Christ. Not a church, or a creed, or a form, sustained his spirit and made sacrifice a joy, but the habitual intimacy with his Father, and the convincing call to do the Father's will. "I seek not mine own will, but the will of him that sent me." "I have finished the work which Thou gavest me to do." "Father, not my will, but Thine be done." To lack this consciousness of mystical communion may not be to fail of conventional conformity, or of respectable morality, but it may well meet the Master's judgment of those who depended on external sanctions and supports, "Yet hath he not root in himself; for, when tribulation or persecution ariseth because of the word, by and by he is offended." To have that root

[2] E. Underhill, The Mystic Way, 1913, p. 45 ff.

in oneself is to secure a vigorous and varied growth both of thought and of action. To feel oneself an instrument is to do one's work with a keen edge. Philosophy is most convincing when the mystic's experience enriches the reason; action is noblest when the Inner Light shines through the self-effacing deed. "Peace," a Friend has written, "is just as much a positive and vivid experience as pain. It is not the cessation of experience, but the reconciliation of the soul to the Master-Power." That was the discovery which made Florence Nightingale, at the end of a life of intense activity and masterful administration, find her peace in the words of a sixteenth century mystic: "True religion is to have no other will but God's." "Mysticism," the same servant of humanity said at another time, "is but a hard word for the Kingdom of God within."

THE MOTIVE OF INDIVIDUALISM IN RELIGION

WARNER FITE

Bloomington, Indiana

"We read in the Book of Genesis that, after our first ancestors had eaten of the tree of knowledge, the Lord God said, 'Behold, this man has become *as one of us*, to know good and evil.' . . . Before this first 'enlightenment,' the Lord God was alone to be considered, and the man could be regarded as a mere instrument for his satisfaction. But this was now forever out of the question. He might be managed by hope of Heaven or fear of Hell; he might even be destroyed; but as long as he retained the power to know, he constituted by that very fact an end in himself, an 'other' even for the Lord God, and he could be moved, or morally obliged, only by an appeal to his personal interests."

"No individual can, therefore, with a clear consciousness of what he is choosing, consent to be eternally damned—either for the glory of God, as the older gospel put it, or for the glory of society, as it stands in the gospel of today. If the glory of God is not also my glory and the salvation of society is not also my salvation, then God and society are necessarily strangers to me, and their good can be for me neither a moral obligation nor a psychologically conceivable motive."

These passages, which I have printed elsewhere,[1] I venture to reproduce on the ground that they state, if somewhat baldly, not indeed all that is important for an individualistic philosophy, but what is most distinctive and necessary. And thus they enable us to see the full dimensions of the question which I shall endeavor to answer, namely, whether the spirit of a free man is compatible with that reverence for the universe and desire for unity with the universe, conceived always as a personal universe—or, more concretely, with that worship

[1] Individualism, New York, 1911, pp. 90 and 27.

and love of God—which I shall assume to be implied in any genuine religion. I need hardly say that the usual answer to the question would be negative. Those who stand firmly enough for the right of self-assertion in the presence of our fellows would be likely either to deny the authority of religion or at any rate to hold that self-assertion has properly no place there. And traditional Christianity, while teaching the doctrine of a personal relation to a personal God and, in the doctrine of personal immortality, affirming, almost distinctively, the worth of the individual soul, treats this worth, hardly as a right, but as a gift, and holds that though a man may stand upright in the presence of his fellows, in the presence of God his attitude must be one of self-abnegation and self-effacement—of submission. On the other hand, in Mr. Bertrand Russell's essay, *A Free Man's Worship*,[2] in which I should say that the *motif* of the "free man" is rendered for the most part admirably, it seems to be implied that a free man's religion is necessarily a religion of self-sufficiency. This states my question: Does the individualistic motive imply a spiritual self-sufficiency?

I

The question carries us back, to begin with, to the meaning of individualism as a social and ethical motive. And here it is clear that most of the historic formulations of individualism, especially those of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, presuppose an exclusive and self-sufficient individual. Mind your own affairs—do as you please—every man for himself—*laissez faire*—that government is best which governs least—such expressions imply, upon their face at least, that no individual is directly interested in his neighbor. The same implication is contained in the conception of an original

[2] Philosophical Essays, London, 1910.

"state of nature" antecedent to the formation of society, whether we think of it as a state of warfare, with Hobbes, or as a state of moral purity, with Rousseau. While a more idealistic motive may be found for most of these expressions, the element of authority that is put forward and made prominent, even as a basis for "reason," is that of natural instinct. By nature the human individual is impatient of restraint; he is exclusive and self-sufficient; and, therefore, his good as well as his freedom consists in being "let alone." In such an exclusive being there appears to be no ground either for a love of God or for a love of his fellow-man.

Or for moral obligation. It is this "isolated individual" of the older individualism that accounts for the present tendency, both in popular philosophy and in the philosophy of the schools, to claim that the sum and substance of morality is to be "social." In this view "individualism" becomes a synonym for vice, the idea being that the essence of all immorality lies in the taint of self-regard. Yet for moral support this social conception of morality appeals, not less than the older individualism, to the authority of instinct; and even more distinctly in so far as it seeks the help of the biological doctrine of natural selection to prove, as Professor Dewey puts it, that all our instincts are directed outward—upon objects. Socially speaking, this means that in the order of nature our instincts are created for the welfare and preservation, not of ourselves, but of our kind. And from this is drawn the ethical inference that virtue consists in self-forgetfulness and self-sacrifice for the common good.

Such is the current antithesis between individualism and the social conception of morality. In my opinion both conceptions rest upon an incoherent, if not indeed a crudely materialistic notion of the relations of individuals in society. In both I should say that attention is

concentrated upon the irrelevant idea of a spatial group to the entire exclusion of the condition necessary to constitute a society, namely, the consciousness of individuals of one another. When we speak of the "isolated individual" (with the implication that individuality consists in isolation), and conceive that individual freedom consists in being let alone, we are thinking of society as a group or aggregate of mere bodies, of which each must be separated from the others by an interval of empty space if it is to be marked off, not indeed as an individual but as a unit; for no individual can be regarded as "isolated" who knows his fellows and is known by them. And when we conceive that social unity necessarily implies self-sacrifice, what we have in mind is not the unity of personal sympathy, but the kind of unity that is attempted when, for example, two bodies seek to occupy the same space or swallow the same food. If we remember that the essentially social relation consists not in spatial aggregation but in spiritual communication, we shall see that there is no necessary connection between social unity and self-sacrifice. The "rule of the road" should be enough to suggest that one of the first fruits of communication is freedom for each to go his own way.

Nor is there any implication of self-sacrifice in the fact that human beings are by nature social. When Aristotle says that man is a "political animal," he means simply that man above all other animals is so constructed as to find his good in the society of his fellows. And this is shown most conspicuously when men come together, not for purposes of commerce or protection, but for recreations and games. Here the "social" motive is pure and undefiled. Yet no one enters a game for the purpose of losing to his fellows; on the other hand, no one cares to play a game with any but his friends. And in calling man a distinctively "political" animal, what

Aristotle has prominently in mind is our possession of organs of speech—as well as of hearing. In other words, man above all other animals is fitted for *conscious communication* with his fellows. And this brings us again to the point that the significance either of the individual or of society is a question, not of units nor of groups, but of consciousness.

This I take to be the logical motive of individualism; this is the ground upon which I stand for the supreme worth of the individual. The right of the individual to assert himself rests, not upon natural instinct, not upon his bodily separateness from others, but solely upon the fact (and it is valid only so far as this is the fact) that he is a conscious agent, who not only acts but knows what he is doing, not only moves but knows whither he is moving, and is thus so far enabled to choose his own ends and to direct his own way. In a word, the logical basis of individualism is not "nature," but self-consciousness. No authority resides in natural instinct. A heedless good nature is as valueless morally as a blind selfishness, and not more lovely. The moral question is not a question merely of how we are constructed; it is not a question of fact, but of value. But value is constituted by consciousness. To know is to evaluate; to be known is to be of value. A watch is of value only to one who knows what it is. If the watch knew itself it would have a value for self and the right to assert itself. Now man (so far as we know) is distinguished from all other animal species by the fact he alone is self-conscious to any considerable degree. Those who seek ethical illumination in the conception of man as a biological species seem to forget that man is the only species that can be said to have a history, a culture, a science, a society. In a word, man is the only animal who knows that he is an animal. Upon this ground, and upon this alone, rests the right, or the possibility, of regarding the wel-

fare of our race as an end. But this race self-consciousness is but the counterpart of an even more distinct individual self-consciousness which compels each of us to regard himself as an end.

To see that this logical motive stands for a genuinely ethical fact, we have only to turn our attention to the institution of marriage. From a biological standpoint the sex-instinct, with its peculiar intensity and pervasiveness, is simply an admirable arrangement of nature for the perpetuation of the species. The current "social" theory of ethics rests for the most part upon biological grounds; and these also are the grounds which underlie the programs of eugenics and the denunciations of "race-suicide." The assumption is that nature, like the stock-breeder, "so careful of the type she seems, so careless of the single life," cares nothing for the personal relation. And in animal marriage, in which personal choice may be supposed to play a rather small part and passing gratification the greater part, it must be admitted that the personal relation seems unimportant. Here indeed marriage may well be regarded as a means for the ends of others. But to any man or woman about to marry, the preservation of the race is a matter of last importance, and even the raising of a family is only secondary. For them marriage is first of all the realization of the demands of their personal lives. If this be dismissed as mere "self-absorption," then we may point out that the sacredness attached to this personal relation is widely regarded as a fair measure for estimating the status of any form of morality or religion. Not that other ends are excluded. On the contrary, I should say that there must be few persons for whom parenthood is not an important part of self-realization. The point is that the moment I become conscious of an instinct working within me, a new end has appeared; in the consciousness of self a new person is created; and whatever may

have been the purpose of the instinct for others, its purpose is now mine, to be fulfilled as I shall discover to be best for me. As a self-conscious person, I am no longer a means for alien ends but an end in myself.

Individualism stands, then, not for the license of unrestraint but for the dignity of the personal life. To be a person is to be self-conscious. As compared with any of the lower animals, every normal human being must be regarded as distinctively a person; and thus, with Kant, we should say that nothing is more intolerable than the subjection of one human will to another. But even within the range of human life there is a wide variation in the degree to which a will may be said to be personal rather than purely instinctive or animal. In the logic of individualism a will is personal so far as it is self-conscious, reflective, and thoughtful. To give a definite meaning to a much abused word, individualism stands for the rights of "personality." And thus it reflects the point of view of a humane culture as opposed to that of a naturalistic science. In the vocabulary of misuse "culture" is often associated with narrowness of sympathies, while "humanity" is identified with bare animality. We excuse our fellow who yields to sensuous impulse on the ground that he is "merely human." In the vocabulary of individualism "human" and "animal" are terms of contrast. And the point of contrast lies in the fact that the human being knows himself. His action is a matter, not of force but of motive, not of causes but of reasons. This is what I mean by culture. Not that an individualist claims to hold a monopoly of thoughtfulness. The issue lies between outer fact and inner meaning. Naturalistic theories of life are based exclusively upon the outer fact as *observed* in the behavior of others. Individualism takes its stand upon the meaning as *experienced* in the consciousness of living, and holds that the meaning is always personal and

individualistic. Culture is the development of that meaning.

Such I take to be the *motif* of self-assertion, the *motif* which in the end underlies all of the forms of individualism. The rationalism of Kant, the irrationalism of Nietzsche, the crude utilitarianism of *laissez faire* and "every man for himself," are only so many attempts to state the significance of a self-conscious being as an end in himself. How one such end is to be co-ordinated with another in a social order, would be a chapter in itself. Here I shall only suggest in passing that, while the world is full of the sacrifice of ends to ends, this sacrifice is nevertheless everywhere diminished to the extent that men clearly grasp their own ends and have a sympathetic insight into the ends of their neighbors. The development of such insight constitutes the meaning of culture and civilization. And except as our personal ends are completely realized, not merely treated each as one in a quantitative apportionment, the social problem is not solved.

Here, however, we are concerned chiefly with the individualistic motive. When we fix our attention upon the implications of self-consciousness, it becomes clear, I think, that while self-consciousness implies self-assertion, there is no implication of self-sufficiency or exclusiveness. Rather must we say that the *consciousness* of self involves necessarily a consciousness of outer realities and at the same time of personal needs that call for real satisfactions. And it is only in the deeper aspirations of *self* that we are able to conceive of greatness in our fellow-men. Hence I should say that there is nothing in a philosophy of self-assertion which is incompatible with modesty and reverence. As an intelligent man I do not pretend to know more than my physician, though before following his advice I may insist upon being convinced. Nor may I refuse to

respect Hegel because I fail to understand him, though I shall decline to accept as my own what I do not understand. These are feeble illustrations, but they may serve to suggest that an infinite reverence for wisdom and goodness is not incompatible with a sense of our own responsibility and worth.

Nor is self-assertion incompatible with a generous sympathy for our fellows. On the contrary, I should say that the need for sympathetic intercourse with our fellows is one of the foundation-stones of an individualistic philosophy. No one can satisfy himself, materially or spiritually, in an empty world. In an empty world no one can assert himself. It lies in the very nature of the individualistic motive that the "others" that we seek are personal. And, on the other hand, only an intensively self-conscious person can love with sincerity and conviction. Individualism rejects a self-effacing love and demands that love be reciprocal. But for an individualistic philosophy the very essence and quintessence of "life" is to be found in the responsive communication of mind with mind. In this lies the real significance and worth, the genuinely "social" value, of all co-operative activity.

Just for this reason, however, will an individualist refuse to commit himself to all the interests that are recommended to him as "social." And in this point lies the practical significance of individualism as against the current "social" conception of morality. It seems to me that much of what is called "social" at the present time is merely expansive. Individualism is intensive, and holds that, in any genuine sense, the relations of men are social only so far as they know one another, and therefore that a relation ceases to be social so far as it ceases to be personal. *Nil humani a me alienum*—this I may say truthfully and even longingly. But everything is alien to me which lies outside of my imagination.

I cannot be said truly to love a brother who is only a social unit; and to bestow a dispersive affection upon "humanity," filling my life with ends to which individually I can give but scant personal attention, is to dissipate the very essence of life and to make our human existence, full indeed of activity and bustle but spiritually mean. How one may best distribute one's attention is a matter of personal equation. From an individualistic standpoint, every extension of fellowship makes life only the richer. But no fellowship is genuine except so far as it is a meeting of minds.

II

I have pointed out that the development of self-consciousness is culture. In the deepest implications of self-consciousness we pass from culture to religion. From an individualistic point of view, religion is simply the further extension of that logic of self-importance which issues from the self-consciousness of the cultivated man. But here again it is all-important to remember that self-consciousness is not, and cannot be, self-absorption. To be self-conscious is only to be intensively thoughtful and reflective. Strictly speaking, I should hold, all consciousness is in its measure both a process of reflection and a consciousness of self. But we properly emphasize the *self*-consciousness of the deeper and more deliberate acts of reflection because here, in the more vivid sense of the presence of *realities*, we become more vividly aware of ourselves as contemplating these realities. There is a common tendency, however, to assume that a reflective attitude involves an absence of contact with reality. This was never more clearly exhibited than in the "social" emphasis of our time, which in countless ways expresses the idea that culture is the antithesis of life. I cannot but believe that this is

a superficial inference from the fact that a thinking man is committed to a certain degree of *physical* solitariness and is apt to be much occupied with books. Only a moment's reflection is needed to see that a man who reads books is in contact with men, and with a wider circle of men than he who does not read. And except in an irrelevant physical sense, no man can be said to be in contact with the men of his own time and place except as he knows them; nor does he know them deeply, except as (after the fashion of serious literary criticism) he knows them self-consciously. Now just as, upon the ordinary plane, our consciousness of our fellows is the counterpart of our consciousness of self, so, I should say, is the consciousness of the larger realities of philosophy and religion the fruit of those moments in which the consciousness of self is keenest and most vivid—when, for example, I pause to face the inevitable fact that I shall die, and that to future generations all that you and I find worth while will seem as ghostly and unreal as to us the life of the Dark Ages. No man, says William James, can steadily contemplate the fact of his own death. Indirectly, this may serve to remind us how rarely we really face the eternal realities, and at the same time how rarely our consciousness comes really "home."

All religion is thus the outcome of a deeper self-consciousness; it is this deeper self-consciousness which brings us face to face with the eternal realities. I have pointed out that man alone among the animals may be said to have a history or a culture. It is an anciently accepted belief that he alone is capable of having a religion—because, we may now say, he alone is a self-conscious person. Animal life, so far as we can see, has a very limited range either of memory or of anticipation. We have only to think of this to see how remote from the stage of animal life must be, not only

the sense of personality, but any questions regarding either the significance of the person or the significance of the world. The significance of the world is a question only for one who can raise the question of his ultimate personal fate; and for him the world can have no meaning which does not include a full meaning for himself. In other words, not only are the belief in God and the belief in personal immortality generally found together as a matter of historical fact; they belong together in the logic of our self-consciousness. For, in the last analysis, religious belief is simply the largest implication to be drawn from ourselves as conscious beings. A religion of individualism rests upon the ground that consciousness is throughout personal.[3]

Hence I should say that an individualist would be bound to reject as unbelievable any form of religious belief which failed to provide an eternal, and an eternally distinct, meaning for his personal self. And thus he would reject the religion of absolute idealism of Professor Bosanquet's Gifford Lectures, in which "all that matters is the whole," and the whole is likewise the only genuine person or individual. This doctrine he would condemn as in contradiction to the meaning of that experience of personality from which absolute idealism is derived. Thus also he would reject those oriental religions which, upon grounds emotional or intellectual, place our highest good in the extinction of the self, or (with Mr. Bradley) conceive that the personal self is to be realized in a higher and superpersonal reality. In an individualistic philosophy there may be many degrees of the personal, but nothing higher than the personal; and whatever conception we may form of the

[3] Scientific psychology to the contrary. In speaking, however, of "impersonal mental states," I should say that we are thinking, not of any fact of consciousness, but of some one of the several objects used by psychologists to "represent" consciousness, such as an image (in a mirror), a photograph, a book, or a piece of writing—something which can convey an idea or represent an object to a thinking person, but which itself knows nothing.

universe as a personal reality, monistic or pluralistic, whether God be one person or many, or many and also one, *this* person who has now emerged in self-consciousness, is, with all his ignorance and shortcomings, a person once for all, and any reality in which his distinctness is obscured will be, not higher, but lower. Finally, I should say that an individualist would be bound to reject any interpretation of Christianity in which the significance of the individual were conceived, not as a right, eternally won by the creative power of his self-consciousness, but as a matter of grace; any interpretation in which the individual is conceived to save his life by losing it—to gain eternal life by extinguishing his individuality; or any in which the individual is conceived as a means for the glory of God. After our first ancestors had eaten of the tree of knowledge, the Lord God said, "Behold this man has become as one of us, to know good and evil." *As one of us*—this seems to me to embody in a most striking way the logic of the situation. A being who knows can no longer be regarded as a means for the ends of any others. As a knowing being he holds an eternal place, as one of us, in the kingdom of ends.

Equally, on the other hand, would an individualist be bound to reject a religion of mere emotion, a religion of desirable experience, such as that commonly offered by the psychology of religion; or a pragmatic religion, as proposed by William James, which is content to accept God as a satisfying conception. In the logic of self-consciousness no experience is significant except as it is revealing, and no desire is satisfied except by an "other." In this sense an individualist is an "intellectualist," and holds that all that gives dignity to experience, and marks it off from digestion, is the illumination of idea. Immersion in mere "experience," even religious experience, is but one form of intoxication among others. Nor is "morality touched by emotion" better than, but only

rather worse than morality untouched by emotion—except as "emotion" stands for a cognitive contact, however vague, with a larger reality. "Intellectualism," as I conceive it, does not compel us to deny that "emotion" may be cognitive. Intellectualism is merely a conscientious attempt to give to all of our experience a coherent meaning and a logical justification—to bring it to the test of truth. This is not to make light of religious experience, but only to insist that religious experience is meaningless except as it is a revelation of the divine.

And upon similar grounds an individualist would refuse to be satisfied with a religion which is merely sociological—a religion of humanity. In the church in recent years it seems that the trend of things has been in the direction of putting society in the place of God, of substituting social betterment for personal religion, and business management for other-worldliness. Precisely the same trend is indicated in the tendency of our colleges to substitute utilitarian and vocational ends for intellectual discipline and liberal culture. Both tendencies are the outcome of a view of life controlled by the point of view of naturalistic, positive science. And it is hard to escape the conviction that, in the church and the college no less than in the laboratory of research, this emphasis upon the social and practical covers a large measure of scepticism with regard to the more spiritual realities of culture and religion.

Individualism expresses the point of view of an intensive self-consciousness. Such a standpoint is not hostile to a generous humanitarianism, but it stands first for the spiritual significance of humanity, for human welfare as a spiritual rather than a barely economic fact, and for "life" as the activity of a self-conscious agent rather than a merely "vital process." Traditionally, the church has expressed this point of view in assuming that its

special function was to focus the attention of its members not so much upon "life" as upon death—in other words, upon their eternal rather than their merely temporal significance. And a similar point of view has been expressed by the schools in assuming that their function was to introduce the men of here and now to the best thought of other places and other ages. I have already suggested that much that is presented as "social" might properly be called "expansive," and to a cultivated man much of it seems merely superficial. The very first attempt to find ourselves, through a process of reflection, shows us that the humanity to which we belong is far wider than the humanity of here and now, or of vaguely "future generations," upon which the attention is focussed in the so-called social standpoint. Any sympathetic insight into the meaning of the literature and philosophy of past times must lead one to feel that there is something peculiarly obtuse in the notion that the past is dead; or that a present unillumined by the past (however determined by it) can properly be called life. In our own time we are confronted by a positivistic science which thinks that it has finally purged the world of fact from the taint of human motives. Nothing would more quickly disturb this belief than a study of its obligations to the logic and metaphysics of Aristotle; and nothing would do more towards revealing the significance of our science for life and for culture.

Passing from culture to religion, I need only point out that any stage of reflection which reaches the question of our ultimate fate as individuals must inevitably reveal to us that each of us is in the presence of a reality much greater in scope than the scope of humanity. To my mind the problem of religion is nowhere more clearly or decisively suggested than in the gulf between the two things which filled the soul of Kant with ever increasing wonder and reverence: "The starry heavens above me

and the moral law within me." In the logic of the situation these two stand at the opposite ends of the universe; and thus they enable us to grasp in our imagination the full scope of the problem known as the problem of religion and science. For the objects commonly studied by physics, chemistry, and biology, and even by geology, are all by comparison familiar and home-like, and many of them are our blood relations. It is the astronomical universe, yet not the universe as seen in the calm beauty of a star-lit night but the universe as pictured in the imagination of the astronomer, terrifying in its vastness, prostrating in its total impersonality and absence of reference to anything human—it is the contemplation of this picture that stirs the deepest questionings regarding the fate of the soul. Here we are bidden to remember that the earth, which is to us so vast, is but one of the minor planets in one of countless systems; that only very recently, geologically and astronomically speaking, has the earth supported life, and yet that the human race has existed for several hundred thousand years. But only for a few thousand years does the race seem to have been very human or to have had any clear consciousness of itself as a race; and of the millions upon millions of souls who have lived during this historic period, for each of whom doubtless, as for you and me, his own life and the fate of his own soul has seemed to be the central and important fact of the universe, the names of only a few survive. What, then, does the world know about you or me? What, indeed, is the whole realm of life but a fortuitous concourse of atoms at one point in an infinity of space and time?

And yet—"the moral law within us." For the sweeping impetus of this naturalistic point of view is suddenly checked before the fact that here alone (as we see it), in this small corner of the universe, do we find bodies that not only move but know that they move, and, in-

stead of yielding to alien "laws of nature," direct their own movements. In this fact of self-consciousness lies "the moral law within us." And before this fact the majestic vastness of the astronomical universe seems to fade into relative insignificance. For if we are to speak of *significance*, if the majesty of the universe is not merely a matter of size, then here alone, in the life of men, and most of all in the life of thoughtful men, lies the revelation of significance. This is the starting-point for all affirmations of significance; this alone reveals the "majesty" of the universe. And not only for significance, but for positive character. For it is not only the grandeur of the universe that reflects our humanity; a human point of view is equally implied in every detail of its description.

What, then, does the contrast mean? Is our self-consciousness a merely exceptional and fortuitous fact? Personally, I find it difficult to conceive what such a statement would mean. Or are we to say that our consciousness of self is a revelation, not merely of our own nature, but of the nature of the universe; in other words, that "nature," as apprehended by natural science, is but one manifestation of a universe which is essentially living and personal and takes account of us? This, I should say, is the problem for a religious belief. For individualism not less than for any other philosophy of life, the possibility of religion depends upon the answer to this question.

And therefore, with a hearty sympathy for the spirit of the "free man" expressed in Mr. Russell's essay, *A Free Man's Worship*, I am unable to see that his view of the universe furnishes any justification either for freedom or for worship. Mr. Russell, seeing in the universe nothing but pitiless force, calls upon man "to sustain alone . . . the world that his own ideals have fashioned," "proudly defiant of the irresistible

forces that tolerate, for a moment, his knowledge and his condemnation." But neither in politics nor in religion can freedom consist in walking alone. "Freedom of speech" would be only travestied by permission to print a newspaper which no one would read. The demand for freedom is a demand to be heard and to receive the response of a fellow. Even the Stoics, whose philosophy Mr. Russell's closely resembles, justified their freedom and their scorn of the (external) world on the ground that the universe is fundamentally rational. Through the rationality of the universe their freedom became effective. There is no freedom in an empty world, and no final freedom of the spirit in a world that takes no account of us. In a world of significance we may assert our significance, and each of us his own significance, without qualification; if anything is significant, I am significant. If, however, our human culture is but a passing cosmic phenomenon, then—then, indeed, the most rational attitude we can take (if any attitude be rational) is not to take ourselves seriously. We may find pleasure and profit in cultivating a kindly humanity, but to give to our social relations the dignity of religion is merely to remind ourselves that in the last analysis they are lacking in significance.

So much for the logic of the individualistic motive. I have made no attempt to present this motive in the warmer light of concrete personal experience. But I have tried to show that the motive fundamental to individualism is personal life. In religion individualism stands for the eternal and distinct significance of the personal self; but this very self-assertion expresses an infinite thirst for the kind of satisfaction that we get in living communion with personal "others." Religion expresses that infinite need of life which is inevitable to a self-conscious being. In the tumult of daily living the need may be forgotten in an eager absorption in the

present, or it may lose courage under the burden of dismaying responsibilities, when life seems an illusion and eternity unreal; but when in a quiet hour we are at home with ourselves, then I think that to each of us it seems nothing less than calamitous that there should be any part of the life of the universe which you and I, each in his own person, may not actively and self-consciously share. But life is at once knowledge and love. These two motives, which for Plato expressed the meaning of philosophy and made philosophy divine, are mutually implied in the consciousness of self; and both are contained in the motive of personality. In religion individualism seeks that infinity of personal knowledge and personal love which is expressed in the love of God.

DRUNKENNESS

ROBERT A. WOODS

South End House, Boston

The familiar process of the elimination of factors from a confused equation is bringing a new stage of progress and of hope in dealing with the form of delinquency which is most distinctive of the English-speaking nations. Until now the forces of alcoholism have nearly always been given the choice of weapons. Too often unreason and ill-restraint have been matched against their like, with the result of only further intrenching the hostile power.

The nature of the evil that goes with the harmful use of liquors is being analyzed. Such use is a vice; but it is not all a vice. It quickly becomes in large part a disease. The chemical effect of alcohol upon body and brain, certainly when taken in other than minute quantities, sets up a morbid condition and undermines self-control at a rate far more rapidly and to a far greater degree than even the enlightened conscience could anticipate. Alcohol gives wings to evil intention, sweeps the will far beyond where it had intended to go, and leaves it much less capable of recovery, than would any normal exercise of an evil choice—if the phrase may be allowed. It is impossible to study many cases of inebriety without reaching the clear conviction that though the inebriate does loosen the foundations of the tower which falls upon him, he can have had no remotely adequate conception of the burden with which he was to be crushed.

Such an approach to the subject may remind us that up to a century ago insanity was looked upon as nothing but a weird, dehumanized type of moral reprobation.

The beginning of humane and penetrating consideration for the insane came as it was understood that their condition was not an unconscionable one, and that the persistent and comprehensive application of remedial and hygienic methods could mitigate and sometimes bring to an end what had been thought to be a hopeless condition.

Today the thick and almost desperate fog of alcoholism—which often seems to penetrate all our minds and make us incompetent of incisive thought with regard to it—is being shot through by the thousand rays that are generated by the new convergence of science with sympathy. The results of this *Aufklärung* are beginning to show themselves in every one of the intricate and vexing complications with which the use of alcohol afflicts personality and civilization. This new light, in a sense, does not make the problem less difficult. It does not suggest that a less degree of concern than now exists with regard to it will be adequate. It rather indicates the need of larger resources and deeper devotion. But it gives assurance that there are concrete lines of action, which, if thoroughly followed out, will at no distant day bring profound and far-reaching gains.

The setting of alcoholism off by itself as a disease at once leads to a further step in the analysis. Fundamentally alcoholism is but the highly exaggerated expression of an antecedent morbid condition of the nervous system. Alcoholism gives such a condition scope and momentum which by itself it would never have. Alcoholism reacts upon the inner state, greatly intensifying it. But when all this has been allowed for, the underlying difficulty, which would exist apart from any alcoholic habit, is a trouble of the mind. This is the key-note in all treatment of alcoholic patients; and to the discerning practitioner it suggests that all the ingenuities of medical therapy must have their climax in a moral appeal to the sovereign will. The method would

seem to be to bring the machinery of human intelligence and co-operation to bear upon the super-effects of the man's fault, and after helping him clear away these, to bring the incitement for the better choice to his self-afflicted soul.

Along with a more inward knowledge of the nature of alcoholism has come a much more discerning measure of its social results. The whole system of laws covering the use and effects of alcoholic drinks seems to proceed from the possibility of violent crime committed by intoxicated persons. While judicious people have recognized alcohol as the source of many evils besides crimes of violence, they have been apt to turn from such consideration lest they should be classed with the fanatical temperance reformer. In effect, therefore, the new attitude towards the results of the abuse of alcohol is coming with a peculiar freshness of appeal to all sorts of people throughout the country. The direct results of the intoxicated state are now seen to represent only a minute fraction of the injury which is inflicted upon the community. Considering that all the serious phases of sexual immorality are involved deeply with intoxicating liquor, it is probably not too much to say that the specific tendency of human nature to throw the reins on the neck of its impulses by means of alcohol is responsible for a greater proportion of all the forms of degeneracy, including the birth of degenerate types, than all other causes put together.

A community so deeply alcoholized demands both to be studied minutely and exhaustively, and to be dealt with throughout from that point of view. It may be said that instead of such thorough diagnosis and any such statesmanlike program, we have had in the past only a sort of very determined application of exorcism; which has by no means been without its value, but could never touch the complication of keys that precipitate the

result and together can in the end prevent it. There is developing, under no centralized organization but with a keen community of interest, a comprehensive forward movement against the evils of alcoholism, which more or less consciously takes its suggestion from such a great public health campaign as that against tuberculosis.

In the first place, the treatment of individual cases of inebriety is being completely reconsidered and recast. Perhaps the best indication of this change may be given by an outline of the new system for the public treatment of drunkenness which has been developed by the State of Massachusetts during the past ten years.

Drunkenness associated with crime, vagrancy, or serious disorder continues to be punished in much the same way as before; but for alcoholism as a thing by itself there is a succession of three stages, all worked out from the new medical point of view with regard to drunkenness. Up to the number of two arrests in the course of a year, the young offender is dismissed the next morning after his arrest without being brought to trial. After that, on being arrested and brought to trial he is placed under probation in charge of a special officer of the court to whom he must report frequently, and who endeavors both to restrain and re-enforce him. If offences continue, a more definite punishment is felt to be needed, and a fine is imposed. The imposition of a fine, however, is not allowed to become equivalent to imprisonment. If the man is not able to pay his fine, his fine is made probationary. He is given a certain period under the charge of the probation officer in which to earn his fine. This procedure came about more easily when it was seen that to confine the drunkard who could not pay his fine was imprisonment not for drunkenness but in a sense for debt.

In due time, if the rake's progress continue, some form of institutional care becomes clearly advisable for the sake

not only of the man himself but of his family and of the community generally. At this stage comes the State Hospital for Inebriates at Norfolk. To this hospital men may either be committed by the courts, or, as happens now in three-fourths of the cases, they go voluntarily. The voluntary cases naturally have a decided advantage, as they come prepared to co-operate in their own treatment. In general this hospital is limited to men under forty years of age, or men who have not had a long history of alcoholism.

The Norfolk State Hospital has 1,000 acres of farm and wood land, and provides a variety of occupations in the open air the year round. There is in general a distinct feeling of loyalty on the part of the patients to the institution and its administration. While the system includes good food, productive work, and sound hygienic conditions generally, its chief reliance is upon a genuine personal relation between the physician and the patients, as they are called. The decisive effort on the part of the superintendent is gradually to gain the confidence of each man so as to be able finally to reach the skeleton in the closet; and there always is one—the sin, the sorrow, the indignity, the defeat—which is more or less consciously rankling at the centre of his being. The knowing physician, possessed of this secret through patient, unaffected fellow-feeling, can begin confidently to erect the scaffolding of a reconstructed life; and the man's soul, no longer transfixed within itself, begins to join gladly and with a sense of revelation in the labor. This, at any rate, is the history of a substantial proportion of cases.[1]

[1] Whether any of the various types of drug-treatment, for which so much is claimed, have any value, is a matter of doubt. In certain cases, drastic chemical action may for a short time restore the balance of nervous energy to the nerve centres, some of which have become congested, some atrophied. If the patient, during this interval, by summoning all his moral resources, can fasten his hold again upon a normal conception of life, he may have a favorable chance of recovery. But there can be little question that the best way to bring about and to confirm a sound moral perspective is through such all-around physical and moral hygiene as is practised under the Norfolk system.

After a stay of a few months the patient becomes acquainted with the after-care officer, also a physician, who, like the superintendent, chose his work for the love of it. He is put in possession of all the facts gained by the superintendent and his assistants with regard to the case. On the one hand, he proceeds to prepare the mind of the patient for going back into normal environment, and, on the other, he visits the man's family, his employer, his clergyman, and any helpful friends, so as to secure for him a reception that will be as conducive as possible to his welfare and progress. The after-care physician continues to visit each discharged patient for a period of months, so as to get for him the most out of every favoring influence.

Carefully collected statistics for the past five years show that twenty per cent. of the former patients have been completely abstinent, and another twenty per cent. have at least maintained a distinctly better standard of self-control than before their stay at the hospital. In due time it is to be hoped that in every community throughout the state there will be citizens who will be ready to take up the responsibility where the after-care physician leaves it. This would considerably reduce the number of those who return to the hospital a second or a third time; and it would—with the proposed development of a detention colony for confirmed cases where they should be kept under gentle constraint for life—effect a very marked decrease in the number of inebriates, which are so great a menace to nearly all communities.

These different stages of treatment, as worked out in a public experiment, no doubt represent broadly a method which will be adopted by private initiative. Certainly the probationary stage and the after-care stage challenge the study and aid of all responsible moral leaders in our local communities. They can in fact do much to raise the standard of intelligence and

training for the probation and parole service. In particular, the church has a distinctive opportunity; for the new developments in the treatment of alcoholic patients throw stronger emphasis than ever upon influences of religion, brought to bear in the light of psychological knowledge.

The two institutional stages, whether under public or private control, will however in large numbers of cases be a necessity. The hospital stage, aside from removing the inebriate from temptation, takes him out of the atmosphere made by those anxieties and importunities of undiscerning friends which seem only to fix the tendency more irrevocably. The detention colony stage, under humane direction, is clearly a mercy to all concerned.

The first step in any great public contest with disease is the care of the afflicted and the isolation of contagious cases; and be it remembered that in many subtle ways alcoholism is the central factor in a complication of infecting evils. The next step consists in the broadest, most exhaustive measures for removing liability to disease.

Here we need to aim directly at reducing those tendencies of mind and body which make easy victims for alcohol. It is one of the new principles of education that attention trained in one direction does not mean attention ready for application in every other direction. Attention must be trained to the specific subject. There must be an increasing number of persons on the staff of the churches, the schools, the charitable agencies, the specialized philanthropies, the secular benevolent associations, and perhaps, above all, the great manufacturing establishments, who shall for the prevention of intemperance urgently promote a varied, consecutive, comprehensive program for the care and enhancement of physical and moral vitality. No one who is at all

familiar with the growth of the system of social service in the large cities, but will recognize the great potencies which exist in it for the rearing up of a new generation which shall be distinctly less susceptible to alcoholic attack.[2] It cannot be taken for granted, however, that such a result will be gained and held in substantial degree unless every aspect of social reconstruction is under continuous experimental study with this precise end in view. In all the training of motherhood and the care of infant life, the medical inspection of children in the public schools, the preparation of children for appropriate vocations, the protection of adolescents against the peculiar and intense moral dangers that beset them, the organization of recreation for children and young people, and the guidance of their spiritual life—at every stage the program will provide that the specific tendencies towards alcoholism be specifically anticipated and intercepted. We may expect that the study of the psychology of alcoholism, which is proceeding rapidly in connection with curative efforts, will be constantly throwing back important clues for use in such preventive service.

The third phase of a wide and far-reaching public health campaign must be to remove so far as possible the chance of exposure to disease, to attack the provoking unit in all its dark lurking places. Alcohol has to all intents and purposes the same relation to the disease associated with it as have the germs of tuberculosis to the great white plague. It is true that the medium of alcoholism is appropriated voluntarily and that its dissemination is promoted under an enormously powerful business motive. But these facts do not affect the principle; they only complicate and baffle its application.

[2] There are some gratifying signs that organized industrial unrest, instead of dallying with alcoholism or assuming that it is a mere by-product of poverty, to be sloughed off by economic progress, is coming to recognize in it an intolerable obstacle to any working-class program.

Here too the method of patient, exhaustive analysis must be followed. The greater, more hurtful evils of the liquor trade must be set off by themselves, and separately disposed of. So much of the sentiment of the community as is ready and available for a single telling step must be organized for that step. As an instance of this policy, the so-called "bar and bottle" law on the Massachusetts statute book registered the conclusion that the sale of bottled whisky to the man who had already been drinking should not be permitted; and there is good reason for tracing to this law the lower rate in the increase of the figures for drunkenness in the state.

Perhaps the most striking fact in this connection is the changed attitude of the medical profession within very recent years as to the place of alcohol. Today the margin of utility or permissibility allowed by medical science to alcohol, whether as beverage or medicine, is narrowing almost to the vanishing point. On account of the psychological and ethical dangers involved, large numbers of men never previously committed to total abstinence are taking that position. Many of the foremost European scientists have become convinced abstainers and prohibitionists.

It seems not unlikely that practically all use of alcohol will be considered as producing the disease of alcoholism, and that within a generation the movement for the abolition of its public sale will be far advanced. To secure, to enforce, and to retain such a result will involve one of the most profound enterprises in moral organization and education which civilization has yet seen. Towards this great end every step in the struggle with any phase of the alcohol problem, even aside from its direct result, has its important contributory value. The final triumph will come when the man who has worked to protect his own home and neighborhood, the man who has resisted a danger to his own and his community's economic and

civic interests, begins to see that by universalizing such experience broad forms of prohibitory legislation and administration will become practicable and inevitable.

Each gain in the release of the individual from the fetters of the disease, in the community-prophylaxis that cuts down the number of the victims, in the restriction of the spread of the dangerous medium, means so much re-enforcement for the consummate victory. Underneath every sort of effort, however, should run the consciousness that the appetite for alcohol is but a blind outreaching for exaltation, for the fulfilment of life; and that so high a day of emancipation as that of the final release of the energies of a nation from alcohol can come only through opening up to the people all the avenues to more abundant life. The result so won will carry in itself the protection against any of the reactions that are sometimes threatened, and will have in it unexpected potencies for those other and further ends towards which social democracy is set. It is indeed not impossible that the movement against alcohol, with all its traditions of incoherence, may first exemplify the varied application of analytical social science gathered up into a "new synthesis," whose outcome shall be the equivalent of a revolution.

THE GROWTH OF THE INCARNATION

EDWARD S. DROWN

Episcopal Theological School, Cambridge, Mass.

The purpose of this article is to study the incarnation in ethical terms. And that means to study it as an ethical process, as concerning the whole life of Jesus. It is a common tendency to identify the incarnation with the conception or the birth of Jesus, to make it an event in a moment of time. As the atonement has too often been limited to the death of Jesus, instead of being treated as the outcome of his whole atoning life, so has the incarnation too often been limited to his birth. But if we are to treat it in ethical terms, we have to deal not simply with the incarnate birth but with the incarnate life.

The necessity of so regarding the incarnation results directly from the Christian belief in God as moral or personal. The incarnation is the expression of the Christian belief about God and man and the relation between them. It must therefore be expressed and interpreted in Christian terms. And the Christian belief is that God is a personal, a moral being, and that man is made in the image of God. Therefore the incarnation must itself be understood as personal and moral if it is to be understood in accordance with the Christian thought.

Now a physical event can be expressed as taking place in a moment of time, and the results that come from it as following in accordance with physical necessity. A clock made and wound up contains already in itself the whole process of its unwinding. So if the incarnation be regarded purely in physical terms, it may be identified with the moment of conception or birth, and the resulting

life will follow by a process of physical necessity. But if the incarnation be primarily moral and personal then it cannot take place all at once. All morality, as we know it, takes the form of time. It is essentially a process. Morality must grow if it is to be morality at all. The old theory that Adam was created perfectly righteous to start with is a theory of moral contradictions. Adam could no more have been created righteous than he could have been created thirty years old. Development in time is an essential quality of righteousness.

If the incarnation is to be the expression of the relation between God and man, it must then be expressed in moral and personal terms. Only thus can it have moral significance for humanity. And it can be so expressed only if it follows the laws of all morality, only if it is regarded as a process of moral and spiritual development. The incarnation concerns the whole life of Jesus. In dealing with the incarnation, we deal with the process and development of the incarnate life.

This thought may be put in a somewhat different form. The Christian belief in God is that God is personal. If therefore He is to be revealed, He must be revealed through personality. If He is to come into contact with human life, that contact must be achieved through personal means. Apart from the Christian concept, the tendency has been to find God given in ways that are impersonal. He has been revealed in signs and omens, in the voice of the thunder, in the flight of birds, in the entrails of the sacred victims. Or if revealed through men, it has been where men have ceased to exercise their full personal powers, through dreams, through unconscious swoons. In all these methods there lurks the thought that God in Himself is impersonal and that therefore He cannot be revealed in personality. The Christian thought is just the opposite. As God is personal His means of revelation must be personal. If He is to be given to human

life, He must be given through human life at its highest, that is, in its supremely personal form. And the supreme personal expression of human life is in Jesus Christ. The incarnate Son is the revelation of God, the Word of God, in and through human life. And therefore the incarnation, which is the supreme expression and revelation of God, must be concerned with the whole person of Jesus, with all that constitutes his character, his growth, his struggle, his victory. The incarnation as a personal fact must be in the form of a personal life. It is a process that concerns the whole life of Jesus. Begun in the manger cradle, God is there manifested in the beauty of the life of the child. But a deeper manifestation is given in the boy as he finds himself at home in his Father's house. A still deeper manifestation is given in the man. And the incarnation is in its fullest sense complete when that manhood is made perfect through suffering, and when in the victory of the cross Godhood and manhood are forever joined in the risen and ascended life. Each stage manifests the divine according to its capacity. But God can be manifested only as the fullness of humanity gives divinity the fullness of expression. The incarnation is not an event in a moment of time. It is the process of the incarnate life.

This position may be misunderstood. It is not that Jesus grows merely as a human being, and that the divine life comes to him as a reward. That would be to lose the essential idea, and therefore the religious value, of the incarnation, to supplant it by an apotheosis, to think of a man becoming God instead of God becoming man. But Christian belief sees in Jesus not first the ascent of humanity to God, but first the gift of God to humanity. The incarnation is no less a gift from above because it takes place in a process rather than in a momentary event. Rather is it true that that gift can take place only in a process, for only so can spiritual gifts be given.

The union of God and man is given from above. But that union can take place only in and through personal receptivity. God and man cannot be joined as things are joined. They can be united only in a personal life. That union becomes more and more perfectly realized in the development of the perfect life.

This thought of the process of the incarnate life has manifold advantages. It gives deeper meaning to the whole life of the Christ. His birth, his death, his resurrection are not isolated events. They receive their meaning from his life as a whole. The birth is the beginning of a process that concerns his whole life. The cross is the summing up of a process that began at birth. The resurrection and the ascension are the eternal results of a life that has won the perfect victory. These events have their meaning not in themselves but as the outcome and expression of the whole life. They are Mounts of Transfiguration, the sacramental expression of that union of divine and human which through his whole life was becoming ever more perfectly realized. They are the sacraments of the incarnate life.

This thought gives greater meaning and a deeper sanctity to the church year. We are to live over again the life of Christ. Through him we are to win for ourselves union with God. We are to make his experience our own. Day by day we are to walk the path he trod. From Advent to Ascension we are to bear within our hearts the birth, the dying, and the rising of our Lord. These events are the expression of that perfect life which was manifested that we might have life and that we might have it more abundantly.

This concept of development also casts light on the problems of the knowledge and the righteousness of Christ. To begin with his knowledge, the question is how the union of divine and human in him was compatible with the limitations of a genuinely human knowledge.

The problem is comparatively a new one in theology. The older orthodoxy mostly took it for granted that as he was divine he must have been omniscient, that even in the cradle he must have been possessed of all the knowledge of the eternal God.

This theory was evidently due to an inability to conceive that God and man could actually be united. It was a part of the Greek dualism, which believed that God and man could come together only if God ceased to be God or man ceased to be man. The thought was that if God came into human life it must be at cost of human limitations. All these must disappear at the influx of divinity. But if we believe that God and man can really come together, that God can be manifested in human life, then we shall get rid of this antagonism. We shall believe that God's life can be manifested even in the limitations of humanity. We shall not begin with a premise that prevents us from reading the New Testament as it stands, and that dehumanizes the Christ. We shall be able to ask fairly the question, What was the nature of his knowledge and what were its limitations?

It is natural that some persons should shrink from such a question. It may seem due to an irreverent curiosity, it may seem to raise questions which are beyond our knowledge and which it is unprofitable to discuss. To such objections two answers may be made.

In the first place the problem is squarely put before us in the New Testament. The limitations of his knowledge are there clearly indicated. St. Luke says that he "advanced in wisdom." He himself asks for information. And in one passage, which the most radical criticism maintains to be an authentic saying of Jesus, he declares "But of that day or that hour knoweth no one, not even the angels in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father" (Mark 13 32). We cannot avoid the question if we are to study the New Testament. To treat it as useless is to be wise above that which is written.

Secondly, it is of supreme importance that we should know "the mind of Christ." He is the heart of the New Testament. To Christian faith he is himself the Word of God. If we are rightly to understand him and his message, we must not shrink from an inquiry into his self-consciousness. We must seek to understand him as perfectly as we can. To be afraid to do so is to show lack of faith in Christ himself.

There have been two unsatisfactory methods of treating the problem. So far as the older theology showed any interest in the question, it tended to approach it on the basis of the distinction between the "two natures" of Christ. It ascribed omniscience to his divine nature and limitations to his human nature. Thus he was at once omniscient and limited. When he said that he knew not the day or the hour, he meant that he knew it not "as man." "As God" he knew everything that God knows.

That answer creates more difficulties than it removes. It sharply separates between his divine and his human nature. It does not really hold that God and man have met together in him. The union is only what has been called a "local" or "spatial" one. There is no real personal union. This is a bit of the Nestorian heresy, which tended to separate Christ into two separate persons. Even more serious is the effect of this theory on the moral character of Christ. To suppose that he said that he knew not, when all the time he knew "as God" and not "as man," is utterly contrary to the openness and simplicity of his character. It puts him in the company of those who make casuistical use of "mental reservation." This solution must be definitely abandoned.

Of more importance today is the so-called doctrine of the kenosis. The word, meaning "emptying," is of course taken from Phil. 2 7 (Cf. R.V.). The whole passage, Phil. 2 5–11, is interpreted to mean that the pre-existent

Christ in becoming man voluntarily "emptied himself" of the attributes of omniscience and omnipotence. He thus lived his human life under human conditions, and having completed his life by obedience unto the death of the cross, was then restored to the possession of the divine attributes. Thus by the act of self-emptying, or kenosis, the divine life was lived under human conditions.

The purpose of this theory is good. It recognizes that the New Testament does not represent Christ as omniscient, and it tries to give a reason for the limitations of his knowledge. But the theory, good as is its purpose, creates more difficulties than it removes. It misinterprets the meaning of "Person" in the doctrine of the Trinity. It conceives of the second "Person" as an independent personality. And if the thought is carried out to the third "Person," it represents the Trinity as consisting of three personalities, three "people" in our modern sense, and thus destroys belief in the unity of God. The theory virtually implies tritheism. It is noticeable that this theory is held by many who hold closely to the "orthodox" theology. It is difficult to see how such persons reconcile their theory with the accepted doctrine of the Trinity. They would doubtless allow, indeed insist, that the word "*persona*" in the Trinity does not mean "person" in our modern sense of an independent personality. And yet, while maintaining this, they conceive the second Person of the Trinity as acting as a separate independent personality apart from the supreme personality of God.

It is but putting the same thought in another way to say that this theory misinterprets the belief in the pre-existence of Christ. It confuses the pre-existence of the Logos, the second Person of the Trinity, with the pre-existence of the total personality of Jesus of Nazareth. It makes pre-existence apply not only to his divine but

to his human nature. It thinks of a pre-existent man. The result is logically to deny that our Lord had any real human soul or spirit. It is the old heresy of Apollinaris, that the Logos took the place of a human soul in Jesus. The theory thus destroys the real humanity of our Lord, and lands us in inextricable difficulties.

The exegetical support for the theory in the passage in Philippians is extremely slight. The kenosis with which St. Paul is dealing is an ethical kenosis rather than a metaphysical one. He is thinking of the divine life manifested in self-sacrificing service even to the death of the cross. And while in presenting this thought he starts undoubtedly from the idea of pre-existence, an idea familiar to the Hebrew mind, which ascribed pre-existence to all things that had enduring reality, yet St. Paul never thinks of interpreting that pre-existence in any such way as to destroy either the unity of God or the genuine humanity of Jesus. To build this elaborate theory of a metaphysical kenosis upon St. Paul's doctrine of the ethical "self-emptying" of Christ in loving sacrifice, is to construct a theory that has no sound exegetical basis. For both theoretical and exegetical reasons this theory of the kenosis as an attempt to explain the self-consciousness of our Lord must be abandoned.

Far simpler than either of these two attempts is the method of approach previously suggested. The difficulties largely disappear if the union of divine and human in Jesus is conceived of as progressive. First of all is to be remembered the essentially Christian thought of the union of God and man. God and man are not opposed. The divine need not cease to be divine in order to enter the human, and the human need not cease to be human in order to receive the divine. The incarnation is the expression of the divine purpose, the perfect unity of God and man. And secondly it is to

be remembered that as that union is a moral and personal one it takes place in the form of moral personality, that is, in the form of growth. The union at each stage of growth is in accordance with the possibilities of that stage.

With these thoughts we approach the problem of the self-consciousness and especially of the knowledge of our Lord. And in accordance with them we shall expect to find that his knowledge is progressive and takes place along the lines of his human development. We shall expect to find each stage perfect in its kind, but we shall not expect to find a perfection beyond that which each stage demands. His knowledge is no less divine because it comes to him along the lines of human development. His knowledge has the limits of his human experience, but of an experience that is perfect in its kind. He learns in the family, in the synagogue, through the reading of the Scriptures. In all ordinary things his knowledge was that which was possible to the conditions of his time. We shall not expect to find in him an infallibility with regard to matters of history or science. We shall expect to find divine insight coming to him ever more perfectly as the union of God and man in him is ever more perfectly accomplished. When that perfect union is fully won, then shall the limitations of knowledge be done away. It is said even of us that then shall we know even as we have been known (1 Cor. 13 12). That full knowledge is the ultimate possession of him in whom the union of God and man was finally accomplished through the process of the incarnate life. But we shall not expect to find omniscience in those stages at which the complete union was not yet accomplished.

Does this thought of a development rule out his authority in moral and spiritual matters? Two things are to be said. In the first place, even in ordinary matters we know little of the limits that would belong to a life

perfect at every stage, untouched by sin. Sin is constantly a disturbing factor that vitiates our knowledge. Even in earthly matters there are depths unguessed by us. And we doubtless see in his relation to things of human experience a depth of perception and a reach of knowledge from which sin shuts us out.

And secondly, this is supremely true of spiritual things. His life in every stage is perfect in that stage. No sin blots his consciousness of God. The growing expression of the divine in him, unvexed by human failure, makes him the supreme possessor of moral and spiritual insight. No moral or spiritual error could have entered the life whose very source was the eternal and revealing Word of God. There are things he did not know, but in moral and spiritual matters he could never have supposed that he did know when he did not. Such error is due to sin. In that perfect life, progressive though it be, no sin interferes with the perfect expression of the divine character. In all moral and spiritual truth we go with confidence to him who revealed the very mind and heart of God. He that hath seen him hath seen the Father.

Viewed in this way the whole life of Christ becomes a perfectly real life. If he were without our limitations, he could have known no genuine human struggle. He could not have lived the life of faith. Prayer would have been unnecessary and unreal. Even the cross could not have been the supreme victory of faith, triumphing by reliance on the divine will. It would have been at the most the endurance of a few hours of suffering. All this unreality is brought into his life unless the divine in him were realized in genuine human form. The limitations of his knowledge, due to the progressive development of the incarnate life, were absolutely necessary if the incarnation was to have moral and spiritual significance. Only thus could there have been in him

the supreme victory of faith, only thus could there have been won the perfect righteousness of his sinless life.

Thus from the subject of his knowledge we are brought directly to the subject of his righteousness. How was that righteousness realized, and what was its relation to struggle and temptation?

The guide to the discussion must be found in the two thoughts already emphasized. In the first place, divine and human actually meet in Jesus. Therefore the divine does not set aside the human. The Christ is no less divine because the divine is realized under the forms of human experience. And in the second place, that realization must be progressive. Divine and human can meet only in moral personality, and the form of moral personality is growth.

This element of growth has especial application to the righteousness of Christ. Righteousness by its very nature must develop. It cannot be given perfectly at the beginning. It must be won through struggle and victory. At the beginning there can at most be innocence, sinlessness. Orthodox Christian theology has always held that this sinlessness was given to Jesus as a native endowment. This view rightly expresses the thought that we cannot regard Jesus as the mere product of the race with all its sinful antecedents. We see in him a new beginning of humanity, in the strictest sense a new birth from above. Yet such a native endowment is wrongly interpreted if it is thought to exclude the need of struggle and temptation in the attainment of his positive righteousness. To make that righteousness a necessary result of his sinless endowment would be to unmoralize his life. And it would contradict the New Testament, which declares that "though he was a Son, yet learned he obedience by the things which he suffered" (Heb. 5 8). It was thus that he was "made perfect." If his righteousness is to have creative power

over us, it must be won in conflict. "It behoved him in all things to be made like unto his brethren, that he might be a merciful and faithful high priest in things pertaining to God" (Heb. 2 17). The incarnate life must be realized through a moral process. Only thus can it bring to us the saving life of God. The problem with which we have to deal is not simply the sinlessness but the positive righteousness of Christ.

Although this article is dealing with an interpretation of Christian belief rather than with the apologetic approach to that belief, it may nevertheless not be out of place to indicate that it is far easier to approach the question of belief in Christ on the basis of his positive righteousness rather than on the basis of his negative sinlessness. It is the hardest of all things to prove a universal negative. To do so requires a complete knowledge of every possible contingency. And apart from belief in Christ, as a basis for that belief, to attempt to prove his absolute sinlessness is to meet with the difficulty that attends the proof of every universal negative. We know very little of the life of Jesus, and from the little that we do know to prove to an unbeliever the fact of his complete sinlessness is practically impossible. The belief in the sinlessness of Christ is the expression of an antecedent belief in him; it cannot be made the basis of that belief. The starting-point must rather be made with his positive righteousness. That positive righteousness stands written clearly before us. It sets a new standard for the world's righteousness. From him comes a new ideal of righteousness which dominates the world's history. We cannot independently of him construct a standard of righteousness and then condescendingly apply it to him, and ask whether he comes up to it. He applies to us a standard far higher than we could have created without him. We do not judge him. He judges us. All judgment is committed unto

him because he is the Son of man. As the supreme expression of humanity, he is the standard which commends itself to the conscience of mankind. His positive righteousness sets a new standard for the world. On the basis of that new ideal of righteousness we can win belief in him, and hence we can believe in his sinlessness. We must first emphasize his positive righteousness rather than first his negative sinlessness.

With this thought in mind, we return then to our special subject. How was that righteousness related to temptation and struggle? How is temptation possible to a perfect life? Are not our temptations the result of the sin that doth so easily beset us? If Christ was perfect, must he not have been above temptation?

So it has been maintained. It has been held that temptation implies sin, for without sin there is nothing to which temptation can appeal. Consequently if Christ were sinless, he could have had no possibility either of temptation or of sin. To be capable either of sinning or of being tempted is to have at least the beginning of an evil impulse. Christ was then by his very nature incapable of sinning, and he stood above the reach of all temptation.

Let us look first at the consequences and then at the logic of this view. As to consequences, it is first to be noted that such a theory is absolutely untrue to the New Testament. Jesus is there represented as undergoing genuine human experience. His ministry begins with a struggle against temptation. The Epistle to the Hebrews says that he was "in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin" (Heb. 4 15). The same Epistle says, "For in that he himself hath suffered being tempted, he is able to succour them that are tempted" (2 18). He who holds the previous view definitely departs from the teaching of the New Testament. And secondly, this view makes the moral life of Jesus unreal. He is removed

from such a struggle as we have to endure. His life is therefore without moral significance for humanity.

As to the logic of the theory, it rests on a double fallacy. In the first place, it confuses temptation with sin. Temptation is a good. It is essential to the moral life. Only by the struggle against temptation can true righteousness be achieved. To yield to temptation is sin. To feel temptation and to struggle against it is a mark of all morality. It was the Spirit by which Jesus was driven into the wilderness to be tempted of the devil. The capacity of being tempted came not from an evil impulse but from the presence of the Holy Spirit. It is false logic to confuse temptation with sin.

And secondly, this theory confuses a moral process with a moral result. It is true that the highest moral result is given when temptation is so conquered that it can be resisted without a struggle. But such a result must be the outcome and not the beginning of a moral process. There is the greatest difference between one who has never felt temptation and one to whom temptation has ceased to appeal because it has been overcome. Such a development is not sin, but is necessary to any character that is to be one of positive righteousness. This theory then overlooks all moral development in Christ, confuses the result with the process by which that result is reached, and essentially denies his positive righteousness. The theory must be abandoned. The temptation and struggle of Jesus must be regarded as real, and as a necessary part of his perfect righteousness.

But just there comes the difficulty. In our own experience temptation and struggle are so bound up with sin and moral failure that it is hard for us to conceive what temptation would have been in a life apart from sin. How was it that the sinless life of Jesus could have known any moral struggle and temptation comparable to our own?

No doubt the mystery cannot be perfectly solved. But there are certain considerations that are helpful in the approach to it. In the first place, it is to be emphasized again that we are dealing with the positive righteousness of Christ and not simply with a negative sinlessness or innocence. Mere innocence might exist apart from struggle and therefore apart from contact with the world. But positive righteousness must be achieved through struggle. It will lead us to think of Christ as having a positive work to do in the actual world of human experience.

Secondly, it is to be remembered that although Christ was perfect he did not live in a perfect world. He lived in a world in which there was sin, and in which sin involved its consequences of suffering and misery. We have not to ask the theoretical question, What would be a perfect character in a perfect world? That question might lead us merely to theoretical abstractions. We have to ask the definite question, What was the perfect character in the world of sin? We have to deal with the historic fact of the perfect righteousness manifested in sinful conditions.

With these two considerations in mind, we may then ask this question, As a character becomes more perfect, does it feel more or less keenly the sin of the world? The answer is easy. True righteousness feels the pressures and power of sin as the weak sinning character can never feel it. Because St. Paul is himself strong, he writes, "Who is weak and I am not weak?" His strength means that he must bear the weakness of others. In the same way righteousness feels the presence of sin. The text, "To the pure all things are pure," is sometimes wrongly interpreted. It is equally true that to the impure nothing is felt as impure. It is only purity that feels the burning horror of the impure. Thomas Hobbes said, "*Adeo sentire semper idem, et non sentire, ad idem*

recidunt." It is only differences that are perceived. Those who live within the roar of Niagara are said to be unconscious of its presence. If they leave it, then they feel the difference. So is it true of the tumult of sin. They who live in the very midst of it, yielding to it and living according to it, are unconscious of its presence. The more perfect a man is, the more does he feel the fact of sin, the more fully does he realize its destructive power.

And that sin cannot be escaped by turning one's back on it and trying to forget its presence. In no such way can righteousness be won. Sin cannot be bounded spatially. No man can say, Sin is there and I am here, free from its presence. To run away from it is to be partaker of it. The more perfect a man is, the more fully must he feel the fact of sin, the more fully must he feel his duty and responsibility concerning it. There is no righteousness but missionary righteousness. A selfish righteousness is a contradiction in terms. To flee to the desert and there to seek righteousness is to turn one's back on the only road in which righteousness can be won. The righteousness of the righteous man can be found only in relation to the sin of the world.

There are two ideals of righteousness in the New Testament. The one is the Pharisaic ideal. The word "Pharisee" means "separatist." The Pharisaic righteousness was to be won by separation from all that was sinful. Righteousness was conceived of almost as a quantum, a certain amount of it in the world, and not enough to go around. "The more there is of mine, the less there is of yours" might well have been the Pharisaic motto. The more righteousness a man had, the more was he separate from those who did not have that righteousness. Sin was conceived of almost in spatial terms. I can escape it by getting away from it. It can exist there without affecting me here. That Pharisaic ideal led to an iso-

lated self-culture, to the seeking of righteousness in selfish seclusion.

The other ideal is that of the righteousness of Christ. His righteousness drives him into contact with the sinful world. In him the sin-consciousness was at its highest point, and just for that reason he was the friend of publicans and sinners. Simon the Pharisee said of him, "This man, if he were a prophet, would have perceived who and what manner of woman this is which toucheth him, that she is a sinner." But he knew her sin far better than Simon did. And because he knew it, therefore he suffered her to touch him. His life must come into contact with sin, whatever its depth and vileness. His own purity could be maintained only if it became a purifying power to the world. St. Paul in almost paradoxical form sums up the secret of the righteousness of Christ, when he says that him who knew no sin God made to be sin on our behalf. His very perfection can be won only by making himself to be sin for others. The absolute righteousness of his life demands the deepest contact with the sin of the world. That righteousness can be maintained only as it is a saving power against sin.

Hence his temptation. His temptation was to seek some other ideal of righteousness than that which could be won through the saving and cleansing contact with sin, a contact which should be at once the means of cleansing others and the only way in which his own life could be kept clean. When the Pharisee heard the cry "Unclean," he kept himself aloof. But Jesus touched alike the physical and the moral leper. His own cleanliness could be preserved only by touching the life of the unclean. Because he knew no sin he must indeed be made sin for us. What must that fact have meant to him whose inner life was perfectly pure, who felt the horror of sin most deeply because of his own perfection? Yet that very repulsion from sin drove him into contact with it. He

must meet it with all its consequences. He must treat it as though it were his own. Only by giving himself for others could his own righteousness be won. Must he not often have echoed the wish of the Psalmist, "Oh that I had wings like a dove! Then would I fly away and be at rest"? But not so can he do his task and win his righteousness. His wearied feet must walk through the crowded streets, until finally they tread the way of the cross.

The upbuilding of that perfect righteousness must have meant a struggle against sin far keener than we can know. The higher the righteousness, the more intense the struggle, the stronger the temptation to flee from contact with sin and to win righteousness in seclusion. Perfection is tempted more than imperfection, for it makes its own temptation. Only perfection can know the horror of the contact with sin, the contact without which perfection itself cannot be attained. The righteous Christ must bear others' burdens, until, making them his own, he conquers in the fight for his own righteousness and for the righteousness of the world.

The conflict between these two ideals of righteousness is the conflict between two ideals of what it is to be the Christ. As the Christ, Jesus is called to be the founder of the kingdom of God. What is that kingdom and what are the forces by which it is to be established? They are not physical forces. To command that stones be made bread, to trust in the divine power for support against material downfall, to bow the knee to Satan in compromise, these seem to be the way of strength. But not so is the Christ called to walk. He must tread the path that leads to human failure, he must walk the way of the cross. The leader of the twelve brings before him the temptation of his life: "Be it far from thee, Lord; this shall never be unto thee. But he turned and said unto Peter, Get thee behind me, Satan; thou art a stumbling block

unto me; for thou mindest not the things of God, but the things of men." The divine way is the way of sacrificing love, of identity with human weakness and sin. And that way must be trod in faith. "O my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass away from me! nevertheless, not as I will, but as thou wilt." The divine way is the way of self-sacrificing righteousness, the way that to man's judgment seems so weak. And that way ends in the cross, a human failure and a divine victory. Therein is the Christ made perfect through suffering, therein does he win his own perfect righteousness. And that perfect righteousness achieved in sacrifice becomes the creative source of a new world. "Him who knew no sin he made to be sin on our behalf; that we might become the righteousness of God in him." The kingdom of God is established, and the law of that kingdom is self-sacrificing love.

The person of Jesus will always be infinitely deeper than we can understand. But this much we know. In him we see God manifested in human life. If we are sure that God is thus truly manifested, we shall not be afraid to see the Man. We shall see him in the limitations of his knowledge and in the struggles of his will. Only thus does the divine enter the human. In those limitations and in that struggle "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself." In those limitations we see the victory of faith, in that struggle we see the perfect righteousness. In him who "advanced in wisdom and stature, and in favor with God and men" we see the presence and the power of the Incarnate Life.

PENSIONS FOR THE CLERGY

WILLIAM LAWRENCE
Boston

The conditions of modern life and the demands for efficiency are pressing the question of salaried workers and wage earners. Salaries and wages are not large enough to enable them to lay up sufficient money for old age. Efficiency demands early retirement from the most active fields of service; division of labor and expert work offer few new openings for those who have passed middle life; the children have not wages or salaries large enough to support their aged parents; adequate life insurance is too expensive for most. The community as a whole must keep its members from suffering and starvation. Hence the demand for retiring- or old-age pensions, under systems whereby all the people in their active days pay taxes for the support of a part of the people in their old age.

Whether the systems be of the state, of a corporation, of a university, or of a Church, the principles are much the same. I mention a few.

Pensions are not charity. They are an extension of the salary or wage beyond the working years. The distribution of the cost of pensions may be varied. The final result is that the cost falls on a large number of people, most of whom in their turn will be benefited directly or indirectly by the system; for in the last resort society as a whole cannot let people starve, and therefore must in some way meet the cost of food and support of the helpless aged. The pension system is one way, and with increasing frequency is felt to be the best way to meet the situation.

Pensions are costly; more costly than most people, even those who are supporting and passing bills for the pensioning of teachers, policemen, and other public servants, yet realize. The bankruptcy of a number of pension systems shows this.

If a man earns his living and supports his family for forty years, and then with his aged wife comes upon a pension system for ten years, that last term involves one-fifth of their whole mature life expenditure; and the payment of pensions to persons disabled for life in early manhood is very costly. Hence the state, great corporations, colleges, and the Churches face a great problem. The science of pensions is yet in its infancy. Besides the necessity of pensions and their costliness, a few other lessons have been learned.

Except for a small and fixed or slowly increasing constituency, the capitalization of pensions is out of the question. The Carnegie Foundation for the pensioning of college teachers, limited to a small and select constituency, has already been obliged to have its capital enlarged, and its fixed charges are steadily increasing. When one considers the pensioning of several thousand persons of an increasing constituency, such as the school-teachers of a state, the ministers of a denomination, the capitalization of a safe system would run into scores and hundreds of millions of dollars. Pensions must be raised as salaries are raised—from the annual incomes of the constituencies.

A pension system to be safe and successful must be compulsory. Voluntary systems have thus far been confined to very limited amounts of aid, and most of them have some charity endowment behind them. It is one of the singular freaks of human nature that men and women who approve highly of voluntary systems for pensions do not go into them or else do not stay in them long. Only compulsion or contract holds them.

The assurance of a living pension in old age gives buoyancy and confidence to the worker during his active years. Herein is the secret of efficiency. The worker works without anxiety for the future support of himself and wife; he can retire from work when his strength is waning, and thus enable an active man to take his post and sustain the efficiency of the work. How many an aged pastor today is disintegrating the parish which his active years have built up! The people, children of his pastorate, cannot honorably turn him out to suffer. They are unable to pension him and at the same time pay an active rector. He realizes and regrets the situation; it cuts him to the quick: so do the people. With fineness of character on both sides, the years may wear on with quiet dignity until his death. Sometimes the strain is too great, and through the fault of no one, only the lack of a pension system, the loving pastorate of a generation ends in disaster to pastor and people.

Again, it is clear that any pension system, to be safe, must be based upon a broad basis of actuarial study and figures. A corporation, a state, or a Church cannot guess what amount it must lay aside this year in order to meet the pension liabilities twenty-five years hence. A multitude of questions and conditions enters in—the average duration of life of those in that particular constituency, their age of entrance into active service, their age of retirement, their chances of early disability, their ratio of increase in numbers, etc., etc.

Averages can be calculated only upon the basis of a knowledge of hundreds, better thousands, of persons in the same sort of constituency. For instance, the fact that clergymen live longer than persons of most other callings adds heavily to the cost of their pensions. How much longer? How much greater cost? Only a skilled pension actuary can tell after exhaustive study of large numbers.

What about the pensioning of Clergy? Is it advisable? Is it possible? The Protestant Churches are committed to the liberty of their ministers to marry. We believe heartily that this is best for the Church and the people. The Churches are therefore committed to such a support of the clergy with their families as will enable them to work with efficiency and buoyancy. The question may well be asked as to whether the salaries of most of the clergy today are not so limited as to hamper seriously their efficiency. A pastor who puts several hours a day into family cares, household details, and petty economies, who cannot buy books, is not, unless he be an exceptional man, as efficient as if he had an adequate salary. Laymen have a direct interest in this. Meagre salaries mean inefficient service. Small salaries of able and faithful men involve wasteful business. The Churches must, if the clergy are to do more efficient work, give thought and energy to the invention and development of measures leading to the increase of active salaries. Deeper spiritual life, finer spiritual enthusiasm, and better business methods, are needed for this. One great step towards this increase, the most practical step at this time, is a pension system whereby, although the immediate salary is not enlarged, the minister escapes the necessity of saving for old age and also does better work in his relief from anxiety, while the parish gains better results and is not in danger of being burdened with an aged pastor unable to do his work. The laity too are relieved from perpetual calls upon their charity in behalf of the aged clergy and their families. Whether the Churches will be able to create such a system or systems is a problem now before us. The need is great; the practical difficulties are great; we shall gain nothing by blinking at them.

The purpose of this article is to make a contribution to the study of the subject by sketching a system which is being placed before the Protestant Episcopal Church.

The principles of the system were approved by the General Convention of that Church last autumn. The subject is now before the several dioceses for their consideration, as to whether they are willing, and, if willing, are able financially to enter the system. Upon their response in the next year or two rests the answer to the question as to whether the system will be carried through.

In approving this system the Church has risen to the determination that it is neither fair nor economical for the parishes to pay mere living salaries to the clergy during their years of active service, and then throw them and their families upon charity. The support of the clergy means and involves their support until death, and, even beyond their death, the continuation of support to widows and minor children.

The way to accomplish this is not to ask of each parish the impossible task of paying its rector a salary large enough to enable him to save sufficient capital for old age and for his widow and orphans, but to ask each parish or missionary board while it is paying the active living salary to pay also into a central pension fund a certain amount, a certain percentage on the salary, which, placed at compound interest, will later pay the pension of the rector when he retires or is disabled, and will pension also the widow and minor children.

Such a system demands for its safety and success exact and scientific actuarial work and a strong and responsible organization. As to the first, answers to a carefully prepared questionnaire including all essential questions have been received from ninety-eight per cent of the 5,600 clergy. These answers, having been codified and classified by an expert, have been given to an expert pension actuary with other information and the proposed rules of the service. When his findings have been received, the authorities of the Pension Fund will be in a position to notify the parishes as to the exact

cost to each one of the pension system. The proposed pensioners will include all the clergy who are in church-work. A minister who is a professor in a college, for instance, would look to other sources for pay and pension.

As to organization, trustees elected by the General Convention have been incorporated in New York as the Church Pension Fund, and have opened an office in Wall Street, New York, for preliminary study and work. In that office will be kept up to date from month to month a record of every clergyman of the Church, his age, position, salary, etc.; for as every clergyman is canonically connected with some diocese, these data can always be known and every change immediately recorded.

In theory the central office will keep in connection with every parish and clergyman. In practice the central office will work through the authorities of the diocese to the parishes and clergy, this being simpler and placing responsibility upon the diocese.

Each year each diocese will hear from the Church Pension Fund what amount—a ratio based on the salaries and other conditions of the clergy in that diocese that year—it must pay into the Church Pension Fund treasury in order to insure the full pensions of its clergy; and the various parishes will be assessed their proportionate amount. If a diocese does not pay its assessment on any given year, the clergy resident in that diocese in that particular year will upon retirement have deducted from their pension the proportionate sum with interest lacking on that year; for if no money for that year has been on compound interest, there is no money to pay out.

The Church Pension Fund is not a charitable institution; it does not pretend to give something for nothing. It is a holding company, which, basing its work on scientific and actuarial study, pays out with interest

what it takes in, and the amount so realized will be sufficient to meet its obligations as they come through the retirement, disability, or death, of the clergy.

Until the final actuarial results have been made up, the precise figures cannot be given; but from an approximate calculation based upon answers from seventy-five per cent of the clergy, the following results can be estimated. If the Church through the parishes and other organizations pays out to the clergy each year in salaries nine millions of dollars (rectories being valued for rent at fifteen per cent of the salary), the parishes and organizations should also pay through their dioceses into the Church Pension Fund an amount equal to seven per cent of the salaries, or $560,000. This would insure the following pensions: Upon retirement at the age of sixty-eight, a clergyman ordained at the usual age and in active service will receive from the central Church Pension Fund an amount equal to half his average life salary. Those ordained later will receive proportionately less. The system however departs from scientific exactness in assuring a minimum pension of $600 and a maximum pension of $2,000. That is, there will be a slight loading on the parishes paying large salaries for the benefit of the whole body, but the extreme cases are so few that the loading will be very slight. The age of sixty-eight may be thought high; but each year added increases greatly the resources of the Fund. Moreover, a disability-clause which promises a pension equal to forty per cent of the last salary enables a man to retire, if necessary, at any age. To the widow of a clergyman is promised an annuity equal to one-half of the pension her husband would have been entitled to during marriage, with a minimum of $300. To each minor orphan child under seven is promised an annuity of $100; to each child between seven and fourteen, $200; for each dependent minor over fourteen, $300. The widow's burden is thus lightened

according to the number of her children, and their education is considered. These statements and figures are in the rough, and are of course subject to modification by rules according to varied conditions. This proposed system is now before the dioceses for their consideration. The difficulties are great and should be frankly stated and met.

I. The pension system is costly. Can the Church as represented in dioceses and parishes afford it? That is for them to say. Without the system, the clergy, their widows and orphans, will continue to be dependent upon the chances of charity, and will be held up to society, as they often are now, as piteously needful and appealing for help. No calling, not even of the ministry, can retain the respect of the people while standing in the role of a pauper.

Without the system, the laity will be subject to continual calls for contributions, of the wisdom of whose distribution they can have no knowledge. The system once started, no appeals will again be necessary. Without a pension system, the ministry will be liable to fall behind other high callings in efficiency.

II. In this explanation I have thus far omitted to mention the tremendous problem of accrued liabilities. What are they? Suppose a clergyman ordained at twenty-eight is now fifty-eight and the pension system is starting. For the next ten years, until his retirement at sixty-eight, the money will flow into the treasury for his pension. When, however, he comes to receive his pension, there will be in the treasury only the amount with interest that has been paid in for ten years. Where is the money that should have been paid in for his first thirty years of service? It is not in the treasury but in the pockets of the laity, who, because the system was not started thirty years ago, have not been called upon to pay. This sum, the liability of those thirty years,

is the "accrued liability"; and it takes only a moment's thought to appreciate what an enormous sum that would be in a body of 5,600 clergy. Perhaps thirty or forty millions of dollars. It is the neglect to consider or provide for the accrued liabilities and the happy optimism that things will all come out right somehow, that has been the undoing of a number of pension systems, and that will lead others within a few years into bankruptcy.

The Church Pension Fund sets the problem of accrued liabilities aside as an entirely separate problem from the active system. The active system could begin and go on without any thought of accrued liabilities. In that case, the pensions of men soon retiring would be almost nothing. Yet "almost nothing" is a little more than they would get without any system. The clergy retiring a few years hence, those retiring twenty and thirty years hence, would receive larger and larger pensions until upon the passing of the present body of clergy, the full system would be running and the full pensions paid. But to ask the churches to increase their fixed charges for clerical support by five or six hundred thousand dollars and at the same time to wait for a generation for the full results, would demand greater patience than could be expected even of the Saints.

The fact is, that with $3,500,000 in hand to meet to a certain degree the accrued liabilities and the system started, the Church can begin immediately to pay pensions of considerable and steadily increasing amounts, and at the close of a generation with the $3,500,000 expended, the system will go of itself. In other words, this sum, although exhausted, will have accomplished more than an endowment many times larger could accomplish. It will have started a great and beneficent pension system. With speed once on, the resources and power within will keep the system moving.

The strong hope of the Church Pension Fund is that those laymen of the Church of keenest business insight will see the enormous advantage to the Church, the clergy, and especially the laity, in the immediate creation of a pension system which will pay to a certain degree the accrued liabilities as well as the earned pension.

A sum, say, of $3,500,000 in the hands of the Church Pension Fund would enable the Church to meet with some adequacy the accrued liabilities, and would commit the Church to a pension system which would afterwards go of itself; which could not run into bankruptcy; which would place the clergy in a dignified position before the public; and which would release the laity from the frequent appeals for help in behalf of the aged clergy and their dependants.

III. A pension system, to succeed in holding its full constituency, must be in some sort compulsory. How can a Church make a condition of compulsion? I do not see how loosely organized Denominations can. This, it seems to me, is an insuperable difficulty to scientific pension systems in Congregational Denominations. The difficulty is very great even in a more closely knit organization like that of the Episcopal Church. There can be no satisfactory compulsion unless there be real penalties. The money to be paid to the Church Pension Fund is not a contribution or an offering or a response to an apportionment. It is an assessment to be met under agreement; for if the pension is expected, the money or assessment must be paid in order that it may go on interest. It is for the parishes to decide through their dioceses as to whether they will accept or invent some form of penalty which will compel payment or result in the loss of certain privileges. In one or two dioceses where a pension system of the clergy is in action, parishes which have not paid their per-

centage as called for are by canon disfranchised for that year. They lose the privileges of seat and vote in Convention. This does not get the money; their property cannot be sold for taxes; but it brings a strong pressure upon them, probably the strongest the Church can exert. Even that, however, is not such pressure as the state can exert for non-payment of taxes. Whether the parishes of the Church through their dioceses will be able or willing to bring any such pressure or compulsion upon themselves, is a question. Some penalty or form of compulsion there must be.

The point that the Church Pension Fund has to make clear is that this is a business proposition; that it is either a system or nothing. It is a contract or agreement which the parties must be under a compulsion to meet—a compulsion stronger than hope or good intention; under such an obligation as must bring the results. Perhaps some form of penalty or compulsion better than that which I have suggested may be discovered.

The alternative is now before the Episcopal Church;—in the consideration of its aged clergy, their widows and orphans, will it continue in its present condition, detracting from the dignity of the clergy, irritating to the laity, and with the present movements in education and society, liable to keep the Church less and less efficient, endangering its spiritual work and leadership? or will it enter upon a system which will place the clergy and their dependants in a position of far greater buoyancy, cheer, and dignity; which will enable men of weakening powers to give place to those younger and stronger; which will keep our parishes manned with vigor; which will enable every clergyman to feel that wherever he is, in South, West, or East, he has in his old age fair treatment from the Church; which will enable every clergyman during his active service to give himself fully and freely without carking cares and anxiety for the future of himself,

his wife, and his children, to the spiritual work of the Church?

Again I say, this question of the pensions of the clergy is not charity, but efficiency, the spiritual leadership of the Church in the coming years.

In attempting to solve for herself this great problem, the Episcopal Church believes that she is leading the way towards meeting in a thoroughly scientific manner a pressing social question, and that her work will be of great value, not only to other Churches but to great commercial and industrial organizations, to banks, railroads, and factories, even to states and governments.

THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY AND THE CROSS OF CHRIST

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD

PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

In a recent number of *The Harvard Theological Review*,[1] Professor Douglas Clyde Macintosh of the Yale Divinity School outlines in a very interesting manner the religious system to which he gives his adherence. For "substance of doctrine" (to use a form of speech formerly quite familiar at New Haven) this religious system does not differ markedly from what is usually taught in the circles of the so-called "Liberal Theology." Professor Macintosh has, however, his own way of construing and phrasing the common "Liberal" teaching; and his own way of construing and phrasing it presents a number of features which invite comment. It is tempting to turn aside to enumerate some of these, and perhaps to offer some remarks upon them. As we must make a selection, however, it seems best to confine ourselves to what appears on the face of it to be the most remarkable thing in Professor Macintosh's representations. This is his disposition to retain for his religious system the historical name of Christianity, although it utterly repudiates the cross of Christ, and in fact feels itself (in case of need) quite able to get along without even the person of Christ. A "new Christianity," he is willing, to be sure, to allow that it is—a "new Christianity for which the world is waiting"; and as such he is perhaps something more than willing to separate it from what he varyingly speaks of as "the older Chris-

[1] VII, 1 (January 1914), pp. 16–46.

tianity," "actual Christianity," "historic Christianity," "actual, historical Christianity." He strenuously claims for it, nevertheless, the right to call itself by the name of "Christianity."

It is, no doubt, a kind of tribute to Christianity—this clinging to its name to designate a religious system which retains so little of what that name has heretofore been used to express. Clearly, the name "Christianity" has become an honorable one under its old connotation, and has acquired secondary implications which do it credit. Mr. G. K. Chesterton has lately called our attention in his serio-comic way to the extent to which such secondary implications have attached themselves to it in the speech of the common people. The apple-women and charwomen, the draymen and dustmen, it seems, are accustomed to employ it in a sense of which we can only say that it lies somewhere between "sane" and "civilized"; which "signifies that which is human, normal, social, and self-respecting." "Where can I get Christian food?" "Where can I find a Christian bed?" These are natural forms of popular speech with which we are all familiar. And, adds Mr. Chesterton, when the modern idealist puts away wine and war and dons peasants' clothes in imitation of Tolstoy, and parts his hair in the middle as he has seen it parted in paintings of Christ, the democracy will most likely pass its scornful judgment on him by simply demanding, "Why can't he dress like a Christian?" By some such immanent logic "Christianity" has apparently come to mean to Professor Macintosh, "rational," "ethical"; and we can observe him, when wishing to express his vigorous rejection of "a particular theory of redemption"—this "particular theory of redemption" being the Christian doctrine of the Atoning Sacrifice of Christ—merely declaring of it roundly that it is "not only not essential to Christianity, because contrary to reason, but moreover

essentially unchristian because opposed to the principles of sound morality."[2]

We certainly feel no impulse to deny that whatever is Christian is rational and moral. And we are profoundly interested in such indications as are supplied by the form of Professor Macintosh's declaration, that the general mind has been so thoroughly imbued with this fact that men instinctively reason on the subaudition that when we say "Christian," we say "rational," "moral." But surely it cannot be necessary to point out that we may not determine the contents of a historical system after this fashion. Shall we deal so with Buddhism or Mohammedanism or Mormonism, with Romanism or Calvinism or the new "Liberalism"? If we find doctrines taught by these systems repugnant to reason and morality, we (so far) reject these systems. We do not forthwith declare that these (alleged) irrational and immoral doctrines can therefore have no place in these systems. We can deal differently with Christianity only on the assumption that Christianity is through and through and in all its parts in complete accordance with right reason and sound morality. The assumption is, no doubt, accordant with fact. But we are not entitled to make it prior to examination. And the first step in this examination cannot be taken until the contents of Christianity have been ascertained.

To argue that a doctrine is not Christian because it is not reasonable or moral, in a word, is to argue in a manifestly vicious circle. It is to confuse the historical question, What is Christianity? with the rational question, What is true? And it can result in nothing other than replacing historical Christianity by a "rational" system of our own, or, to phrase it in Mr. Chesterton's language, in "turning the Christians into

[2] P. 18. Cf. p. 35, where this judgment is repeated: "being irrational, it cannot be of the essence of Christianity"; not being "rigidly moral," "it must be pronounced essentially unchristian."

a new sect, with new doctrines hitherto unknown to Christendom." Nietzsche, Mr. Chesterton reminds us, insisted that there never was but one Christian, and He was crucified; the improvement now offered, Mr. Chesterton hints, may consist in suggesting that perhaps even that single Christian was not a "Christian." Certainly, the "Christianity" which is constructed on the principle, not that it consists in the religion founded by Jesus Christ and practised ever since by His followers, taught of Him, but that it shall contain only what commends itself to our ideas of "reason" and accords with our ideas of "morality" runs a considerable risk of becoming a Christianity which stands out of all relation to Christ and to whatever has heretofore passed for Christianity. It offers us, in point of fact, merely a Rationalistic system—taking the term in its broader historical and not in its narrow philosophical significance.

Clearly, Christianity being a historical religion, its content can be determined only on historical grounds. The matter scarcely requires arguing; and we may be permitted, perhaps, at this point to content ourselves with simply referring to the very lucid statement of its elements made by H. H. Wendt in the opening pages of his *System of Christian Doctrine*, as also in an earlier pamphlet devoted to the subject. "The Christian religion," remarks Wendt with admirable point[3]—

"is a historically given religion. We cannot by an ideal construction or by deduction from a general notion of religion, determine what constitutes its genuine essence. We must rather seek to determine this essence by such an objective historical examination as we should give it were we dealing with the determination of the essence of some other historical religion."

Again[4]:

"In a scientific presentation of Christian doctrine, as we have already seen, one side of its criticism and positive justification must

[3] Die Norm des echten Christentums, 1893, p. 3; cf. p. 23.

[4] System der christlichen Lehre, I, 1906, pp. 23–24; cf. pp. 3 ff., 42 ff.

be directed to the proof that the doctrine presented is also genuinely Christian doctrine. How is this proof to be made? The recognition of the fact that Christianity is an entity which is historically given, and is not to be ideally constructed, is of fundamental importance for answering this question. . . . The question of the genuine Christianity of the Christian doctrine to be presented is, as a matter of principle, not to be confused with the question of the truth and the value of this doctrine. From our incidental conviction of the truth and indispensableness of Christianity there easily arises the assumption that a religious conception, if it is true and valuable, must also be genuinely Christian. But from the scientific standpoint it is self-evident that it must first be proved what conceptions are genuinely Christian, and only then the truth of these Christian conceptions be tested. Even when a capacity for ever-advancing development is recognized for Christianity and for Christian doctrine, the question of the authentic Christianity of any conception presented as Christian remains at bottom a historical one. For the question of what constitutes the ground-type of Christianity and of Christian doctrine, by which it is to be determined whether anything can still pass as Christian or not, is just as certainly to be answered historically as, for example, the question of what belongs to the ground-type of the Buddhist religion and doctrine."

There is really no mystery about the matter. The process by which it is determined what is a truly Christian doctrine (something very different from what is a true Christian doctrine), or what the Christian religion really is, differs in principle in no respect from the process by which we determine what is an old Hellenic doctrine or what Ritschlism really teaches, what is the nature of Islam or what is the essence of the Pragmatic philosophy. In the very nature of the case such questions are purely historical and purely objective in their character, and the answers to them are not in the least advanced by any judgments we may pass upon the rationality or morality of the several doctrines or systems which come under our survey.

The justification which Professor Macintosh offers for permitting his subjective judgments of rationality and

ethical value to intrude into the determination of the purely objective question of "What is Christianity?" he draws from a theory, which he very earnestly advocates, of the proper method of procedure in determining "the essence" of "any historical *quantum*." This theory might well have been derived, by the simple process of transferring it to historical quantities, from the metaphysical doctrine of "essence" propounded of late by our Pragmatic philosophers. Out of the general Pragmatic doctrine that "reality must be defined in terms of experience"[5]—or, as even more sharply expressed, that "reality is experience"[6]—these thinkers have evolved the notion that the "essence" of anything is not what it is, but what it is, not merely to but for me; not that which makes the thing precisely the thing it is, but that in the thing, whatever it may be, which I find needful for the realization of a purpose of my own. "The essence of a thing," says William James,[7] "is that one of its properties which is so important for my interest that, in comparison with it, I may neglect the rest." Applying this astonishing doctrine to historical entities, and especially to Christianity, which is the historical entity in which at the moment he is interested, Professor Macintosh feels able to argue that the essence of Christianity is not that in Christianity which makes it the particular thing which we call Christianity, but that in Christianity which he finds it desirable to preserve in constructing what he considers the ideal religion. Since the essence, as he tells us with the emphasis of italics, "is necessarily *what is essential for a purpose*," and the right purpose is, of course, the realization of the true ideal, the essence of the Christian religion is necessarily "that in the totality of the religious phe-

[5] John Dewey, Studies in Logical Theory, p. x.

[6] F. C. S. Schiller, Studies in Humanism, p. 463.

[7] The Principles of Psychology, 1908, II, p. 333; Text-Book of Psychology, 1892, p. 357.

nomena of Christianity which is a necessary factor in the realization of the true ideal for humanity, and of the true ideal for human religion in particular"; or, varying the language slightly without altering the sense, "whatever in actual phenomenal Christianity is necessary for the realization of the true ideal of human spiritual life in general and of human religion in particular."

The odd thing is that Professor Macintosh does not betray any consciousness of the outstanding fact that, in the process of his reasoning, he has transmuted the question which he started out to discuss, namely, What is essential to the retention of Christianity? into the fundamentally different one, in which he is himself perhaps more deeply interested, of What in Christianity is it essential that we retain?—namely in order that we may build up "the ideal religion. Unless we judge it to be still odder that he does not seem to have considered what would be the effect of the application of this method of determining the essence of a religious system to other religions besides Christianity—although he expressly presents it broadly as the proper method of determining "the essence of the Christian religion, or, for that matter, the essence of any historical *quantum*." If the discovery "in the totality of the religious phenomena of Christianity" of something which we judge "necessary for the realization of the true ideal of human spiritual life in general and of human religion in particular" justifies our calling that particular thing the "essence of Christianity" and ourselves, on the strength of our retention of it, "Christians"; would not the discovery of such an element in "the totality of the religious phenomena" of, say, Mormonism, equally justify us in declaring that element the "essence" of Mormonism and ourselves Mormons on the strength of our retention of it in our ideal religion? And surely we cannot doubt that

Mormonism does possess in its composite system, however deeply buried beneath its own *bizarreries*, some truly religious and even some truly Christian elements —from which, indeed, we may believe, it derives whatever vitality it exhibits as a religious system; and certainly we cannot avoid retaining these elements as we build up our ideal religion. Or, if we seem to go too far afield in adducing Mormonism as an example, let us think for a moment of that active Christian sect known as the Seventh-Day Adventists. Undoubtedly, in the "totality of the religious phenomena" exhibited in the life of the members of this sect, there are many elements which must abide in any ideal system of religion. Do these elements therefore constitute the "essence" of Seventh-Day Adventism? And does our retention of them in our ideal construction justify our calling ourselves Seventh-Day Adventists?

It may not be an unpleasing thought to Professor Macintosh that, discerning something of value in each of the great religious movements which have stirred the waters of humanity, and preserving for the purposes of his ideal religion all that he sees in them of value, he may conceive himself to have therefore embraced "the essence" of each of them in turn, and to have thus acquired the right to claim for himself the name of every one of them. It may please him thus to think of himself as at once a Fetishist and a Shamanist, a Brahmanist and a Buddhist, a Confucian and a Mussulman, as well as a Jew and a Christian; perhaps also at once a Romanist and a Protestant, a Pelagian and an Augustinian, an Arminian and a Calvinist—for surely there is *something* of permanent value even in Calvinism, and if so, that is its "essence," and he who holds to the "essence" of Calvinism is surely a Calvinist. We have no wish to deny that Professor Macintosh's claim upon the one name may be as sound

as upon another. But we confess to a doubt of the value of so diffused a claim upon names representing movements historically so distinct. And we confess to something more than a doubt of the validity of the method of determining "the essence" of historical entities which may lead to results so very embarrassing.

It must be admitted that the notion of "essence" has not always been dealt with lucidly by the metaphysicians. Cicero, indeed, who introduced the term into the Latin language, defined it very sensibly as "the whole of that by which a thing is, and is what it is"—a definition happily echoed in Locke's "the very being of anything, whereby it is what it is." And that essentially this remains the meaning of the term until today in general philosophical usage, we may be assured by Rudolf Eisler's definition of it. "Essence (*οὐσία, essentia*)," says he,[8] "is, ontologically speaking, that which constitutes the reality (Selbst-Sein) of a thing, its most proper, abiding nature, in distinction from its time-and-space-conditioned, changeable existence." Even an activist like the late Borden P. Bowne[9] without hesitation speaks in the same sense of "essence" as just "the nature of a thing": "We believe that everything is what it is because of its nature, and that things differ because they have different natures. . . . The nature of a thing expresses the thing's real essence; and we hold that we have no true knowledge of the thing until we grasp its nature." To him, of course, as Being is just action, and a thing as conceived just a "conceived formula of action," the essence of a thing consists in a law "which gives both its coexistent and its sequent manifestations." But this concerns only his ontology. Under its guidance he writes:

"Now this rule or law which determines the form and sequence of a thing's activities, represents to our thought the nature of a thing, or

[8] Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe,[3] 1910, p. 1774.

[9] Metaphysics, 1882, pp. 59–60.

expresses its true essence. It is in this law that the definiteness of a thing is to be found; and it is under this general form of a law determining the form and sequence of activity that we must think of the nature of the thing." "In the metaphysical sense, the nature of a thing is that law of activity whereby it is not merely a member of a class, but also, and primarily, itself in distinction from all other things." "When then we speak of the nature of a thing under the form of a law, we regard this law as entirely specific and individual and not as universal. The nature has the form of a law but applies only to the single case."

In one word, to Bowne too, the "essence" means just the specific quality of a thing.

Nevertheless already a half-century ago James McCosh could write of "essence": "It is a very mystical word, and a whole aggregate of foolish speculation has clustered round it."[10] He had perhaps been reading the section on "essence" in Hegel's *Phaenomenologie*, without the assistance of William Wallace. "Still," he adds hopefully, "it may have a meaning." Whether he could have spoken so hopefully, had he had the discussions of our Twentieth-century Pragmatists before him, we can only conjecture. Certainly they have done what they could to confuse the matter, and it may be a fair question whether under their definitions the term "essence" retains any meaning at all. What is called its "essence" certainly ceases to have any significance for the object whose "essence" it is said to be; and, being transmuted into merely whatever the changing observer in his changing moods may find from time to time in an object utilizable for his varying purposes, has whatever significance it may retain rather for him than for it. We observe in the mean time that the Pragmatists have great difficulty in carrying their discussions of "essence" through consistently on these lines. The real meaning of the term is continually making itself felt, and advertising to the reader the artificiality of the construction which is being commended to him.

[10] The Intuitions of the Mind,[2] 1869, p. 152.

William James's discussion is particularly instructive in this respect.[11] Every object, he explains, has an indefinite number of attributes. But we, being finite, cannot attend to all these attributes at once. We must, by the necessity of the case, make a selection. And we shall inevitably make our selection according to our interests. The attribute to which we attend under the influence of an interest at the moment governing our attention, is not more "essential" to the object than any other attribute to which another observer, led by another interest, or ourselves at another time, governed by another interest, may attend. The object "is really *all* that it is"—a statement which seems to assure us that the essence of an object is "really" all that by virtue of which it is what it is, and that is very much the old definition of "essence." But *we* must "attack it piecemeal, ignoring the solid fulness in which the elements of Nature exist, and stringing one after another of them together in a serial way, to suit our little interests as they change from hour to hour." Thus the "essence" of the object may seem to us to be a different attribute at each successive moment. And that leads James to declare with the emphasis of underscoring: "*There is no property* ABSOLUTELY *essential to any one thing.* The same property which figures as the essence of a thing on one occasion becomes a very unessential feature upon another." This, however, can only mean that there is no single property among the many which belong to the object "really" which is "absolutely," that is to say, always and in every contingency, essential —to us, for our interests and purposes. Our interests change, and with the change of interest the quality of the object to which we attend also changes. This is not to say, of course, that there are no properties of an object which are absolutely, that is indispensably,

[11] The Principles of Psychology, 1898, I, pp. 332 ff.

essential—to it, that is to say to the preservation of its integrity as the very thing that it is. That this cannot be said is already made plain when it is declared that the object "is really all that it is." That little word "really" has confounded all of James's reasoning. And so he proceeds to tell us that "the elements of Nature exist" "in solid fulness"; and that it is only our partial, piecemeal dealing with them that hides this fact from us from time to time. Things, then, have "really" a "solid fulness" of properties by virtue of which they are objectively what they are; and this fact cannot be altered, though it may be obscured, by our habit—it may be a necessary habit—of attending to this "solid fulness" of elements one by one, and emphasizing each as it may meet a transient (or permanent) interest of our own. What things "really" are—that is what is essential *to them;* what in them meets an interest of ours (transient or permanent)—that is what we find essential *for our* (transient or permanent) purposes.

It is quite proper for James to say, therefore, that those properties which we are accustomed to select out of an object in accordance with "our usual purpose," "characterize us more than they characterize the thing." They are, no doubt, properties of the thing, and so far characterize it. But they need not be the particular properties of the thing which are most characteristic of it and form its specific quality. They are only the particular qualities of the thing by virtue of which it is most usually serviceable for us, and which therefore most constantly attract our attention. It is not implied, therefore, that there are no qualities which particularly characterize the thing, make it the thing it is, and so constitute its "essence." It is only recognized that we do not always, or commonly, select these properties for contemplation. When we are making selections of properties in accordance with our interests, we

rather commonly, or always, select elements in the object which, because they are essential to *our* purposes, characterize *us* rather than the object. It is passing strange, therefore, that James should now go on to define the "essence *of a thing*," as "that one of its properties which is so *important for my interests* that in comparison with it I may neglect the rest." This, he has told us, is not "really" "the *essence* of the thing"; *that* lies elsewhere, and *this* is only the element in the thing which is essential *to my purpose*—which surely is a very different matter; unless, indeed, our particular purpose at the moment happens to be to determine what the "essence of the thing" is, in which case we may perhaps select out the particular properties which, constituting the essence of the thing, meet also our present purpose.

It is, of course, the Pragmatic point of view which, intruding here so many years before its formal announcement, forces this logical saltation upon James. From this point of view, he despises all questions of "inner essence"[12] as mere hair-splitting abstractions, and insists that "we carve out everything" "to suit our human purposes."[13] Accordingly he suddenly asserts here, without any justification in the preceding discussion, that "the only meaning of essence is teleological." A thing *is* just what it is good for, and, let us add, just what it is good for to me—and now. He has given us no reason, however, to believe that this is the case. He has only given us reason to believe that our interest in things is apt to be focussed on whatever we find serviceable to us, for the moment or permanently. That this is not all that the things are, however, he tells us himself, when he tells us not only that "the properties which are important vary from man to man and from hour to hour" in accordance with the purposes which dominate observation, but in express words that "the reality

[12] Cf. Pragmatism, 1907, p. 107.

[13] Pragmatism, pp. 251 ff.

overflows these purposes at every pore." Surely it cannot be pretended that the properties which constitute the "concrete fact" "vary from man to man and from hour to hour," and are never more than what meets our purposes, which the reality that they constitute "overflows at every pore." And surely it is legitimate to inquire what then these properties are which enter into and constitute this "concrete fact," from the richness of which men may select what suits their purposes from time to time, but which in its richness "overflows" these purposes "at every pore." On the face of it this is the problem of "the essence" of the "concrete fact" in question.

Except that it seems to show a somewhat more formal respect for objectivity, F. C. S. Schiller's definition of "essence"[14] does not differ essentially from James's. He speaks, of course, from his activistic standpoint, to which "the activity is the substance; a thing *is* only in so far as it is active." "So it is the activity," he explains, "which *makes* both the 'essence' and the 'accidents,' both of which are as it were 'precipitated' from the same process of active functioning." "'The essence,'" therefore, he proceeds, "is merely such aspects of the whole behavior as are selected from among the rest by reason either of their relative permanence or of their importance for our purposes." He is recognizing nothing but activities. Some of these "activities" are "relatively" more permanent than others. Some of them are more important for us than others. We are to call either the one or the other of these sets of "activities" the "essence" of the object under consideration. Which? The former give us an objective criterion; the latter, a subjective one. Both are activities; but the latter only are conceived Pragmatically. If the latter be employed as our criterion, we are fully on William

[14] Humanism (1903),[2] 1912, p. 225.

James's ground. If the former, we seem to be as fully off of it; we seem to be allowing that the "essence" of a thing is what makes it persistently (at least "relatively") the thing that it is, not what we discover in it serviceable to us—which is what we shall have if the latter criterion be employed.

How the two criteria—objective and subjective—can be conciliated, does not appear. Schiller does indeed tell us that they "are, of course, convergent." And he explains this by remarking that "a permanent aspect is naturally one which it is important for us to take into account, while an important aspect is naturally one which we try to render permanent." We shall have to take his word for both declaration and explanation. An aspect taken into account because it is permanent is surely one selected on grounds relative to the object; it tells us what the object itself is, or, if we prefer that mode of statement, how the object itself behaves. And an aspect taken into account because it is important for us (we assume that it is not significant that the "for us" has dropped out of the second clause) is one selected on grounds relative to us, to "our purposes"; it tells us what we find in the object (or its behavior) which is serviceable to us. How these two criteria can be said to "converge" passes our comprehension—unless indeed we are to think circularly as well as activistically, and conceive that motions in diametrically opposite directions will meet—on the other side of the circle. It must be admitted that Schiller's statement is not free from suggestions of such a circular movement. If an aspect of the behavior of an object under our contemplation is to be held "important for us" because it is permanent, one would think that its observed permanence would precede our interest and determine it; and that, in such a case, we could scarcely say that the "essence" of the object, identified with this permanent aspect of its

behavior, is determined by our interest. And yet we are immediately told that we can render permanent an aspect of the behavior of such an object in which we chance to be interested; or at least that we may try to do so, presumably hopefully. One would like to know how he is to go about trying to make permanent an aspect of the behavior of an object under his observation; and if we can render an aspect of it permanent because it is important for us that it should be so, why cannot we create this aspect for ourselves in the first instance, that it may serve our purposes?

We may take it that Schiller's disjunctive is merely another illustration of the difficulty of carrying out the programme of the subjectivation of the "essence," and that it therefore bears witness only to the fact that the "essence" of an object cannot really be conceived merely as that in it which is essential for me—which is of importance for my purposes—but will continue to present itself as that in the object which is essential for it—which is necessary to its integrity, to its remaining the precise thing it is. That is to say, those aspects of the whole behavior of an object which are permanent constitute its "essence," and that quite independently of their "importance for us." It is important, of course, that we should take cognizance of them and adjust our behavior to them, for they constitute reality, that actual environment upon which we react. Hardness, for example, does not enter into the essence of a stone-wall because it serves an interest of ours and can be made serviceable to us. It enters into its essence because it is "there," quite independently of its serving an interest of ours; and it is important for us to recognize that it is "there" because the recognition of realities serves interests of ours, and realities have a very unpleasant fashion of revenging themselves on those who do not recognize them. It is the hardness of the stone-wall

which determines our interests, not our interests which determine its hardness; and it would be very difficult to understand how we should go about rendering its hardness permanent, because we found it important for us. We may discover many good reasons on the other hand, why it would be well for us to render permanent our recognition that a stone-wall is hard. The assumption of an "external world" which ordinary experience makes, as Schiller himself allows, "works splendidly."[15]

It is upon some such flimsy philosophical basis that Professor Macintosh, transferring the matter to the sphere of historical entities, develops his method of determining the "essence" of historical movements. It must be allowed that, in applying to this new class of objects the principles laid down by the metaphysicians, he proceeds with a consistency which fairly puts the metaphysicians to the blush. He is seeking what he indifferently speaks of as a valid "definition," "the real nature," the "essence" of the Christian religion. In order to obtain this, he lays down with great firmness and with the emphasis of italics the general proposition that "the essence," that is, the essence of any "historical *quantum*," "is necessarily *what is essential for a purpose*." The "unrelieved subjectivity" of this proposition is obvious, and he seeks to mitigate it, but only by insisting that "the controlling purpose" which is to determine the essence of an object "must be the right purpose in the given situation." He explains this to mean that it must be "the purpose to realize what under the circumstances is the true ideal." Thus we obtain what he regards as two "normative principles" which it is necessary to observe in extracting "the essence" from any historical entity. They are: "in the first place, the essence must be in the total actuality"; "and in the second place, the

[15] Studies in Humanism, p. 459.

controlling purpose must be the right purpose." "In short," we read (again in the emphasis of italics), "*the essence is whatever is both present in the actual and demanded by the ideal.*"

Why the essence of any historical entity must be something found not only in it but also in our ideal, is not made clear to us, and we profess ourselves unable to divine. We appear only to be given a formula by means of which we may get rid of the historical entity and substitute for it our own ideal; we are to recognize as the essence of the historical entity nothing that we do not find in our ideal. Shall Protestant investigators then declare that the essence of Romanism must be identified with what is common to Romanism and their ideals? Or Rationalistic investigators declare that the essence of Protestantism is what is common to Protestantism and their ideals? In that case Romanism is merely defined as really Protestantism, and Protestantism as really Rationalism. The matter is not relieved by the expedient taken to guard against error. "To guarantee that what is taken as essential is the real essence," we read, "what is taken as the ideal must be the true ideal." What is to guarantee that what is taken as the ideal is the true ideal, we are not told here, but afterwards it is intimated that "what this true ideal is, must be determined by a critical philosophy of values," which leaves us in great concern to know whose "critical philosophy of values" is to have this decisive function committed to it.

A third normative principle is now, however, invoked. What is under these rules extracted as the essence of any historical entity must, we are told, "be able to maintain itself after it has been selected and separated from all that is unessential"—that is, we infer, from all that to the investigator seeking the "true ideal" seems harmful to that ideal. Accordingly, "in addition

to being the highest common factor of the actual and the ideal, *the essence must be vital enough to persist in separation from all that must be eliminated.*" "The essence of the actual, then"—we reach now the final summing up—"is that element in the actual whose continued existence is demanded by the true ideal, and which can retain its actuality and vitality after the elimination of all objectionable elements from the actual at the demand of that same ideal."

The process of extracting the essence of any historical entity which is commended to us by Professor Macintosh is now before us. It is in brief the following. First, by "a critical philosophy of values," determine independently for yourself what is the true ideal. Next, go to the historical entity in question with this "true ideal" in your hand, and select from this historical entity whatever seems to you fitted to promote the "true ideal." This is "the essence" of that historical entity—provided only that when you discard all in it which is not in your judgment fitted to promote your "true ideal," enough is left to call the essence of anything. If not enough is left, then say that that entity has no "good essence" and discard it *in toto*. Clearly, in this process, the historical entity is nothing; our ideal is everything. We have simply sunk the historical entity in our ideal; and it almost has the look of a concession that it is still allowed that what is called its essence shall actually be found in the historical entity.

Applying this method of extracting the essence of historical entities to the Christian religion, Professor Macintosh has naturally no difficulty in moulding Christianity to his own taste. He tells us that the result reached is that "the Christian religion" "must be in essence whatever in actual phenomenal Christianity is necessary for the realization of the true ideal of human spiritual life in general and of human religion in par-

ticular." Obviously, then, the contents of "the Christian religion" are not determined by the contents of "actual phenomenal Christianity"—and by this must be understood not merely the Christianity which happens to be actual at any one moment, but any and all Christianity which has ever been actual in the course of its entire history—but by the contents of "the true ideal of human spiritual life in general and of human religion in particular." The "true ideal" of religion—that is, of course, the investigator's ideal of what religion ought to be, determined, no doubt, by his "critical philosophy of values"—is thus simply substituted for Christianity, and given its name. The only connection which this ideal can claim with "actual phenomenal Christianity"—that is, any Christianity which has ever actually existed—will be dependent on the presence in "actual phenomenal Christianity" of elements which are in harmony with it and may, therefore, be preserved. Whatever in "actual phenomenal Christianity" agrees with "the true ideal" of religion is preserved; the rest is discarded; and the total ideal religion,—inclusive, of course, of the elements thus "taken over" from "actual phenomenal religion" because already present in the ideal religion, and also, of course, of all else that is contained in the ideal religion which was not present in "actual phenomenal Christianity,"—receives the name of "the Christian religion." The process is exceedingly simple. "Our religion" is certainly Christianity, because *real* Christianity is, of course, just "our religion." Everything else in "actual phenomenal Christianity" is to be discarded because it is not included in "our religion."

The particular religion to which, under the name of "the ideal religion," Professor Macintosh reduces Christianity by this process, proves, as has been already intimated, to be indistinguishable from that which is generally professed in the circles of so-called "Libera

Christianity." How he arrives at the conviction that this is "the ideal religion" and therefore essential Christianity, he does not fully explain to us. It emerges as such in his pages as the culmination of an exposition of the fundamentally moral character of Christianity as he conceives it—a moral character attributed to his "Christianity" because it is an element "common to actual Christianity and to ideal religion." If we understand Professor Macintosh at this point, he defines Christianity on this ground as the "religion of moral redemption," and then distinguishes it from other religions of moral redemption by the particular quality of the morality of which the redemption wrought by it consists. Christianity, he says, "is the religion whose 'miracle' or 'revelation' consists in the experience of *moral* 'salvation' or 'redemption.'"[16] To the objection that "a moral element is to be found in other historical religions also," he seems to reply that this need not invalidate the claim of Christianity to be the moral religion by way of eminence—if, that is, the quality of the morality brought by it to its votaries may be shown to be superior to that offered by other moral religions. This he affirms to be the fact, and he fixes on the term "Christlike" to express the specific quality of specifically Christian morality. Accumulating emphasis upon this quality he declares, then, that "Christianity is the religion of deliverance from unchristlikeness to a Christlike morality, through a Christlike attitude towards a Christlike superhuman reality." Repeating this with further elaboration, he declares again: "There is good ground to suppose, then, we take it, that redemption from unchristlikeness to a Christlike morality and ultimately to a Christlike fellowship with God, accomplished in the life of men by the activity of the Christlike God in response to a Christ-

[16] The echoes of Rudolf Eucken's language may be noted, but we do not stop to advert to the matter.

like dependence and filial attitude on the part of the individual, is the essence of the Christian religion."

It is important to observe that these statements contain much more than was prepared for by the preceding argument. We have travelled very rapidly and very far and have arrived very unexpectedly at a very definite dogmatic result. Not only is the character of the morality involved in the Christian "redemption" defined as "Christlike" without sufficient justification or even explanation, so that we get a particular standard of morality, and one, be it observed, quite external to the subjects of religion, and wholly dependent on the truth of history for its validity and its very meaning. But we also have a particular manner—and that a very astonishing manner—in which the moral revolution asserted to take place in the subjects of the Christian religion, is wrought, made, without any, we do not say merely justification, but preparation in the preceding discussion, a part of the definition of that religion. It is wrought, we are now suddenly told, "through a Christlike attitude towards a Christlike superhuman reality"; "by the activity of the Christlike God in response to a Christlike dependence and filial attitude on the part of the individual." The essence of the Christian religion is thus made to consist not merely in the fact that it brings a moral redemption, and not merely in the specific character of the morality which it brings, but still further in the particular manner in which this moral redemption is produced. We do not stop now to press the question of what is involved with respect to the relation of Christianity to the historic Christ in the definition of this morality—and everything else significantly Christian—as "Christlike." We merely ask the warrant for the particular manner in which the moral revolution which is declared to be the essence of Christianity is asserted to be accomplished. Professor

Macintosh gives us none. At a later point, it is true, we are told that this is involved in "the essence of the Christian gospel," and that this is derived from "the religious example of Jesus." "The Christian evangel," we read, "is the gospel of the power of God manifesting itself in a Christlike morality on condition of the cultivation of a life of Christlike religious devotion. It is the gospel of the universal possibility of redemption as a human religious experience, through following the religious example of Jesus, taking the attitude of sonship towards the 'God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.'" We have difficulty, however, in accepting mere repetition as justification. And we observe that Professor Macintosh can only profess in any case to be "practically certain" that the attitude here declared to be of the essence of Christianity on the ground that it was the attitude of Jesus, was really "the religious attitude of Jesus"; and indeed contends strenuously that it is not absolutely necessary for the validation of his "Christianity," thus made to hang entirely on the example of Jesus, that there ever should have been any Jesus to set this example. Nor have we discovered any reason given by him justifying the belief that if there was a Jesus and this was His attitude to God, it is capable of being imitated by us; or indeed whether, if it were imitable by us, it would have the effects asserted for it. The upshot of it all is merely that it is dogmatically declared to us, with no reasons rendered, that the ordinary "Liberal" construction of Christianity is the only true Christianity, and its fundamental postulates constitute "the essence of Christianity." On the face of it this declaration rests on nothing more solid than that the ordinary "Liberal" construction of Christianity seems to Professor Macintosh the "ideal religion," and it pleases him to call what he thinks the "ideal religion," "Christianity."

Even Adolf Harnack did better than that. It is quite true, as Alfred Loisy points out,[17] that Harnack does not speak really as a historian but as a dogmatician, in those brilliant lectures in which he advocates his personal religious opinions[18] under the name of "the essence of Christianity," and which, Ernst Troeltsch tells us,[19] have become "to a certain degree the Symbolical Book of all those who follow the historical tendency in theology." But he had at least the grace to profess to derive his idea of what Christianity is from historical Christianity, and his argument at least formally runs, that this and nothing else is the essence of the Christianity which was launched into the world by Jesus and has been lived by His followers. He tells us accordingly[20] that it is "a purely historical question" which he undertakes, and that therefore it is to be dealt with absolutely objectively; we are simply to ask what Christianity is without regard to what "position the individual who examines it may take up in regard to it, or whether in his own life he values it or not." His historical point of view is so marked, indeed, that he even declares that though we must start from "Jesus Christ and His Gospel," it is impossible to get "a complete answer to the question, What is Christianity?" "so long as we are restricted to Jesus Christ's teaching alone"; we must look upon Him merely as the root out of which the tree of Christianity has grown. "We cannot form any right estimate of the Christian religion unless we

[17] L'Évangile et l'Église,[3] 1904, p. ix: "The definition of Christianity according to Harnack—is it that of a historian or only that of a theologian who takes in history what suits his theology? The theory which is expounded in the lectures on The Essence of Christianity is the same as that which dominates the learned History of Dogmas which the same author has published. But has he really deduced it from history, or has he rather only interpreted history according to the theory?"

[18] Loisy, p. v, justly calls the Wesen des Christentums, "a profession of personal faith in the form of a historical sketch."

[19] Die Christliche Welt, xvii (1903), 19, p. 444.

[20] Das Wesen des Christentums, 1900, 56–60 thousand, 1901, Lect. 1. E. T., What is Christianity? 1901, pp. 7, 8, 10, 11, 15.

take our stand on a comprehensive induction which shall cover all the facts of its history." "What is common to all the forms it has taken, corrected by reference to the Gospel, and, conversely, the chief features of the Gospel corrected by reference to history, will, we may be allowed to hope, bring us to the kernel of the matter."

We could not easily have fairer historical professions. The pity is that Harnack's actual procedure corresponds so ill with them. He certainly does not approach his task in a purely historical spirit. He brings with him to the investigation of the teaching of Jesus, for example, a whole body of presuppositions, under the influence of which he forces his material into preconceived moulds. And he certainly does not derive his conception of Christianity from an induction from its entire phenomenal manifestation; he simply makes his reconstructed version of Jesus' Christianity the sole Christianity which he will recognize. Troeltsch [21] accordingly is compelled to pronounce Harnack's critics right when they declare that "his *Wesen* is no purely empirical-inductive work, but includes in it strong religio-philosophical preconceptions by which it is deeply influenced"; nor can he deny that Harnack treats the gospel of Jesus alone as the essence of Christianity and "works up the details of Jesus' preaching into an idea of Christianity, which he then merely illustrates from the later history of the Church, partly by pointing to departures from it, partly by emphasizing what is consonant with it in further developments." [22] What Harnack invites us to do is thus in point of fact merely to recognize as "the essence of Christianity" the "religion of Jesus" as he has reconstructed it under the influence of his own naturalistic

[21] As cited, p. 486 f.

[22] Cf. W. Sanday's remarks, An Examination of Harnack's What is Christianity? 1901, pp. 16 ff.: "And yet in spite of these explicit promises, the criterion that Harnack really proposes throughout his book is his own mutilated version of the teaching of Jesus."

postulates. Before we can follow him we must be assured that what he presents as such was really "the religion of Jesus," and that "the religion of Jesus," in his sense of that phrase, is really Christianity. We do not need to adopt Loisy's standpoint to perceive the justice of his criticisms at these points. And surely a remark like this cuts to the bottom:

"If what is desired is to determine historically the essence of the gospel, the canons of a sound criticism do not permit us to resolve in advance to consider as unessential what we are now inclined to think uncertain or unacceptable. What is essential to the gospel of Jesus is what holds the first and the most considerable place in His authentic teaching, the ideas for which He strove and for which He died, not that merely which we believe to be still vital today. . . . In order to determine the essence of Islam we shall not take, in the teaching of the Prophet and in the Mussulman tradition, what we may consider true and fertile, but what was actually of most importance to Mahomet and his followers, in point of belief, ethics, and worship. Otherwise with a little good will we might discover that the essence of the Koran is the same as that of the Gospels—faith in the clement and merciful God."[23]

It is interesting and not uninstructive to observe in passing the diametrical opposition of the methods by which Harnack and Loisy, each, seek to extract the essence of Christianity. If Harnack, having reconstructed from the evangelical narratives a Jesus to fit his naturalistic presuppositions, sees in this reconstructed Jesus at once the entirety of Christianity and will allow nothing to enter into its essence but what he finds in Him, Loisy perceives in the Jesus to which he looks back through the stretches of history only the germ out of which his Christianity has expanded. It is Harnack, it is true, who writes[24]:

"Just as we cannot obtain a complete knowledge of a tree without regarding not only its root and its stem but also its bark, its

[23] As cited, pp. xiv ff. [24] As cited, p. 11.

branches, and the way in which it blooms, so we cannot form any right estimate of the Christian religion unless we take our stand upon a comprehensive induction that shall cover all the facts of its history."

But it is not Harnack's but Loisy's method which this figure suggests. "Why," demands Loisy [25]—

"Why ought the essence of the tree be thought to be contained in a single particle of the germ from which it has proceeded, and why will it not be just as truly and more perfectly realized in the tree as in the seed? Is the process of assimilation by which it makes its growth to be regarded as a change in the essence, virtually contained in the germ; or is it not rather the indispensable condition of its existence, of its preservation, of its advance in a life always the same and incessantly renewed?"

Harnack, he contends,[26]

"does not conceive of Christianity as a seed which has grown—first a potential plant, then an actual plant, identical with itself from the beginning of its evolution to the present moment, and from its root to the tip of its trunk; but as a ripe, or rather, a decayed, nut which must be shelled if its incorruptible kernel is to be reached. And Harnack tears off the shell with so much perseverance that the question arises whether anything will remain at the end!"

Perhaps with a little idealization, we may represent to ourselves the fundamental ideas embodied in the divergent views as involving essentially some such conceptions as the following. Harnack wishes to see the essence of Christianity in what is constant in the entire history of the Church, and just on that account seeks it in the primitive beginnings of Christianity—in those primitive beginnings, no doubt, as reconstructed by him on the basis of his postulates. He therefore makes primitive Christianity, the Christianity of Jesus Himself (as he reconstructs it), the standard of all Christianity; that alone is Christianity which is to be found in the preach-

[25] As cited, p. xxvi. [26] As cited, pp. xxix, xxx.

ing of Jesus. Loisy wishes to view Christianity as a constant development, as finding its reality not in its germ but in its full growth. The gospel of Jesus is merely to him the root of the Church; the Church is the living development of the gospel; the essence of Christianity is its historical evolution, which in every part is the necessary outcome of the complex of circumstances in which it lives.[27]

When he lays aside figures and speaks plainly, Loisy, it is true, finds difficulty in maintaining himself at these high levels. At one point, indeed, he seems to work rather with the ordinary logical conception of "essence" in his mind, according to which "it denotes the common quality or qualities which are found in all the members of a class."[28] He makes in effect a genus of Christianity by cutting it up into periods; and, extracting the characteristic quality of each period in turn, he compares these together and concludes that what is common to all is the essence of Christianity and what is peculiar to each is the differentiation of each period.[29] No doubt there may be obtained thus a conception of what has persisted through all ages of Christian history; and this may, in a sense, be called "common Christianity." But what will be the result, if perchance Christianity has become apostate in any one age and has recovered itself ("come to itself" like the Prodigal Son) only after a period of general corruption? Obviously, at the best, such a method must confound "the essence of Christianity" with the minimum of Christianity, and presents no great advantage in this respect over that thoroughly misleading method of determining what is essential to Christianity, dear to the hearts of all "indifferentists," which

[27] Cf. Troeltsch, as cited, p. 445. [28] McCosh, as cited, p. 152.

[29] As cited, p. xv: "If common traits have been conserved and developed from the origin until our day in the Church, these are the traits which constitute the essence of Christianity. At least the historian cannot recognize any others; he has no right to apply any other method than that which he applies to any other religion."

seeks it in what is common to all those who in any age "profess and call themselves Christians"—extension through space taking here the place of Loisy's extension through time. What is common to all who call themselves Christians, whether as extended through time or space, is, of course, just the minimum of Christianity; otherwise those forms of professed Christianity or those periods of Christian history in which only the minimum of Christianity is or has been confessed would be excluded. The "essence of Christianity" and the minimum of Christianity are not, however, synonymous expressions. If choice were confined to these two, it would be better to follow Loisy in his ecclesiastical evolutionism and discover the essence of Christianity in the maximum of Christianity, in Christianity in its fullest growth and vigor.

The evolutionism of Loisy is reproduced in Ernst Troeltsch, though of course with all the involved temperamental and environmental differences.[30] Troeltsch bids us[31] keep in mind that the conception involved in the phrase "the essence of Christianity" is historically inseparably wrapped up with the modern critical evolutionary point of view. The Romanist, he says, does not speak of "the essence of Christianity," but of the faith of the Church, and distinguishes only between the complete knowledge of that faith which is expected of the clergy and the less explicit knowledge of it which may be tolerated in the laity. Nor would old orthodox Protestantism have used the phrase. It would have said, "the revelation of the Bible," and have distinguished only between fundamental and non-fundamental articles. Even for the Enlightenment, the phrase would

[30] Six articles entitled "Was heist 'Wesen des Christentums,'" published in Die Christliche Welt, xvii (1903), Nos. 19, 21, 23, 25, 28, 29. These articles have been reprinted in Troeltsch's Gesammelte Schriften, II, 1913, pp. 386–451, but we cite from the articles.

[31] P. 483.

have had no significance. It spoke with Locke of "the reasonableness of Christianity" and rationalized the Bible, making the post-Apostolic Church responsible for all untenable dogmas. It is with Chateaubriand and his *Génie du Christianisme* that the notion first emerges into sight; that is to say, it is a product of Romanticism. And it is to the German Idealists and especially to the Hegelians that we owe its development. By it is not meant Christianity as a whole—this is external appearance—but that which unfolds itself in the phenomena of Christianity, "the idea and power" which has dominated Christianity through all its history and determined its varied phenomenal forms. It is "the internal spiritual unity" which binds all these phenomenal forms together and which can be reached only by a process of historical abstraction. Serving himself heir to the Hegelians (with the necessary corrections),[32] Troeltsch accordingly looks upon Christianity as, like other great coherent complexes of historical occurrences, the development of an idea which effloresces progressively, incorporating into itself and adapting to its uses all alien material which lies in its path. The isolation of this idea to thought is, in his view, the discovery of the essence of Christianity. The essence of Christianity is, therefore, an abstract notion by means of which the whole body of the phenomena which constitute Christian history is reduced to unity and explained.

It must not be imagined, however, that this wonderful informing idea which is to be distilled from phenomenal Christianity can, in the opinion of Troeltsch, "be simply abstracted from the whole course and the totality of the manifestations of Christianity in its historical development." A distinction, it is asserted, must be drawn between the phenomena which express the essence and those in which it is suppressed.[33] The historical

[32] P. 484. [33] P. 534.

forms must be subjected to a criticism according "to the ideal which informs the chief tendency."[34] This ideal may most conveniently be discovered, Troeltsch thinks, in the classical expression of Christianity in its origins.[35] But even there distinctions must be drawn. The primitive age must not be assumed to be a perfectly unitary complex. We must ask, What in the primitive age contains what is really classic? No doubt we shall find this in the figure and preaching of Jesus. But we must not forget that the figure and preaching of Jesus must be reconstructed. And for this reconstruction we need something more than the Synoptic Gospels. We need Paul and John, and more. "We do not find our foundation in the historical Christ, the Christ after the flesh, but in the spirit of Christ, which was disengaged by the destruction of the earthly manifestation in death."[36] The "words of Christ" are not Christianity; rather faith in Christ and the spirit which proceeds from this faith and operates in the community—this is Christianity. This spirit, however, did not exhaust its efficiency in the Pauline and Johannine Gospels; the totality of the Christian development is involved. In it elements continually present themselves, which were, no doubt, present in the primitive age, and in the light of the later development may be recognized as having been present in it, but which certainly only manifest themselves later and in particular circumstances. "We must recognize them as contained in the essence of Christianity and as important for the determination of that essence; we must look upon them as effects of the spirit of Christ: but we do not find them expressed in the primitive form in itself alone, and indeed cannot even directly attribute them to it."[37] So clear is it that we cannot derive the essence of Christianity exclusively from its primitive form; this essence "cannot be an

[34] P. 535. [35] P. 578–9. [36] P. 580. [37] P. 581.

unchangeable idea which is given once for all in the teaching of Jesus." Rather—

"the essence must be a somewhat which contains in itself energy and mobility, productive power of continuous reproduction. It can certainly not be denoted by a word or a doctrine, but only by an idea which includes in itself from the first mobility and fulness of life; *it must be a self-developing spiritual principle*, a 'germinative principle' or a seed-thought, as Caird has it, a historical idea in Ranke's sense, that is, not a metaphysical or dogmatic conception, but a spiritual force which contains in itself a life-aim and a life-value, and which unfolds in its consistency and power of adaptation."[38]

The continuity—the unity binding the multiplicity of forms together—is, Troeltsch admits, no doubt, difficult to trace. It cannot lie simply in the preaching of Jesus, as persisting in all forms of Christianity as their basal element; nor yet in an abstract, generic idea common to all varieties of Christianity. It does not consist in any formulated conception, but in a spiritual power embracing in itself many ideas. Nor are we done with it when we are done with historical Christianity. In determining the essence of Christianity we must take in present Christianity as well as past Christianity; yes, and future Christianity too—if we believe in any future for Christianity. Thus from an abstraction, the essence of Christianity becomes an ideal.[39] We cannot avoid transforming it thus if we stand in any vital relation to Christianity. We study its history that we may learn from it. What we thus learn must be applied to the present, and must be projected also into the future. Thus the "divinatorial imagination" of abstraction necessarily passes into that "prognostictional imagination" which presages the further unfolding of the basal idea.

"Determination of essence is modification of essence. It is the extraction of the essential idea of Christianity from history in such

[38] P. 581. [39] P. 651.

a fashion that it shall illuminate the future; and at the same time a vital survey of the present and the future world together in this light. The repeated determination of the essence is the repeated historical reorganization of Christianity. This can be avoided by none who seeks the essence of Christianity in a purely historical manner, and at the same time believes in the progressive power of the essence. Only those can take a different course who look upon Christianity as an outworn and transcended historical organism or who understand Christianity from an exclusively supernatural revelation in the Bible."[40]

This apparently means that Troeltsch is aware that in the process of extracting "the essence" of Christianity from its phenomenal manifestation, he is moulding it to his own ideals, and that he considers this natural to one in his position—one, that is, who looks upon Christianity as a growth and yet is concerned for its continuance in the world. We find him a little later, accordingly, speaking not merely of "the essential elements of Christianity" but rather of "the abiding and essential elements of Christianity." The notions of "abidingness" and "essentialness" have, however, in themselves nothing in common; and we only confuse ourselves, when we are seeking to discover the essence of Christianity, if we insist that what we find "essential" must be what we consider will be "abiding." We are here very near to employing the term "essential" again in the sense of "essential to us."

Troeltsch does not glose the essentially subjective character of the method of determining the essence of Christianity which he proposes, nor does he fail to perceive the danger which accompanies it of passing, without observing it, beyond the limits of Christianity into a new religion only loosely connected with Christianity.[41] These things, he says, simply must be recognized and faced. Then he continues[42]:

"These remarks show our attitude towards one of the strongest assaults made of late years upon the Christianity of the essence of

[40] P. 654. [41] P. 682. [42] P. 682–3.

Christianity, as Harnack and his friends understand it. Eduard von Hartmann, who already somewhat earlier called the so-called Liberal theology the self-decomposition of Protestantism, will not permit the left-wing Ritschlians—therefore, above all, Harnack and those of like mind with him—to pass any longer as Christians. Their essence of Christianity is, he intimates, the abandonment of Christianity; and their Christianity is a self-deception due to their training and sentiment. What they maintain to be Christianity is their modern religious conviction, which has only a loose connection with the real spirit of Christianity, and which clings all the more anxiously to a few accidental historical supports. The proof which Hartmann offers of this view is as instructive for the whole question of the essence of Christianity as for the question of the maintenance of its continuity. For him, in a purely historical sense, the essence of Christianity lies in the conception of God-manhood; and he explains this conception in a Pantheistic sense of the unity of the Divine and human spirits; and declares it the great idea of Christianity, which only needs to be separated from the myth of the incarnation of God in Jesus, and to be freed from all theistic-personal traits in the idea of God, to be able to enrich the religion of the future. That means, however, very clearly that Hartmann too will recognize as essence only what has in his eyes a relatively abiding importance; with him too the essential is what is valuable for the future, as he understands it. But because this abiding element can obtain for him its full further significance only by elimination of essential conceptions of historical Christianity, the revelation-significance of Jesus and the personality of God, therefore Christianity, despite it, is for him in its entirety a transcended epoch, and those are already fallen out of the continuity of Christianity who do not make the conception of God-manhood central, but by giving it an externally historical connection with some words of Jesus persuade themselves that an ethical Deism, without significance either for itself or for the future, is the essence of Christianity."

The question raised here, says Troeltsch, cannot be argued; the difference lies in the point of view. But the reader will scarcely be able to agree that a mere strong counter-assertion on the part of Troeltsch and his friends that they know themselves to possess a better objective-historical conception of Christianity than Hart-

mann, and to preserve with it a personal religious continuity precisely in what is essential to it, is a sufficient refutation of Hartmann's strictures. Their "Christianity" is confessedly not the Christianity of the past; as Troeltsch elsewhere acknowledges,[43] it is not the vital Christianity of the present; and it can become the "Christianity" of the future (as he also allows)[44] only if Christianity may suffer a sea-change into something possibly richer, but assuredly exceedingly strange—and yet remain Christianity. Whether it can perform this feat is the real question of "the essence of Christianity" as expounded by Troeltsch.

It is, of course, precisely Troeltsch's evolutionism which commends his presentation of "the essence" of Christianity to our evolution-obsessed generation. And a purer evolutionist than he, Edward Caird,[45] reminds us in more direct language that "evolution in human history includes revolution." If we are to distort (as Caird does) Tertullian's *anima naturaliter Christiana* into a prophetic pronouncement that what we call Christianity is the natural production of the human soul, as man struggles slowly towards the "consciousness of himself and of his relation to God," there is no reason why we should not understand that this so-called Christianity, as it reacts on its changing environment, takes on many forms and passes through many phases, connected only as the successive, though varying, expressions of the "growing idea of humanity." And there is no reason why these phases, as they succeed one another, should not advance by a zig-zag motion, which may often seem (and indeed be) retrogression, or should not sometimes even bring con-

[43] Die Bedeutung der Geschichtlichkeit Jesu für den Glauben, 1911; cf. Harvard Theological Review, V, 4 (October 1912), p. 459.

[44] Ibid. Troeltsch speaks of the change which Christianity has passed through in the hands of those who think with him as a "transformation."

[45] Article, "Christianity and the Historical Christ," in The New World, VI, xxi (March 1897), p. 10.

tiguous phases into a relation of direct opposition to one another; Caird tells us that the condition of development "is rebellion against the immediate past." Only, then, let it be distinctly understood, Christianity has lost all content. It is no longer a religion, but religion, finding its expression through varied forms: and the forms through which it finds its expression, whether of thought or of sentiment or of practice, are indifferent to it, so only the underlying religious impulse is there. It is only natural, therefore, that Jean Réville, for example, in endeavoring to tell us what "Liberal Protestantism" is—he might just as well have said "Liberal Christianity," he tells us himself—takes much this line.[46] It is not to be denied, of course, that there is a sense in which it may very properly be said that the essence of all religious movements is just religion. It is this primal instinct of human nature which gives its vitality to every form of religion from Fetishism up to—well just short, let us say, of the religions of revelation, if it be allowed that there is such a thing as revelation. Here we have the thing which all religions have in common, and by virtue of which they live in the world. We may abstract everything else from each of them in turn, and, leaving to each only the pure religious impulse and its products, may plausibly maintain that in this we have "the essence" of every religion which has ever existed or which can ever exist. Only, in that case, it is clear, we must allow that there never has been and never will be at bottom more than one religion. The "essence" of Christianity, so conceived, and the "essence" of Fetishism are the same; and we may, on the ground of holding

[46] Liberal Christianity, E. T. 1903, p. xi; cf. p. 200: "The profession of faith of Liberal Protestantism or of Liberal Christianity—for these two names are interchangeable—is wholly summed up in the single precept, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy soul and thy neighbor as thyself." It does not trouble itself, however, as to who or what this God is which its 'single precept' requires it to love" (pp. 64, 76, 120, 194).

to its "essence" call ourselves with equal right by either name. In holding the "essence" of one, we hold the "essence" of all. It was under the influence of some such conception that the late Auguste Sabatier lost himself in rapture over what he seemed to himself to see, in the way of real unity in the midst of apparent diversity, in any average congregation of "Christian" worshippers. There is the aged woman who has no other conception of God than the white-bearded old man with eyes like coals of fire she has seen in the pictures in the big Bible on the parlor-table. And there is the young collegian imbued with a pure Deism by his philosophical course at the university. And there is the disciple of Kant who holds that all positive ideas of God are contradictory and who can allow of God only that He is the Unknowable. And there is the proud Hegelian who knows all about God, and knows Him to be the All. Moved by a common piety all these bow down together and adore. I do not know, says Sabatier, if there is a spectacle on earth which is more like heaven![47]

From such a standpoint, the cry Back to Christ! can have, as Caird does not fail to remind us, little meaning. The adjective "Christian" is employed to describe the movement which goes by this name only because that particular movement of religious development is supposed, in point of fact, to have taken its temporal beginning in Christ, or to have reached in the rise of Christianity a decisive—or at least an important—stage of its development, or merely perhaps to have received from Christ or from the rise of Christianity some impulse, more or less notable, the memory of which is preserved in the name by which it thus is accidentally designated.

[47] Discours sur l'Évolution des Dogmes, pp. 21–22; cf. the comment on it by H. Bois, De la Connaissance Religieuse, 1894, pp. 35 ff. Also Jean Réville, Liberal Christianity, E. T. pp. 61 ff.: "You may hold doctrines most dissimilar and even irreconcilable concerning the essence of God and God's government of the world, and yet be equally good and faithful disciples of Christ."

It is in any case an illusion to suppose that we can find in Christ "the true form" of the movement which is thus more or less loosely connected with His name; that would be, Caird suggests, "seeking the living among the dead."[48] If we speak of Him as the "seed" out of which the "plant" of Christianity has grown, we are merely using tropical language which very easily may be deceptive. We may imagine that "there is an implicit fulness in the seed which is not completely repeated in any subsequent stage in the life of the plant"; but then we must allow that this fulness in the seed is very "implicit" indeed; and we should not do amiss to bear in mind that "we can know what is in the germ only by seeing how it manifests itself in the plant." We must, in plain words, interpret Christ from Christianity, not Christianity from Christ. It strikes the reader with a sense of unreality, therefore, when writers like Troeltsch, committed to an evolutionary view of Christianity, are found laying great stress on primitive Christianity and particularly on the personality and teaching of Jesus. No sooner does Troeltsch establish the "classical" place of primitive Christianity and especially of Jesus for the interpretation of Christianity, to be sure, than he forthwith sets himself to unravelling the coil in which he has thus involved himself. We do not say he succeeds in unravelling it. But that only shows that his evolutionary conception of Christianity is not only inconsistent with the significance he has established for Jesus as not merely the germ out of which it has grown but its Founder; but, being inconsistent with it, is untenable. We can look upon the stress laid upon primitive Christianity, and on the person and teaching of Jesus, by writers of this class, in a word, only as concessions to undeniable fact; fatal concessions to a fact

[48] Caird employs the phrase, not directly of the cry Back to Christ! but illustratively of the parallel cry, Back to Kant!

which, when fairly allowed for, refutes their entire point of view. Christianity, clearly, is not a natural evolution of the religious spirit of man, with a more or less accidental connection with the man Jesus; it is a particular religion instituted by Christ and given once for all its specific content by His authority.

The manner in which Troeltsch establishes the "classical" significance of "the person and preaching of Jesus" for the determination of the "essence" of Christianity, is meanwhile worth observing somewhat more closely on its own account. His acknowledgment of the universal recognition of "primitive Christianity and behind primitive Christianity the person and preaching of Jesus" as bearing this "classical" significance is itself a concession of the highest importance. He is, no doubt, dissatisfied with the manner in which the classical significance of primitive Christianity and the person and preaching of Jesus is ordinarily established, because of the involution in it of, as he explains, "the presuppositions of the popular antique supernaturalism" and because of the position of absolute authority in which it leaves primitive Christianity and Jesus. He desiderates, therefore, a new grounding for the acknowledged fact, a grounding which will invoke and issue in nothing which is unacceptable to "the purely human-historical conception." He explains[49]:

"What is in question is a purely historically grounded significance of primitive Christianity for the determination of the essence. Such an one is, of course, actually at hand in the fullest sense, and is easy to point to. The authentic meaning of a historical phenomenon is contained most strongly and purely in its origins; and if such a statement can apply only in a qualified sense to complicated culture-forms like, say, the Renaissance, it certainly applies without qualification to the prophetic-ethical religions, which receive their entire life from the personalities of their founders, require their adherents constantly to renew their vitality from the primitive sources, and therefore connect their names and essence in the closest way with

[49] P. 579.

their personalities; it especially applies in an unqualified sense to Christianity, which prescribes to its adherents more rigidly than any other religion the continual nourishment of their religious life from contact with the Founder, and in its Christ-mysticism[50] has produced a unique phenomenon which corresponds with especial clearness with this circumstance. Accordingly, it is self-evident that the determination of the essence should adhere before all to the primitive period, and look upon it as the classical age."

We may look askance at some of the things that are said in this extract, but one thing emerges with great emphasis. Christianity certainly did not just "grow up"; it was founded. And subsequently to its founding, it has not "run wild," gone off in this or that direction according as some contentless "informing spirit" or "germinal life" within it may have chanced to lead it; it has been held strictly, more strictly than any other religious movement, to its fundamental type, by constant references back to its foundations. For whatever reason, on whatever ground, it has kept a constant check upon itself lest it should depart from type, and has shown an amazing power, after whatever aberrations, continually to return to type. Its eye has been fixed not merely in forward gaze but in backward as well. It has manifested a unique capacity of growth, justifying its Founder's comparison of it to the mustard-seed and to the leaven; but, after all is said as to the transformations it has suffered, its slacknesses, its degenerations, its failures, its growth has lain not in the gradual development of a content for itself, but in the steadily increasing assimilation of its environment to itself. In this respect too it has been like the mustard-seed and the leaven to which its Founder compared it; it has grown at the expense of its environment, not being moulded by it, but moulding it. It has accordingly remained amid its changing surroundings, and through all the forms which it has occasionally taken, essentially the same; and

[50] On this Christ-mysticism, cf. also J. Réville, as cited, p. 123.

its "nature" is to be ascertained, therefore—like the "nature" of other stable entities—simply by looking at it. "Divinational imagination," and "prognostical imagination" are all very well in their place, and we have no wish to deny that there is a place for them even in estimating the meaning and movements of Christianity. But observation is the proper instrument for the ascertainment of the nature of stable entities, and in spite of the "varieties of Christianity" in time and in space, it will broadly suffice for the ascertainment of what Christianity is.

It is clear then, and it may be taken as generally acknowledged, that Christianity is not merely a form which religion has spontaneously taken in the course of developing culture, but a specific religion which has been "founded," and the specific content of which has been once for all imposed upon it at its foundation. It is in the strictest sense of the terms, a "positive religion," a "historical religion"; and its content is to be ascertained not by reference to what we may think "the ideal religion," but by reference to the character given it by its Founder. This is the real meaning of a procedure like Harnack's, when, after proposing to determine the nature of Christianity from its total historical manifestation, he really seeks and finds it solely in what he has brought himself to look upon as "the religion of Jesus." His procedure here is not in itself wrong. His fault lies primarily in the critical method by which he ascertains the "religion of Jesus"; or, to speak more exactly, by which he imposes his own ideal of religion upon Jesus as "the religion of Jesus." Thus he is led to present as "the religion of Jesus" a religion which is as different as possible from the actual religion of Jesus, and the result of that is that he completely separates "the religion of Jesus" from the religion which He founded, and is compelled, therefore, to treat Christianity in its entire

historical manifestation as a radical departure from "the religion of Jesus"; or, to put it brusquely, as a religion quite distinct from that which had been introduced into the world by Jesus, although it has usurped its place and name. In these circumstances, naturally, he could not fulfil his promise to present Christianity from "a comprehensive induction that should cover all the facts of its history." He could only present what he had determined to be "the religion of Jesus" as genuine Christianity, and illustrate from the subsequent history the greatness of its departure from the original type, and the occasional efforts which have been made to return more or less fully to it; perhaps also the abiding presence throughout its whole history of a persistent, if vague, apprehension that some such religion lay in the background, until at last at the end of the accumulating centuries, through great throes of labor, the "Liberal" theology has thrown off the superincumbent accretions and recovered the pure gospel; or, at least, recovered it in its essence; for the acknowledgment is inevitable that "the religion of Jesus" in its completeness, just as it lay in His own mind and heart, was His own, belonged to His time and circumstances, and cannot be brought back again, in its completeness, in our day. All we can do is to recover what in it is of "permanent validity."

In thus setting "the religion of Jesus" and historical Christianity over against one another in a relation which can be called nothing less than antipodal (whatever larger or smaller qualifications may be insisted upon) Harnack is speaking, of course, as the representative of the "Liberal" theology in general. It has become the traditional historical postulate of the "Liberal" construction of the early history of Christianity that the "religion of Jesus" was at once overlaid by the "faith of the primitive community", and this in turn by the dogmatic constructions of Paul. Thus Paul emerges to view as "the second

founder" of Christianity, and the Christianity which has propagated itself through the ages is held to derive from him rather than from Jesus.[51] Two deep clefts—between Paul and the primitive community and between the primitive community and Jesus—are imagined to separate historical Christianity from the teaching of Jesus; and across these, we are told, we must somehow find our way if we are to recover the teaching of Jesus, as across them the teaching of Jesus would have had to find its way if it were to determine the development of historical Christianity. It is to this conception of the course of early Christian history that William Wrede gives perhaps somewhat extreme expression when he declares—we avail ourselves of Harnack's words here—that "the second gospel," that is, the teaching of Paul over against "the first gospel," that is, the teaching of Jesus, "is something entirely new, that it, as far as it contains what we call historical Christianity, presents a new religion, in which Jesus Christ Himself has no, or only a most remote, part, and that the Apostle Paul is the founder of this religion."[52] And it is from this point of sight that Wilhelm Bousset, for example, twits "the orthodox" with "basing the truth of their whole system and the form of their faith on a fantastic mythical-dogmatic interpretation of the life of Jesus by Paul."[53]

[51] Cf. W. Wrede, Paul (1905), E. T. 1907, p. 179 ff.: "It follows then conclusively from all this that Paul is to be regarded as *the second founder of Christianity* . . . for Paul it demonstrably was who first . . . introduced into Christianity the ideas whose influence on its history up to the present time has been deepest and most far-reaching. . . . This second founder of Christianity has even, compared with the first, exercised beyond all doubt the stronger—not the better—influence. . . . Through long stretches of church history . . . he has thrust the greater person whom he meant only to serve utterly into the background." Cf. p. 165 f.: "The name 'disciple of Jesus' has little applicability to Paul, if it is used to denote a historical relation. . . . He stands much further away from Jesus than Jesus Himself stands from the noblest figures of Jewish piety."

[52] Harnack, Aus Wissenschaft und Leben, II, 1911, p. 216.

[53] Address on "The Significance of the Personality of Jesus Christ for Belief," printed in the Proceedings and Papers of the Fifth International Congress of Free Christianity and Religious Progress, 1911, p. 209.

One great difficulty—certainly not the only one nor even the greatest one—which stands in the way of this reading of the course of primitive Christian history, arises from Paul's vigorous repudiation of the honor thrust upon him. He emphatically denies that he is the teacher of a new gospel[54] and explicitly represents himself as in his teaching but repeating the common gospel of Christ which had been taught from the beginning; and that especially in those very items in which he is declared to be most violently the innovator. To adduce but a single instance—that with which we are at the moment most immediately concerned—Paul, in the most natural way in the world and with a simplicity which confounds every effort to discredit it, declares that he did not invent but received from his predecessors in the teaching of Christ's gospel the great central fact—it is made the head and front of his offending—"that Christ died for our sins, according to the Scriptures," that is to say, the Christian doctrine of atonement in the blood of Jesus.[55] We may believe, however, that it is rather the insuperable general difficulties which spring at once into sight when an attempt is made to construe Christianity as rather Paulinism—with its involved relegation of Jesus, as Wrede puts it, "utterly into the background" (though He is still inconsequently declared the greater person of the two)—which has caused this construction of primitive Christian history,

[54] Cf. E. von Dobschütz, TSK, 85 (1912), p. 364: "Paul calls his preaching gospel, the gospel; in conflict with the Judaisers, he vigorously denies that there is any other gospel (Gal. 1 [6], 2 Cor. 11 [4]); another gospel exists just as little as there exists another Christ." But Wrede (as cited, p. 166) does not hesitate to say there was another Christ: "The being whose disciple and apostle he wished to be was not actually the historical man, Jesus, but another." This contention indeed lies at the very root of the theory expressed by the phrase "the double gospel" in the New Testament.

[55] Wrede can only say in a footnote (p. 112, E. T. p. 168), that "it requires a very literal interpretation of Paul's words to make out that what was delivered to him includes 'died for *our* sins'"—a remark which is very naturally cited by von Dobschütz (p. 342, note) with a subaudition of derision.

long dallied with, to begin to crumble just so soon as it has been given clear and unvarnished statement and its logical consequences exhibited. It is not without its significance that a single recent number of a theological journal[56] contains side by side two articles in which the attempt is made to close up again the yawning gulf that has been opened by the speculations of the "Liberal" theology between Jesus and Paul. The circumstance that the two writers proceed to their common end by precisely opposite methods—the one by denying that Paul was a "Paulinist,"[57] and the other more reasonably by pointing out that Jesus was Himself very much of a "Paulinist"[58]—only exhibits the more clearly the precise nature of the difficulty which is created by attempting to set Paul in opposition to Jesus and emphasizes the more strongly the intolerableness of the situation induced.

We need not, however, go beyond Harnack himself to learn both the intolerableness and the untenableness of this construction of primitive Christian history. In an address delivered before the Fifth International Congress of Free Christianity and Religious Progress, held at Berlin in the early days of August 1910, under the title of *The Double Gospel in the New Testament*,[59] Harnack as decisively as von Dobschütz repels the notion that Paul was the author of a new gospel, and shows as clearly as von Dobschütz that the germ of Paul's teaching is to be found also in that of Jesus, although he still

[56] Theologische Studien und Kritiken, 85 (1912), Heft 3.

[57] G. Kittel, Jesus bei Paulus, pp. 366–402. By a drastic criticism of the text followed up by an artificial exegesis, Kittel manages to deprive Paul of everything which would markedly separate him from the "Liberal" Jesus.

[58] E. von Dobschütz, Gibt es ein doppeltes Evangelium in Neuen Testament? pp. 331–336. Von Dobschütz's thesis is that "the contrast between Jesus and Paul, as it has been set forth by the newer theology, especially since the publication of the Volksbücher of Bousset and Wrede, is possible only when the Gospel of Jesus has been greatly reduced and, on the other side, the traits of the preaching of Paul which lead away from the Gospel of Jesus are strongly emphasized in a one-sided manner" (p. 346).

[59] Aus Wissenschaft und Leben, II, 1911, pp. 211–224 (E. T. in the Proceedings and Papers of the Congress, 1911, pp. 97–107).

rests rather more than von Dobschütz under the illusion that the gospel of Paul differs from that of Jesus in important particulars.[60] He therefore speaks of "a double gospel" lying side by side in the teaching of the New Testament writers, and indeed persisting side by side throughout the entire history of the Church. The problem of the origin of what he calls "the second gospel," that is, "the preaching that the Son of God descended from heaven, was known as man, through His death and resurrection brought to believers redemption from sin, death, and devil, and thus realized God's eternal counsel of salvation"—just "Paulinism" in the tradition of the "Liberal" theology—he carries back with complete confidence to the beginnings of the Christian community. He says[61]:

"The declaration that Christ 'died for our sins according to the Scriptures' Paul calls a traditional, therefore a universal Christian article of belief of the first rank; and he says the same of the resurrection of Christ. It is accordingly certain that the original apostles and the Jerusalem community shared this belief and doctrine. This is also attested by the first chapters of the Book of Acts, the trustworthiness of which in this respect is incontestable. The problem must therefore be carried back chronologically from Paul to Jesus' first disciples. They already preached the atoning death (*Sühnetod*) and resurrection of Christ. If they preached them, however, they also of course recognized them as the principle articles, therefore as 'the gospel' in the gospel, and this is evident in point of fact in the oldest written Gospel which we possess, that is, in that of Mark. The whole work of Mark is so disposed and composed that death and resurrection appear as the aim of the entire presentation. Mark may certainly have been influenced by the Pauline preaching; but the same structure has been given to the Palestinian Gospel of Matthew too; it will not have been new then to the Palestinian Christians."

[60] Therefore von Dobschütz (p. 364) notes: "I must accordingly, however, repel also Harnack's formula of the 'double gospel' which is found in the New Testament, however much I approve of its purpose to bring the apostolic preaching again to its rights. I think that Paul and the others would have one and all protested against it; they were not conscious of any difference and would have acknowledged none."

[61] P. 216 (E. T. p. 101).

If Harnack's eyes are still so far holden, that he does not yet see that what Paul found in the primitive disciples they in turn found in Jesus Himself, he is still able to go a certain distance towards the recognition of this great fact also. We find him saying[62]:

"Jesus' proclamation comes so far into consideration here as He preached not only the necessity and actuality of forgiveness of sins, but undoubtedly placed His Person and His Work in relation to it. He not only laid claim to the power to forgive sins, but at the celebration of the Last Supper He brought His death into connection with the deliverance of souls. This may indeed be disputed, but this much is at any rate certain, that attachment to His Person, that is, discipleship, was His own provision. He, however, who attached himself to Him must have found and known Him as somehow 'the Way' to the Father and to all the benefits of the Kingdom ('Come unto me')."

Why these utterances of Harnack's should have aroused the wide-spread interest which they have is a little difficult to understand. Not only do they seem very much a matter of course—and Harnack himself reminds us that they have always been common property (not even Strauss, says he, disputed them, and Baur fully acknowledged them)[63]—but he had himself years ago set them in a clear light and partly in even more suggestive form, in his lectures on *The Essence of Christianity*. "If we also consider," says he there,[64] "that Jesus Himself described His death as a service which He was rendering to many, and that by a solemn act He instituted a lasting memorial of it—I see no reason to doubt the fact—we can understand how this death and the shame of the cross were bound to take the central place." He even calls attention there to that very significant fact, that the death of Christ, being looked upon as a sacrifice—as it confessedly was by His very earliest disciples—"put an end to all blood-sacrifices";[65]

[62] P. 218 (E. T. p. 103). [63] What is Christianity? p. 156.
[64] P. 160. [65] Pp. 156 ff.

surely not (as Harnack inconsequently suggests)[66] because it showed that blood-sacrifices were in themselves meaningless (it was itself looked upon as a blood-sacrifice), but because (as is implied in Harnack's own words) this was to Jesus' followers the only true blood-sacrifice and left no room for any other. "This death," he is impelled himself to write,[67] "had the value of a sacrificial death; for otherwise it would not have possessed the power to penetrate into that inner world out of which blood-sacrifices have issued"—which surely is as much as to say, with the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, that it actually cleansed the consciences of men while other sacrifices did not avail to cleanse them, that it satisfied the demands of the uneasy consciences of those who were suffering under a sense of their guilt.

That there is something still lacking in these acknowledgments is of course true. Something of what is lacking is supplied by von Dobschütz's somewhat more hearty recognition of the saving value which Jesus Himself attached to His death.[68] That He looked upon His death, not as an untoward accident befalling Him or as a hard necessity breaking off His work but as an instrument for the accomplishment of His mission, von Dobschütz shows with sufficient solidity. And

"We have still three declarations in which Jesus expresses Himself to His disciples—certainly only to them—with respect to the redemptive significance of His death, suggestively, figuratively, yet sufficiently distinctly; I mean the declaration about ministering and giving His life λύτρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν (Mk. 10 45), the declaration about the Body and Blood as symbols of the New Covenant (Mk. 14 24), and the declaration, transmitted to be sure only in the Fourth Gospel but certainly original, about the hazarding of

[66] P. 158. [67] P. 157 (German ed. p. 99).

[68] Pp. 352 ff. Harnack is inclined to deny to Jesus the saying recorded in Mk. 10 45, Matt. 20 28, especially its last clause (Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, 1912, xxii, p. 9); of von Dobschütz's three passages, he would allow therefore only one (Mk. 14 24) to be direct evidence of Jesus' teaching.

His life in conflict with the adversary who menaces His people (Jno. 10 [11]); three varying figures, all of which come at last to the recognition by Jesus of His death as necessary for the completion of His work, viz., for uniting men again with God, by an expiation removing the guilt which separated them, overcoming the Evil One, establishing the indissoluble covenant relation predicted by the prophets. I can find no decisive reason for exscinding these three declarations from the genuine tradition of Jesus. What has been adduced against them proceeds from *a priori* presuppositions which seem to me unjustified, such as that Jesus could not foresee His death, to say nothing of predicting it. Neither His own dismay at Gethsemane, nor the conduct of the disciples, their flight and their despair, gives any justification to such a contention. They remain psychologically thoroughly intelligible, even with respect to the perception and salutariness of His death. And then these declarations are, so to say, necessary for explaining the fact that the Apostolical preaching from the beginning deals with the redemptive significance of Jesus' death as with a settled fact, while yet remaining entirely without clarity as to the 'how' and seeking after varying explanations, all of which, however, ultimately move in directions more intimated than inculcated by these declarations of the Lord."

In order to reach the truth we need only take one step more and frankly recognize that these declarations are central to Jesus' conception of His mission.[69] And this step we must take not less on account of the declarations themselves (Jesus says expressly that He "came" for the distinct purpose of "giving His life as a ransom for many" and with great explicitness declares the sacrificial character of His death) than on account of numerous other less direct but no less real references to the significance of His mission as redemptive, and in order that the whole subsequent historical development may not be rendered unintelligible (the very disposition of the matter of the Gospels is determined by this presupposition, and the whole preaching of the disciples turns on it as its hinge). No doubt Jesus is

[69] Compare the discussion of the matter in The Princeton Theological Review, XI, 2 (April 1913), pp. 259 ff.

thus implicated in the presentation of Christianity as specifically a redemptive religion; "an appearance is created," to use Paul Wernle's phrase in an analogous connection, "that Jesus Himself is responsible for the momentous dogmatic development, and encumbered the simple, eternal will of God with a minimum of dogma and ecclesiasticism"[70]; an appearance, we may add, which is not deceptive, as Wernle would have us believe, and with an amount of "dogma" which cannot justly be called a "minimum." This is, however, only to permit Jesus to come to His rights in the matter of His teaching; and to allow Him to found the religion which He tells us He came to found, and not to insist on thrusting an essentially different one upon Him because we happen ourselves to like it better.[71] These declarations of Jesus as to the redemptive significance of His death cannot be denied to Him; their meaning cannot be eviscerated by studiously minimizing expositions,[72] and they cannot be deprived of their cardinal position in the religion which He founded.[73] In point of fact, Jesus announced His mission as not to the righteous but sinners; and what He offered to sinners was not mere exemption—or if even that word retains too much reminiscence of a price paid, say immunity—but specifically redemption.

In the mind of Jesus as truly as in the minds of His followers, the religion which He founded was by way of eminence the religion of redemption. Perhaps we could have no better evidence of this than the tenacity with

[70] Die Anfänge unserer Religion,[2] 1904, p. 58.

[71] A very pleasantly written exposition of Jesus' relation to "the double gospel" may be found in Lic. theol. Martin Schulze's brochure, Das Wesen des Christentums, 1897.

[72] We permit ourselves merely to refer here to the treatment of these by James Denney, The Death of Christ,[3] 1903, pp. 11–60. E. D. Burton's attempt to make "to give His life a ransom for many" mean to give His life, not His death (Biblical Ideas of Atonement, 1900, pp. 113 ff.) surely requires no refutation.

[73] Cf. what Paul Feine says, Theologie des Neuen Testaments, 1910, pp. 120 ff.

which those who would fain retain the name of Christianity while yet repudiating its specific character, cling to the term "redemptive" also as descriptive of the nature of their new Christianity, identified by them with the religion of Jesus. Professor Macintosh, for example, wishes still to describe his new religion as "the religion of moral redemption"; though he discriminates the notion which the term connotes with him as its broad sense, as over against "the narrow sense" which it bears in its customary application to Christianity. By "redemption" he means, however, merely "reformation;" and these are not only the narrow and the broad of it; they are specifically different conceptions, and the employment of the two terms as synonyms cannot fail to mislead. For our part, we prefer the perhaps brutal but certainly more unambiguous frankness of William Wrede.[74] He conceives "the religion of Jesus" on the same lines as Professor Macintosh's "Christianity," and roundly denies on that very account that it can strictly be called a religion of redemption, contrasting it with Paul's precisely on this score. He does not deny that "redemption" may have a wider meaning also, according to which we "may say of all real religion that it is and intends to be redemptive." But he knows very well that "it is not of this general truth that we are thinking when we characterize particular religions as religions of redemption." And since in his view the emphasis in the religion of Jesus "falls on individual piety and its connection with future salvation," he remarks simply, that "no one who set out to describe the religion which lives in the sayings and similitudes of Jesus could hit by any chance on the phrase 'religion of redemption,'" while on the other hand, with respect to Paul, "everything is said when we say that he made Christianity the religion of redemption." It tends to obscure the fact that a religion is being ascribed to

[74] Paul, pp. 177 f.

Jesus which is not in the accepted ("narrow") sense of the word "redemptive," to characterize the religion which is ascribed to Him so emphatically as "redemptive" (in the "wider" sense of the word), especially when it lies on the face of the record that the religion which Jesus founded is a redemptive religion in the narrow sense, that is to say, has the Cross set in its centre.

Its redemptive character has not, then, been imported into Christianity from without, in the course of its development in the world—whether through the instrumentality of Paul or of some other one. It has constituted its essence as a specific religion from the beginning; without which it would cease to be the religion that Jesus founded, and that, retaining the specific character impressed on it by Him, has borne His name through the centuries known from it as Christian. Precisely what Christianity was in the beginning, has ever been through all its history, and must continue to be so long as it keeps its specific character by virtue of which it is what it is, is a redemptive religion; or rather that particular redemptive religion which brings to man salvation from his sin, conceived as guilt as well as pollution, through the expiatory death of Jesus Christ.

So clear is this that even an observer who approaches the matter from a very general point of view, and seeks only, as a student of philosophy, to determine from the outstanding facts what the real nature of Christianity is, cannot miss it. Josiah Royce,[75] asks himself "what is vital in Christianity?" using the term "vital" much in the sense which is ordinarily attached to the term "essential." "That is vital for an organic type," he explains, illustratively, "which is so characteristic of that type that, were such vital features changed, the type in question, if not altogether destroyed, would be changed

[75] Essay III. in the volume, William James and Other Essays on the Philosophy of Life, 1911.

into what is essentially another type." In seeking an answer, he naturally brings the "Liberal" and what he calls the "Traditional" answers into comparison. "Is Christianity essentially a religion of redemption," he inquires, "in the sense in which tradition defines redemption? Or is Christianity simply that religion of the love of God and the love of man which the sayings and the parables so richly illustrate?" For the former view, he notes, is pleaded "the whole authority, such as it is, of the needs and religious experience of the church of Christian history; the church early found, or at least felt, that it could not live at all without thus interpreting the person and work of Christ." For the latter is pleaded that "the doctrine in view seems to be, at least in the main, unknown to the historic Christ, in so far as we can learn what He taught." Nevertheless he has no hesitation in rejecting the latter view, or in ascribing the former to Jesus. "As a student of philosophy, coming in no partisan spirit," he declares, "I must insist that this reduction of what is vital in Christianity to the so-called pure gospel of Christ, as He preached it and as it is recorded in the body of the presumably authentic sayings and parables, is profoundly unsatisfactory." The historic church was led to support the opposite view, he asserts, by "a sense of religious values which was a true sense." And despite what he (erroneously) believes to be the testimony of the records, he refuses to believe that the "Liberal" view can fully represent our Lord's own conception of His religion. He argues:

"For one thing Christ can hardly be supposed to have regarded His most authentically reported religious sayings as containing the whole of His message or as embodying the whole of His mission. For if He had so viewed the matter, the Messianic tragedy in which His life-work culminated would have been needless and unintelligible. For the rest, the doctrine that He taught is, as it stands, essentially incomplete. It is not a rounded whole. It looks beyond

itself for a completion, which the Master Himself unquestionably conceived in terms of the approaching end of the world, and which the church later conceived in terms of what has become indeed vital for Christianity."

That one who does not profess to approach the question with which he deals "as an authority in matters which are technically theological," and who has accordingly been led astray by those upon whom he was compelled to depend for the statement of the facts—and whose own interpretation, we must add, of the significance of the conclusion that he reaches leaves so much to be desired—should yet have seen thus clearly, and been led to assert thus strongly, that Christianity is, in its essence, "a redemptive religion" and that "what is most vital in Christianity is contained in whatever is essential and permanent about the doctrines of the incarnation and the atonement," seems a notable testimony to the obviousness of the main facts. Had Royce understood that these elements in the Christian religion which he finds vital to it were not introduced into it by the followers of Christ in their interpretation of His religion, but were inserted into it as its very heart by the Master Himself, we may fancy with what increased emphasis he would have insisted upon them as the very essence of this religion.

Professor Macintosh tells us, to be sure, that if this is Christianity, "he would have to confess not only that he is not a Christian, but that he does not see how he ever could be a Christian." It is a sad confession, but by no means an unexampled one. Every Inquiry Room supplies its contingent of like instances, and Christianity had not grown very old before it discovered that the preaching of Christ crucified was unto the Jews a stumbling-block and unto the Grecks foolishness. The only novel feature in the present situation lies in the proposal that if one cannot or will not accept the

Christianity of the crucified Son of God, we shall just call what he can or will accept "Christianity" and let it go at that. This may seem an easy adjustment; but it is attended with the inconvenience of transferring our interest from things to mere names. The thing which has hitherto been known as Christianity appears to remain the same, however we deal with the name by which it has hitherto been known. And that thing enshrines the Cross in its heart. Paul Feine does not in the least exaggerate when, in the opening words of the section in his *Theology of the New Testament*[76] which speaks of Jesus' own teaching as to His death, he writes:—

"It has been the belief and the teaching of the Christian Church of all ages and of all Confessions, that Jesus, the Son of God, in His sacrificial death on the cross wrought the reconciliation of men with God, and by His resurrection begot anew those who believe in Him unto a living hope of eternal life. This belief forms the content of the hymns and prayers of Christian devotion through all the centuries. It filled with new life the dying civilization of Greece and Rome and conquered to Christianity the youthful forces of the Germanic stock. In the proclamation of Jesus the Divine Saviour who died for us on the Cross, still lies even today the secret of the successes of Christian missions among the heathen. The symbol of this belief greets us in the form of the Cross from the tower of every church, from every Christian grave-stone and in the thousands of forms in which the Cross finds employment in daily life; this belief meets us in the gospel of the great Christian festivals and in the two sacraments of the church. . . ."

Enough; there can be no doubt what Christianity has been up to today; and there can be no doubt that what it is now proposed to transfer the name to is an essentially different religion. Have we not had it for a generation past dinned into our ears that it is an essentially different religion? that precisely what Paul did, when he substituted "the religion about Jesus," that is, the

[76] P. 120.

religion of the Cross, for "the religion of Jesus," that is, the "Liberal" reconstruction of what Jesus Himself taught, was to introduce a new religion, a religion, to recall Wrede's characterization, more unlike the religion of Jesus than the religion of Jesus was unlike Judaism?[77]

It seems merely frivolous to declare in one and the same breath that Paul introduced an essentially new religion when he supplanted "the simple gospel of Jesus" with the religion of the Cross, and that this new religion of the Cross is not essentially deserted when a return is made from it to "the simple religion of Jesus." The two religions are, in point of fact, essentially different, and no attempt to confuse them under a common designation can permanently conceal this fact. He who looks to be perfected through his own assumption of what he calls a Christlike attitude towards what he calls a Christlike superhuman reality—though he considers that the term "Christlike" may without fatal loss be a merely conventional designation—is of a totally different religion from him who feels himself a sinner redeemed by the blood of a divine Saviour dying for him on the Cross. It may be, as Troeltsch seems to suggest, that "Liberal Christianity" lacks the power to originate a church and can live only as a kind of parasitical growth upon some sturdier stock.[78] It may be that it is not driven by internal necessity to separate itself off from other faiths, on which it rather depends for support. It is otherwise with those who share the great experience of reconciliation with God in the blood of His dear Son. They know themselves to be instinct with a life peculiar to themselves and cannot help forming a community, distinguished from all others by this common great experience. We have quoted the opening words of

[77] If Wrede be thought a mere extremist, let the words of Paul Wernle (Anfänge,[2] 1904, p. 112; E. T. I. p. 158 f.) be considered.

[78] As cited, p. 681.

Feine's remarks on Jesus' teaching as to His sacrificial death. The closing words are worth pondering also. They run[79]:

"Let it be said in closing that in the two declarations of the ransom-price and the cup of the Lord's Supper there lies church-building power. Jesus did not organize His community; He founded no church in His earthly labors. But the Christian Church is an inevitable product of the declaration of the expiatory effect of His death for many. For those who have experienced redemption and reconciliation through the death of Jesus must by virtue of this gift of grace draw together and distinguish themselves over against other communities."

There is indeed no alternative. The redeemed in the blood of Christ, after all said, are a people apart. Call them "Christians," or call them what you please, they are of a specifically different religion from those who know no such experience. It may be within the rights of those who feel no need of such a redemption and have never experienced its transforming power to contend that their religion is a better religion than the Christianity of the Cross. It is distinctly not within their rights to maintain that it is the same religion as the Christianity of the Cross. On their own showing it is not that.

[79]As cited, p. 148.

BOOK REVIEWS

RECENT BOOKS ON THE OLD TESTAMENT

HANDBUCH DER ALTORIENTALISCHEN GEISTESKULTUR. ALFRED JEREMIAS. J. C. Hinrichs, Leipzig. 1913. Pp. xvi, 366. 10*m.*

THE RELIGION OF ISRAEL UNDER THE KINGDOM. ADAM C. WELCH. T. & T. Clark. 1912. Pp. xvi, 305.

THE PROPHETS OF ISRAEL FROM THE EIGHTH TO THE FIFTH CENTURY. MOSES BUTTENWIESER. The Macmillan Co. 1914. Pp. xxii, 350. $2.00.

THE RELIGIOUS IDEAS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. H. WHEELER ROBINSON. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1913. Pp. viii, 245. 75 cents.

ROOT-DETERMINATIVES IN SEMITIC SPEECH. SOLOMON THEODORE HALÉVY HURWITZ. Columbia University Press. 1913. Pp. xxii, 113.

The astral theory, of which Dr. Jeremias is now the leading exponent, concerns itself only with ultimate (that is, stellar) origins of religious ideas and procedures. It does not discuss the ethical and religious significance of cults. The astral lore, it is held, took different forms in different lands. The form it took in Israel is set forth in minute detail by Jeremias in *The Old Testament in the Light of the Ancient East.* In this Manual he sketches the main principles of the Secret Lore, that, as is maintained, starting from Babylonia, or finding its best expression there, penetrated the whole East, and is reflected in the mythical, legendary, and historical narratives that embody the truths indicated by the celestial phenomena—monotheism and trinitarianism, conflict and redemption, death and the beyond. No argument is conceived to be necessary except to set side by side celestial phenomena and the corresponding facts of earthly life. The astral element of mystery appears, Jeremias remarks, in the fact that Moses and Ezekiel receive the plans of sacred buildings by divine revelation. His theory leads him to combat the opinion, held by Eduard Meyer and others, that Hebrew prophecy and messianism were derived from or deeply influenced by Egyptian ideas. Rather, he says, both Egypt and Israel give expression, each in its own way, to the common cosmic lore of the Orient (that is, in mundane phrase, we have in this case independent origination, under

similar conditions, in the two countries). He adds, however, that Israel impressed on all this astral lore a noble ethical significance. While this volume throws no light directly on the nature of the Old Testament religion, it contains, mingled with its fancies, suggestions that the instructed reader will be able to use with advantage.

The three works standing next in the list given above traverse practically the whole field of Old Testament religious thought. Dr. Welch discusses the stories of JE, prophecy before Amos, the prophets Amos, Hosea, and Isaiah, and the book of Deuteronomy (he omits Micah as adding nothing to the preceding books, and Zephaniah as forming a transition to Deutero-Isaiah). Professor Buttenwieser includes all the writing-prophets from Amos down, except that he says little of Zechariah and nothing of Nahum, Obadiah, Haggai, and Malachi. Mr. Robinson's survey takes in the whole of the period from the early legends to Daniel. All three writers, cordially accepting the general conclusions of recent criticism, devote themselves to the exposition of the ethical and spiritual characteristics of the advanced thought of the times considered.

The points in the prophetic thought on which Dr. Welch lays stress are Yahweh's aloneness, his moral government of the world, and his peculiarly intimate relation to Israel. He recognizes the fact that Israel shares certain religious features with other peoples, and he remarks properly that what is important for our judgment of the Old Testament is not this common heritage from the past but the conceptions characteristic of the great Israelite thinkers. Yet he does not always keep this distinction in mind. He finds it noteworthy that even in the Pentateuchal narratives Yahweh is spiritual (that is, disassociated from external nature) and practically omnipotent, able to do whatever is necessary for the realization of his designs. But tribal gods are everywhere credited with these qualities. The distinction of the prophetic thought lies in the use that Yahweh is held to make of his powers. Further, Dr. Welch's habit of translating Old Testament language into terms of modern thought leads him insensibly to ascribe to the prophets broad quasi-philosophic generalizations and a well-rounded system that we cannot be sure they had distinctly in mind. To distinguish between the implicit and the explicit is not to detract from the epoch-making character of the prophetic conception of the world. One may doubt, for example, whether the Deuteronomic reformers held distinctly "the great conception of a nation filled throughout with the sense that it has its own character to preserve and its own work to fulfil, and is more interested in these things than in asserting its place in

the world" (p. 223). But the general treatment of the prophetic writings is good. Naturally, there is no little repetition, since the ideas discussed are everywhere the same; but this rather increases the rhetorical force of the presentation. It may be added that the difficulty that Welch and Buttenwieser find in construing Hosea 1 and 3 may be lessened by the supposition that chapters 2 and 3 4 f. (in which the smooth flowing discourse differs so greatly from the ejaculatory style of 4–14) are not by Hosea, and that the episodes of 1 2–9 and 3 1–3 are free dramatizations of ideas suggested in chapter 2.

Dr. Buttenwieser, after some general remarks on the prophets' consciousness of divine inspiration (a result of their sense of communion with God) and their vision of the ultimate regeneration of mankind, makes a detailed examination of the ideas contained in the writings attributed to Jeremiah. To bring out these ideas he subjects the chronological arrangement and the Hebrew text to a sharp criticism, in the course of which he offers numerous fresh suggestions, with full citations of recent works. Jeremiah, in fact, presents the culmination of prophetic spiritual experience, and his struggles, defeats, and victories are here set forth in a clear and helpful way. Sections worthy of special attention are the description of the temple-sermon (which is held to have consisted originally simply of 7 2–15, 21–26), and the analysis of the narrative of chapters 37, 38, 34, 32 3b–5, 21, containing an account of the persecution of Jeremiah under Zedekiah. The view that the preservation of the utterances of the prophets was due to their disciples rather than to themselves (held by several recent critics) is here vigorously combated. Since, however, we have no sufficient data on this point, it will be wise to reserve opinion. As to the prophetic conception of the punishment destined by Yahweh for Israel—whether it was inevitable and what was to be the final outcome—various opinions are held by commentators. Buttenwieser agrees with those who think that the threat of doom is unconditional, that the prophets do not hope (and, he adds, do not desire) that it will be set aside by their preaching. These differences of opinion are due, doubtless, in part to the nature of the text, which is in some places vague, semipoetical, and ill-arranged, and thus admits of different interpretations. It must be borne in mind also that the utterances of the prophets are not to be treated as if they were articles in a carefully drawn-up creed. Their inspiration proper depended on their conviction of religious truth; their judgments of historical issues were affected by their momentary emotions, which they could not help identifying with the will of God. They all (except the Deuteronomists and a few others)

thought the moral and religious condition in Israel desperate (their picture is perhaps too highly colored), demanding no less than the wiping-out of the existing national life. But such a conviction would not be incompatible with some element of hope, some instinct that Yahweh, as protector of his people, would find a way of escape consistent with his moral requirements. It is true that the larger hope is expressed not by the prophets of the eighth and seventh centuries but by the seers of the sixth and following centuries; yet Isaiah and Jeremiah thought immediate deliverance possible. However, the prophetic views concerning the fate of the nation Israel are not of great importance, since they do not affect their general moral and religious principles. The same thing may be said of supposed references and allusions to a "world-catastrophe," of which, if belief in it existed in Egypt, Canaan, or Israel, we know very little. Certainly there is no evidence that such a belief materially affected the religious development of Egypt and Western Asia.

Within the limits of a small volume Mr. Robinson has succeeded in giving an intelligible sketch of the Hebrew religion from the crude beginnings to the verge of the reception of the belief in ethical immortality. In successive chapters he discusses the Old Testament idea of religion (moral intensity along with lower elements); the idea of God (personality, purpose to draw men into moral fellowship with himself); the idea of man (unity of body and soul, relation of human spirit to divine spirit, life in Sheol); the approach of God to man (theophanies, prophets, the written word); the approach of man to God (sacred places, seasons, ceremonies and persons, moral holiness); the problems of sin and suffering (forgiveness, cosmic evil); the hope of the nation (the kingdom of God, nationalism and universalism); and, finally, the permanent value of the Old Testament (its relation to the New Testament, to philosophy, to experience). In this sort of historical treatment there is the obvious advantage that it enables the writer to bring out clearly the lines of progress of the thought and the conditions, internal (great personalities) and external (foreign influences), that induced or favored the progress. Illustrations of this fact may be found throughout the volume; see, among other points, the remarks on the contribution of Semitic animism to the Old Testament conception of religion (p. 46 ff.), the statement of the character and function of the spirit (pp. 81 f., 111), the qualifications to be made in estimating the moral excellence of Old Testament religion (p. 42 ff.), and references here and there to the peculiar family relation between Israel and Yahweh. The homely phraseology expressing this relation, inherited, doubtless in part from the old clan

constitution, has contributed greatly to making the Old Testament the source of devotional literature for the Western Indo-European peoples. The length of the period treated by Mr. Robinson has made it impossible for him to consider in detail all the important questions that arise therein. He holds that something in the nature of a covenant took place at Sinai (pp. 38 f., 186 ff.), and that the fact that the people entered into the agreement voluntarily helped to give the Yahweh religion its remarkable virility; but he does not ask what tribes were there represented, and he does not mention the exegetical and other difficulties connected with the narrative of Ex. 18. He does not explain what he means by the affirmation that Yahwism was "essentially moral in principle" (p. 38). Elsewhere he appears to assume that the moral character of the religion varied according to the moral character of the people, as indeed every ancient religion had the morality of the community professing it. He sees in Isa. 53 the belief that all the world is to be brought to repentance and salvation through the suffering of the Servant (Israel) (p. 176 *al.*). He does not notice the view that the reference is to the salvation of blind and disobedient Israelites, nor does he treat carefully the noteworthy apocalyptic passage Isa. 25 6 ff. In connection with the remark on the practical failure of the prophets (p. 122), the significance of the succeeding ritual movement in the general development would deserve extended notice (if there were room for it). On the origin of the Sabbath (p. 139), the opinion that it was originally the day of the full moon should be referred to. Some of the larger questions here involved have been touched on elsewhere by Robinson (see the reference, p. 98, n. 2); and the excellence of his work makes us wish that he would treat at length the Old Testament conceptions of the nature of God, the nature of salvation, the nature of the right and the good, and other points that arise in connection with these.

This is not the place for a technical notice of Dr. Hurwitz's Dissertation, which is purely philological. It must suffice to say that he gives a good sketch of the discussions bearing on the origin of Semitic triliteral and biliteral stems, and that his observations on the question are well-considered and helpful. Such investigations may possibly be of service in fixing the meaning of certain Hebrew words, and may thus aid in the interpretation of the Old Testament; but these researches go back to remote and dim prehistoric times, and for our knowledge of the Biblical vocabulary we have to depend mainly, if not exclusively, on the usage of the historical period.

Crawford H. Toy.

Harvard University.

DIE MISCHNA. Text, Übersetzung, und ausführliche Erklärung, mit eingehenden geschichtlichen und sprachlichen Einleitungen und textkritischen Anhängen. Herausgegeben von G. BEER und O. HOLTZMANN. Töpelmann, Giessen. 1913 *seq.*

This edition and translation of the Mishna is evidence of the increased interest Christian scholars have lately been showing in Jewish literature as a result of a recognition of the fundamental importance of a knowledge of Judaism at the beginning of our era for the understanding of the New Testament. The scholars of the 17th century were fully aware of the value of the rabbinical literature for exegetical purposes, and made those great collections of parallels and illustrations from which later generations borrowed extensively, if not always intelligently. Latterly, even this second-hand wisdom has in great part been thrown out of the "exegetical handbooks" as learned ballast, and consequently the newest commentaries are completely a loss about passages and expressions which were perfectly explained two centuries and more ago. A list of such lapses into ignorance would be instructive—and amusing.

The old collections, however, though they may still be very useful to the exegete, are quite insufficient for the historical study of Judaism. For their purpose, the age of an illustrative example was often indifferent, whereas for ours it is highly important; they intended the elucidation of expressions or passages in the New Testament, we need to understand ideas and feelings—the whole complex structure of a religion. That cannot be done by means of extracts, however extensive and well-arranged; above all it cannot be done in a literature like the Jewish. There is no way but to read largely, to soak one's self, so to speak, in the language, the ways of thinking, of interpreting, arguing, and all the rest. The present edition of the Mishna is meant to encourage and assist such an endeavor, and it is by this aim that it must be judged.

The Mishna has been distributed in parts among a dozen or more scholars, and several parts have already been published. Those before me are *Joma* (Day of Atonement), by Meinhold; *Baba qamma* (on torts and delicts), by Windfuhr; *Challa* (priests' toll from baking of dough), by Albrecht; *Middot* (plan and dimensions of the temple), by O. Holtzmann.

The text is revised, on the authority of manuscripts and early printed editions, vowelled, and punctuated, or rather broken up, in a peculiar—and objectionable—fashion. A translation faces the text on alternate pages, and the notes are at the foot of both pages; the

text critical notes are at the end. Some of the parts (e.g. *Joma* and *Middot*) have long introductions.

The enterprise is not the first of its kind: Professor Hermann Strack has published, with his well-known accuracy, several parts of the Mishna in a revised text with critical and explanatory notes, some of them accompanied by translations; an edition of the whole Mishna, with German translation and commentary, has been in slow progress for many years under the hands of several Jewish scholars, and is still remote from completion.

The different tracts of Beer and Holtzmann's edition vary considerably in execution; some of them have been subjected to rather severe criticism on the philological side—not all of it with a solely philological animus. Certainly it cannot be claimed for them that they have great scientific value for the interpretation of the Mishna—though the title-page seems to profess something of the kind. They are essentially school-books, and there is about some of them a perceptibly amateurish air; but their shortcomings are not such as seriously to impair their usefulness for the readers for whom they are designed.

The publisher has done his part well; the typography is excellent, and the paper sufficiently opaque.

George F. Moore.

Harvard University.

The Theology of the Gospels. James Moffatt, D.D., D.Litt. (Studies in Theology.) Charles Scribner's Sons. 1913. Pp. xii, 220. 75 cents.

The aim of this book is thus defined in its preface: "What these pages attempt to do is to present a study of the central and salient features in the theology of the Gospels, taking theology in its stricter rather than in its wider sense." The assumption that the Gospels contain a theology is defended by insisting that "the most elementary and spontaneous experience of the Christian religion, then as now, involved what may be called without inaccuracy dogmatic or theological conceptions."

This means that these conceptions are to be found in the Gospels. "Because they mirror an experience which tends to become conscious of its issues in history and nature, . . . they are Gospels." These theological ideas which belong to an intelligent experience are assumed to be a self-consistent product; there is a theology of the Gospels. To be sure, this theology is, so far as the first three Gospels are concerned, "implicit rather than explicit," which perhaps means that these dogmatic conceptions are not affirmed, but

inferred from the religious utterances of their authors. Still, implicit or explicit, the theology is there. "There is a line of continuity between the first three Gospels and the fourth in point of their theology." There is "a theology of the Gospels."

Do the phenomena of these documents justify this assumption? Dr. Moffatt is too thorough and candid a New Testament scholar not to appreciate the difficulty which many of his readers will have in accepting it. Each of the three Synoptic Gospels presents its author's religious thought; that of the Fourth Gospel comes from a mind of great originality. The words of Jesus preserved in the Synoptics are those of a creative genius. Can we gather all the dogmatic or theological conceptions into a self-consistent whole, and call it a theology of the Gospels? Yes, says our author. At least so far as the "classic and fundamental elements" of Christianity" which it contains are concerned. Jesus, Mark, Matthew, Luke, John, give us one theology.

This thesis is wrought out in Dr. Moffatt's discussion of the Christology of the Gospels. There is no essential difference, it is urged, between the various conceptions of Christ. The latest is the earliest in a more developed form. "Jesus felt that he had a unique personal relation to the Father." "This is the primary factor of the Christology of the Gospels." "The Messianic consciousness is a modification of this." "To Mark Jesus is a heavenly being sent by God as his only and well-beloved son, to accomplish the purpose of his kingdom." "The birth-stories of Matthew and Luke are naïve attempts to express the Christian sense of what was implied in the unique filial consciousness of Jesus." In the Fourth Gospel Jesus' unique sonship is represented as a relation belonging to the divine nature. "His incarnation as the Logos is only a form of that eternal sonship which he enjoyed with the Father as an essential relation with his nature." He is specifically related to the Father as a divine being akin to God in nature and at the same time dependent on Him. "It is the recognition of this filial consciousness of Jesus as the crucial element in the Synoptic Christology which really enables us to understand the continuity between the first three Gospels and the Fourth. . . . When the filial consciousness of Jesus is seen to be prior to the Messianic, the starting-point for the special Christology of the Fourth Gospel is at once gained."

If Dr. Moffatt means by this that the Johannine Christology is, to use his own word, "implicit" in the filial consciousness of Jesus, he makes an assertion which many candid readers of the Gospels will be unable to accept. They will insist that this is not the only

interpretation of that consciousness which preserves its religious value, and explains Jesus' teaching and acts. That Jesus was the Eternal Son of God incarnate is surely a "theological, or dogmatic conception." That this conception was entertained by him, Dr. Moffatt does not undertake to show. He assumes that one who appreciates Jesus' thought of himself, so far as known, will think of him in this way.

The reviewer would ask, why assume this? He ventures the criticism that the unsupported assumption is a serious defect in a book professedly giving results drawn from facts by historical methods. Dr. Moffatt, to be sure, insists that study of the Gospels must be pursued in a religious spirit to find the theology in them, and that this spirit is one of subjection to Jesus Christ. "Before we can safely reason from the Gospels, we have to share their position towards the great personality behind and above them."

But even one who occupies this position is not able to find all the truth he needs without using his mind. He can "safely reason," and he must reason to get conclusions. And if he present what profess to be conclusions drawn from facts, he may properly be asked to show that they are drawn by valid inference.

The thesis of the book then, that the Gospels hold a "theology in the stricter, rather than the wider sense," has not, in the opinion of the reviewer, been made good. One lays down the book feeling that its title stands for an unverified assumption.

But this criticism must not be understood to imply that the book is without interest and value. On the contrary, its author's acquaintance with recent Gospel criticism, and his endeavor to present the thought of the Gospels in the light of that criticism, make it suggestive and stimulating. Dr. Moffatt deals with topics of criticism in a candid spirit. His discussion of problems of interpretation, such as the eschatology of Jesus, or Jesus' self-designation—"Son of man"—is able. The ease of the author's expression makes the book attractive. The obscurity which one now and then finds in a sentence may perhaps be attributed to the compression required by the character of the series to which the book belongs. Its value is enhanced by a bibliography, a general index, and an index of the Scriptural quotations.

Edward Y. Hincks.

Andover Theological Seminary

THE PRIMITIVE TEXT OF THE GOSPELS AND ACTS. ALBERT C. CLARK. The Clarendon Press. 1914. Pp. viii, 112.

New Testament textual critics are accustomed to accept it as a rule that the shorter of two competing readings is more likely to be the true one. This rests on the assumption that the change which produced the variance of reading in different manuscripts was editorial, not accidental. Accident may omit; an addition is usually the result of deliberate alteration. A classical philologist, however, like the Corpus Professor of Latin at Oxford who writes this book, is more familiar with accident than intention as the cause of corruption in ancient texts, and therefore brings a fresh eye to these New Testament questions.

Taking accident as a more important element than Westcott and Hort, or most modern critics, have believed, Professor Clark holds that many of the readings of Codex Bezae and the "Western Text" (which are often longer than those of the Vatican and Sinaitic codices) are probably original. His argument is (1) that, as the papyri show, books in the early centuries were frequently written in narrow columns of ten to twelve letters; (2) that both the Sinaitic and the Vatican manuscripts show many undoubted omissions, where, as is made plain by counting the letters, it is probable that one or more short lines of an ancestor have been dropped; (3) that hence it is likely that many other cases of the same accident took place at an early time; and (4) that these can be detected by counting the number of letters in the disputed readings.

It is indeed the fact that a large number of the additional phrases in the "Western Text" can be explained in this way, and it must be admitted that New Testament critics have too much neglected the significance of this form of accident as a cause of variation. Especially when similarity of ending of two words ("homoioteleuton") appears, the facts presented by Clark are important. It must be said, however, that in the case of the longer passages, like Mark 16 9–20, which he defends as genuine, the evidence from the coincidences between the numbers of letters contained in the passages is not at all convincing, and it will not do to assume that long and important verses and sections omitted by accident from one early copy would have continued absent from texts used in widely distant churches for long periods. In the Book of Acts the theory breaks down, for here the multiples of ten to twelve letters fail to appear consistently, and in any case a large degree of intentional editing (whether by way of enlargement or of diminution) has to be admitted.

The essay collects valuable material, should stimulate to further study, and is a needed reminder of important considerations often overlooked. It illustrates that welcome contributions to textual criticism may be expected from many quarters; but also that no single line of observation, however brilliantly conceived and patiently carried out, will lead to a general solution of a problem which has been complicated by the intricate working of many forces.

James H. Ropes.

Harvard University.

Der Brief des Paulus an die Römer. Ausgelegt von D. Dr. Ernst Kühl, Professor der Theologie in Göttingen. Quelle & Meyer, Leipzig. 1913. Pp. xvi, 511.

Professor Kühl, with a sincere and affectionate piety, honorable alike to himself and to his venerable instructor, dedicates his commentary to his "highly esteemed and fatherly friend," Professor D. Dr. Bernhard Weiss. There is special propriety in this, for the commentary in the main follows the lines of thought which Professor Weiss has made familiar to his numerous readers.

The book contains no formal introduction, but questions usually treated in introductions are incidentally discussed in the interpretation of passages which suggest them, and the volume ends with a "conclusion" which presents the author's views upon some of them. This may seem to many a regrettable omission, for a reader can estimate more justly and sometimes understand more perfectly an interpreter's comments if he is first told his opinions upon questions of the authorship, date, etc., of the document which he is discussing.

Dr. Kühl accepts the claim which the Epistle makes to Pauline authorship without question or argument. He seems to think that it has been transcribed and preserved without serious redaction or interpolation. Ἐν Ῥώμῃ, in 1 7, 15, was, he holds, in the original document. The fifteenth and sixteenth chapters were in the Epistle as it came from the hand of Paul, except the section 1 1–20, 24, which was incorporated from a letter of Paul's to the Ephesians; and the doxology was written by Paul, perhaps with his own hand, at the end of the Epistle.

Questions of textual criticism are not often or very fully discussed; though when the form of the text is of special significance for the exegesis, the author gives his opinion and briefly his reasons for it. He holds, for example, that the context demands the reading ἔχομεν in 5 1, notwithstanding the support given ἔχωμεν in important manuscripts.

The instruction which the apostle gives in the thirteenth chapter concerning the attitude Christians should take towards the Roman civil government, proves that the Epistle must have been written before the breaking out of the Neronian persecution; but the date of its composition is not more closely indicated.

Professor Kühl confidently maintains and repeatedly affirms, as against Zahn and others, that Gentile converts formed a majority in the Church at Rome, though it also included in its membership a Jewish-Christian minority. It is difficult to see why this question should seem so important, or should be capable of such positive decision as Kühl and many others, on each side of the question, contend. If each element was present and enlisted the interest of the apostle, what does it signify whether the Gentile or Jewish converts were more numerous? And if Paul more frequently or with more apparent interest or solicitude addresses his words to the Gentile element, may there not be other reasons for this than their numerical preponderance?

The author presents and develops the theological positions taken in the Epistle more fully and with more manifest interest than the critical and historical problems involved. He reveals in these discussions a conservative temper, but, at the same time, a free and open mind. The limits of this review forbid anything beyond a brief statement of his views upon some of these subjects. The examples given below of his interpretation of important terms or sections in the Epistle will sufficiently illustrate his point of view and the results in general of his exegesis.

He holds, for example, that in 1 3, 4 we have a summary of the Pauline gospel. The conception of the Son of God is plainly from the Old Testament, and the thought of the apostle is occupied with the fulfilment of prophecy in the historical facts of Jesus' life. If the doctrine of the pre-existence of the Son of God lies in the background, it does not find expression in these verses. Paul's conception of the divinity of Christ rests rather upon the resurrection and exaltation of Jesus to a position of divine dignity, through which he became Son of God "in the full sense of the term." So in 9 5 the Christ is from the Jews according to the flesh, but, as exalted at the right hand of God, Paul addresses him, in his inserted doxology, as One who is "God over all, blessed forever"; for Kühl is confident that these words are addressed to Christ and not to the Father.

In his interpretation of 1 4 the Professor holds that in Christ the place of the νοῦς in the unregenerate man, is, in Paul's view, occupied by the πνεῦμα ἁγιωσύνης in Jesus Christ. As he maintains that

the same Spirit which pervaded and controlled Jesus is also bestowed upon men who are born again, it does not seem probable that he means to deny to Jesus the possession of νοῦς, but only to affirm that, through all his life, it was pervaded and controlled by the Spirit of holiness.

Professor Kühl affirms that the thought expressed somewhat incidentally in 1 17 controls the discussion through the long section which follows as far as 5 10, and that its influence is felt in the sections which follow that. The righteousness of God is the equivalent of the divine forgiveness bestowed upon the ἀσεβὴς before repentance, and does not, in itself, involve a moral change; any change or improvement in character is due to the subsequent gift of the Holy Spirit. He contends against Jülicher's views that in justification God enables men by faith to appropriate His own righteousness, and holds that Jülicher is in the wrong when he affirms that Paul would never have been satisfied with the simple reckoning of something which, in truth, did not exist. Justification anticipates and prepares for conversion as well as sanctification. It is essentially negative, the removal of a hindrance to an upright and spiritual life. At the same time, the only salvation offered to men is through this righteousness of God accepted by faith. For all who do not attain this the final judgment must be judged upon their works, and this judgment must be condemnatory of all without exception. The cases suggested in 2 26, 27 are purely hypothetical.

The author is perhaps most original in his full and vigorous discussion of Paul's theodicy, presented in the long section of the Epistle from chapter ninth through the eleventh chapter. He interprets Paul's argument here as involving not only the doctrine that the repentance and salvation of both Jews and Gentiles is dependent upon the divine decree and control, and that, in the execution of His purposes, God makes use of the sin and obduracy of men, but also that all their sins and hardness of heart, illustrated in the attitude of the large majority of Paul's Jewish contemporaries, are due to the will and positive control of God. Even the tenth chapter does not really, but only apparently, qualify this view. This interpretation is not novel; it appears as early as the time of Calvin, perhaps of Augustine. But Kühl holds that Paul is discussing, not a general and eternal principle of the divine government, but rather a problem of his own generation. The fate of past generations is not in the apostle's mind, nor does he forecast the religious character of future generations, for, in his view, the end of the world is near at hand, and the promise of God must be fulfilled before the great catastrophe

occurs. The substitution, in the proclamation of Christianity, of the law of faith for the law of works had, necessarily and by divine appointment, stumbled and hardened consistent Jews who revered the law of God as given in their Scriptures. But the hardening of the Jews opened the way for the proclamation of the Gospel to the Gentiles; which they could the more readily accept, and thus be grafted into the true olive tree. But their engrafting would kindle the jealousy of the Jews and arouse them to seek re-engrafting, and thus all Israel would be saved; not simply a considerable number of Israelites who may be considered the ideal Israel, as Zahn mistakenly interprets, but all Israel, though Kühl does not affirm that this includes every soul in the Israel of Paul's generation.

Dr. Kühl ably defends this thesis. It is not the province of a reviewer to examine in detail his exegesis. But a reader of the commentary cannot avoid raising the question—which it may not be the duty of an exegete to raise or answer—Just where does this interpretation of the apostle's view leave the apostle? Could he, as a man of insight and clear vision, thirty years or so after the crucifixion of Jesus, after all his experience with non-Christian Jews and Jewish Christians, have supposed that within the period of that generation in which he lived, all Israel would renounce its belief in the saving power of obedience to God's law and accept the doctrine of salvation by simple faith in Jesus, under the motive of jealousy kindled by the conversion of Gentiles—however the word "jealousy" may be defined? It seems impossible; and one cannot escape the conviction that the interpretation of a writer must be influenced, if not controlled, by the evidence of the writer's general sanity and power to interpret the facts of life. That a very intelligent man may believe in the speedy coming of the Lord and the end of the age, is easily admitted. Such a belief does not rest upon or reckon with the forces and tendencies which are observed in the social, moral, and religious conditions of one's contemporaries. But that Paul could have believed, about the year 58 A.D., that the Jews were just on the threshold of a sudden and substantially universal acceptance of Christianity, seems incredible. Nor is this much relieved by any reasonable theory of Paul's belief of the power of God and the principle of determinism upon which God is supposed to control the wills and characters of men. For, in Paul's view, God is a god of order, and His control of human life, however absolute it may be, is not arbitrary or lawless. If Paul had believed that all Israel was, in his generation, to pass through an experience like his own on the Damascus road, would he not have depicted this

conviction clearly, with a rhetorical fervor and a pictorial imagination, rather than in a plain and not very correct figure taken from horticulture; and would he not have found a loftier and more inspiring word than "jealousy" to express the motive under which they were to act? It does not seem impossible that Paul may have believed in a speedy coming of the Lord and yet of a continued progress of Christianity after that great event, which would result in the ultimate conversion of all Israel.

There are some general features of the book which merit brief mention in closing this review.

As has already been remarked, the commentary aims to expound the religious convictions of the apostle as expressed in the Epistle, rather than to examine and interpret the terms in which these views are expressed. The literary and religious history of significant terms is here not often discussed with much fullness, and but limited use is made, and then usually by reference to Deissmann's labors, of the recently published Greek papyri.

Dr. Kühl does not believe that the doctrines or rites of the mystery cults had any real influence in Paul's development of Christian doctrine, or his interpretation of the sacraments; though terms thus made familiar to his readers, and certain ideas connected with them may have aided in the expression and transmission of his own views, which were suggested by the Old Testament as interpreted and enforced by his own Christian experience.

Earlier commentaries, even down to those of the last generation, are but sparingly cited, while a limited number of contemporaneous writers are frequently referred to and quoted with approval or disapproval. This feature may add to the value of the commentary for the readers for whom it was especially designed; but for an American reader, the book is, in too large degree, a commentary upon the writings of Zahn, Jülicher, Lietzmann, and a few others, rather than upon the writing of the Apostle Paul.

The text of the Epistle is not printed either in Greek or German, but in its place the author gives a rather full paraphrase of its contents, in sections scattered through the book, thus occupying about eighty of the five hundred pages.

William H. Ryder.

Andover Theological Seminary.

Rome, St. Paul, and the Early Church. W. S. Muntz, D.D. The Young Churchman Co. 1913. Pp. xvi, 227.

The chief purpose of this work, or at least its most distinctive feature, is the use of the conceptions of Roman Law to illuminate certain of St. Paul's phrases. In the main the author repeats what Ramsay and Deissmann have said on the same subject. Where he goes beyond them he stretches this method of interpretation too far. There is not much booty to be won in this field. One might summarize in ten pages all that can be aptly said. The author's presentation is less telling than it ought to be, because it is diffuse and repetitious. At one point there emerges a glaring contradiction which suggests some doubt of the author's interpretation as a whole. On page 100 it is said that "the principles of our law" cannot satisfactorily explain St. Paul's phrase "heirs of God." According to the conceptions of Roman jurisprudence "heirs" and "inheritance" implied the very reverse of the conceptions implied in the modern use of these terms. "Birth, not death, according to Roman Law, brought the heir into being." But on page 165, in the discussion of the South Galatian theory, it is said: "By the testamentary law of Rome in the age of Paul, a will was a secret instrument while the testator lived; it took effect at death only, and, moreover, was revocable. Accordingly Roman wills at that time were on these points similar to English wills of today." Whatever the fact may be, the method evidently is precarious. Incidentally it may be remarked that the South Galatian theory had better not be discussed at all if space is lacking to discuss it adequately. It is interjected here irrelevantly.

The title which the author has chosen is a charter of limitless scope—and, unfortunately, he has taken advantage of it. In the case especially of so small a book one might expect (and wish) that the topics, Rome, St. Paul, and the Early Church would be dealt with only so far as they all three have to do with one another. The author, if he has not dealt too much at length with Roman institutions, has dwelt upon peculiarities of St. Paul's character and doctrine which were neither influenced by Roman Law nor influential in the history of the Early Church, and along some lines he has followed the history of the Church well into the Middle Ages. The author warmly combats the prejudice which disparages the forensic element in St. Paul's doctrine; it was good in itself and also valuable as a means of interpreting the Gospel to the Gentile world.

But on the other hand, he would trace to the influence of the conceptions of Roman Law almost all that he accounts bad in the theology of the Western Church and in its discipline—particularly the idea of Papal supremacy. It is, of course, not impossible that the same influence which was salutary to St. Paul worked only mischief to the Church after him; but in the lack of any stringent proof of this, one is more inclined to think that the author's judgment of values is perilously subjective.

WALTER LOWRIE.

ROME, ITALY.

COMPARATIVE RELIGION. F. B. JEVONS. (Cambridge Manuals of Science and Literature.) 1913. Pp. viii, 152.

This is religion in a nut shell—it is a temptation to say, in a peanut shell. It includes, besides an Introduction, chapters on Sacrifice, Magic, Ancestor-Worship, the Future Life, Dualism, Buddhism, Monotheism, a short bibliography, and an index.

Readers of Professor Jevons' earlier books need not be told that he brings to his task ample knowledge or that he writes with admirable lucidity. But in putting so much into such small compass, qualifications and explanations are impossible, and the concise statements and broad generalizations leave large room for misunderstanding, when they do not invite it.

GEORGE F. MOORE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

A HALF-DOZEN BOOKS.

Our group is varied. It ranges in subject matter from *Gospel Origins*[1] to *The Christian Reconstruction of Modern Life.*[2] In method of treatment it descends from the severe and comprehensive dialectic of A. Schweitzer (*Paul and his Interpreters*[3]) to the "popular" level of Holdsworth. In style it includes the new instalment of Edwin A. Abbott's encyclopaedic exegetical notes (*Light on the Gospels from an Ancient Poet*[4]), Fr. Spitta's latest documentary analysis (*Die Syn-*

[1] By W. W. Holdsworth, M.A. From the Scribner series of "Studies in Theology." 1913. Pp. 211. 75 cents.

[2] By Charles Henry Dickinson. Macmillan. 1913. Pp. 327. $1.50.

[3] From the German Paulinische Forschung by W. Montgomery. Macmillan. 1912. Pp. 253. $2.75.

[4] Part ix of the Diatessarica, Cambridge University Press. 1912. Pp. 602.

optische Grundschrift[5]), neither of which affords easy reading even for the expert. It includes also, however, the graceful periods of C. H. Dickinson (*Christian Reconstruction*), an expression of noble thought in lofty style by a comparatively unknown writer; alongside of which must be placed T. R. Glover's "Angus Lectures" on *The Christian Tradition and its Verification*,[6] a little book of great ideas in simple form by a well-known master in the history of our faith.

Of the studies in Gospel origins Spitta's has chief importance. The author is well known for his minute critical analyses of Acts, the Revelation, and the Fourth Gospel, as well as for other contributions to New Testament criticism. Unfortunately Spitta's truly remarkable penetration and exegetical power are obscured by his predilection for theories of source combination in the form A + B = C, where A represents an original document free from the elements objectionable to modern criticism, B an inferior and later parallel, guilty of all the blunders and distortions, and C an ingenious redactor who nevertheless betrays the composite nature of his work to the still more ingenious critic. It is almost in spite of Spitta's theory that we profit by his book. True, he takes in general the right line of advance. The majority of gospel critics follow the delusive identification of the document from which the so-called Q material is drawn with the *Logia* attributed by Papias to the Apostle Matthew. In consequence the fundamental non-Markan source is usually reconstructed on the plan of our first Gospel, instead of that of the narrative third Gospel. Q was a *narrative* source, and is much better represented, as well as more fully, in Luke than in Matthew. Spitta does well therefore to designate his book "*Die Synoptische Grundschrift in ihrer Ueberlieferung durch das Lukasevangelium.*" It is his characteristic disposition which produces the chief blemish of the work, the wish to vindicate a critically acceptable *Urquelle* by putting all blame on "the wicked partner." One is compelled to ask: How could such a complete and perfect masterpiece have been wholly lost to sight, superseded in all branches of the church by secondary and inferior products? In spite of this besetting sin of proving too much, Spitta's work faithfully and critically studied is always rewarding. He has knowledge of contemporary literature and modes of thought, fearless originality, and remarkable exegetical acumen.

Edwin A. Abbott's literary parallels from the recently discovered *Odes of Solomon* are also rewarding, though they require perhaps still

[5] From Windisch's series of "Untersuchungen zum neuen Testament." Leipzig, J. C. Hinrichs. 1912. Pp. 512.

[6] Macmillan. 1913. Pp. 213. $1.25.

greater patience. The work is really the fullest and most illuminating commentary yet produced on these obscure and perplexing mystical poems. Abbott's poetic sense, as well as his large familiarity with Talmudic and primitive Christian literature, give special value to his literary parallels. If we may suggest a direction in which further light should be sought it would be in *El Zohar*, chief work of cabalistic mysticism, affected like the *Odes* by neo-Platonic and Gnostic-Christian thought, but like them also in being fundamentally Jewish in conception and expression.

William West Holdsworth is "Tutor in New Testament Language and Literature in Handsworth College." Why he should have been selected for "A Study in the Synoptic Problem" in a series of *Studies in Theology* which includes James Moffatt's *Theology of the Gospels*, Souter's *Text and Canon of the New Testament*, and Peake's *Introduction*, is itself a problem on which very little light is shed by the book. Perhaps the publishers believed originality could be secured by applying to a writer who had *not* "been to school in Germany."

From the brilliant author of *The Quest of the Historical Jesus* we know what to expect. Probably there is no more consistent answer than the present volume to the type of interpretation of Paul and Paulinism advanced with such sweeping acceptance in our day by the "Religionsgeschichtliche Schule." It will be well to read side by side with Schweitzer's attempt to account for Paul and his "gospel about Jesus" without recourse to any but Jewish influences, the new book on the same subject by C. G. Montefiore. The liberal Jew naturally represents the opposite pole of criticism. Perhaps Clemen's *Primitive Christianity and its non-Jewish Sources* would serve well as a mediating element. But the weakness of a theory is best seen in its extreme applications. Schweitzer's theory of apocalyptic eschatology as primary in the message of Jesus breaks down when it attempts first to prove that this estimate of Jesus is in no degree morbid or pathological,[7] and finally to account for Paul and his message on the "eschatological" basis.

Glover and Dickinson contribute interpretations of Christianity from the broad view-point of the history and philosophy of religion. Both are admirable. Glover naturally excels in his first-hand acquaintance with historical conditions in the Empire, but writes more sketchily, disregarding proportion in the interest of immediate impression on his audience. Dickinson treats his subject compre-

[7] See the author's Jesus psychiatrisch beurtheilt.

hensively, as one who after wide and thorough reading and mature deliberation sets forth his best thought in polished language for thoughtful minds, even though unschooled. The writer will be read with pleasure as well as profit, and should secure a wide hearing.

Benjamin W. Bacon.

Yale University.

Our Own Religion in Ancient Persia. Lawrence Mills. The Open Court Publishing Co. 1913. Pp. xii, 193.

Between these covers and under a taking title are brought together lectures delivered at various times during a period of several years. The subtitle runs: "Lectures . . . presenting the Zend Avesta as collated with the pre-Christian exilic Pharisaism, advancing the Persian question to the foremost position in our Biblical research." The author's thesis is that "some of the fundamental articles of our Catholic creed" were first revealed by God to Zoroastrians; that the same ideas later arose spontaneously and independently among the Jews; and that the Persian system exercised a powerful, though secondary, influence on Judaism, and through it on Christianity.

Other lectures are on "The Avesta and The Veda," "The Moral Idea in the Gatha," "Immortality in the Gatha." One very characteristic chapter, with an appendix, is on the eminence of Professor Mills, and the abysmal ignorance and jealous malice of others.

The lectures are printed with the various additions made from time to time to adapt them to different audiences. The author remarks that "readers will easily recognize the later insertions, from the difference in the stylistic flow of the language, as a later and to some extent a more pointed animus imparts greater pungency and vivacity to one's mode of expressing himself." To aid the higher critic, he has enclosed these interpolations in brackets and parentheses. Despite their occasional "pungency," the many interruptions and long digressions, added to an involved and formless style—which the Philistine may conjecture to be modelled on Pahlavi—make the way of the reader hard.

George F. Moore.

Harvard University.

THE CANTICLES OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH, EASTERN AND WESTERN, IN EARLY AND MEDIAEVAL TIMES. JAMES MEARNS. Cambridge University Press. 1914.

This admirable study covers ground which has hitherto received inadequate treatment in English. The author does not attempt to go into the details of the liturgical use of the canticles, referring the curious in such matters to the article on *Cantiques* by Dom Cabrol, but limits himself to a study of the manuscripts in which the canticles are found. Nor has he sought to make a complete inventory of all existing manuscripts, but he has examined those preserved in a considerable range of Continental libraries, and has classified and indexed the important representatives of each type. The result is the tabulation of a large number of ancient psalters, with a careful study of the canticles used in the various branches of the Christian Church, Eastern and Western.

The use of songs taken from Scripture presumably goes back to the very beginning of Christian worship, but there appears to be no definite information earlier than the fourth century as to what passages were so used. Even by that time the selection of canticles was not definitely settled, and in the Eastern Church the use of the set known as the Nine Odes cannot be clearly traced before the sixth century; though since that period the Nine Odes have been very generally used with only occasional variations or additions.

In the West, however, there has been much greater diversity. The local Roman Use differed from that at Milan, and from the Gallican Use, as well as from the Use of Latin-speaking Eastern Europe and North Africa, and the Mozarabic Use in Spain. Furthermore the monastic use of canticles varied in remarkable degree, not only as between different orders but as between different houses within the same order. Thus Mr. Mearns points out that the monks of Bury St. Edmunds used as late as 1405 a set of canticles which had gone out of use elsewhere in the tenth century. Most of the canticles included in the Nine Odes of the Greek Church were, indeed, universally accepted, but the order in which they appear varies greatly and they are supplemented by a great number of other canticles. Thus in the Mozarabic Use some seventy-eight canticles are listed, while the monastic uses include still others. The evidence of these widespread and interesting variations is clearly tabulated and is a significant contribution to our knowledge of liturgies.

This volume, though small in bulk, represents a large amount of research. Its information is clearly set forth, and the author has done his work so thoroughly that it will not be necessary for others to glean the field again.

Henry Wilder Foote.

Harvard University.

The Unconscious. Morton Prince, M.D., LL.D. The Macmillan Co. 1914. Pp. xii, 549. $2.00.

The Fundamentals of Human Personality Normal and Abnormal is the subtitle of this volume, and it is from it that we obtain an adequate idea of the scope of the book. It is Dr. Prince's opinion that the psychology of the future will seek its facts in the vast reservoir beneath the level of personal consciousness. This is his very deep conviction after many years of experience in the field of abnormal psychology, which has been recently still further strengthened by the remarks of M. Bergson, who says: "To explore the most sacred depths of the unconscious, to labor in what I have just called the subsoil of consciousness—that will be the principal task of psychology in the century which is opening."

Introspective consciousness, the author believes, reveals to us only a small part of our mental life, and, what is more to the point, it is useless to search there for our explanations. Mental phenomena are likened to the iceberg, of which two-thirds is submerged.

The nature of the subconscious is discussed at some length; for although, as Dr. Prince says, the practical value of the methods set forth in the book are in no way influenced by the choice of a particular theory, yet the theoretical importance of the problem justifies the exposition. On page 253 is a classification which is most welcome as giving Dr. Prince's views in a form free from the possibility of misunderstanding. It is regrettable that this section was not placed nearer the beginning. That there is a certain lack of system in the arrangement of the material is probably due to the fact that the book consists of selected lectures, which consider more exhaustively the subject matter of papers appearing at various times in the *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*. The subconscious is divided into the coconscious and the unconscious. The coconscious is synonymous with subconscious ideas, that is, ideas not in the field of awareness. They are psychic but not psychological. The unconscious consists of conserved dormant neurograms or neural dispositions and active neurograms or neural processes. These neurograms are the impressions made upon the nervous system, and may or may not appear at

some future time in the field of consciousness. This description differs from that of scientists who deny the existence of the subconscious, in that the latter believe that all ideas not in the field of awareness are neural processes, thus allowing for no subconscious or coconscious *ideas*.

Most of the book is devoted to illustrations from abnormal cases of the functioning of these coconscious and unconscious processes. The results obtained especially through hypnotism, automatic writing, crystal-gazing and psycho-analysis, are given at great length. The facts of the famous case of Miss Beauchamp are frequently quoted.

For the general reader the part dealing with personality is particularly interesting. Here we see with what imperceptibly small steps the normal states shade into the abnormal. It is only in degree that they differ. The important fact for an understanding of thought is the conflict of ideas. If an idea with a sufficiently strong emotional setting is in the subconscious, its effect may be seen in the conscious attitude of the individual. Old memories, dormant for years, are the cause of hysterical outbreaks and are also frequently responsible for peculiarities in the normal mind. The coconscious may conflict so thoroughly with the conscious that a double personality is formed. A crucial proof that the subconscious influences the conscious is the fact that a definite idea implanted in the subconscious during hypnotism will, when the patient regains a normal condition, have the predicted effect. The intelligence of the subconscious processes is also forcibly described. Dr. Prince finds himself in close accord with William McDougal's views as stated in his *Social Psychology*, especially in regard to instincts and sentiments. A sentiment is an idea with a strong emotional setting, which directs the action of the individual from the realm of the subconscious. Mood can be explained as the submerged complex of ideas and emotions which guide our thoughts and our selections. Even the social conscious, the "civic," and the "national," patriotism and public opinion, may be explained by unconscious complexes. "All these mental attitudes may be reduced to common habits of thought and conduct derived from mental experiences common to a given community, and conserved as complexes in the unconscious of the several individuals of the community." We read further: "Common-sense depends upon the fact that in the unconscious lie memories, the origin of which we do not remember."

It is particularly pleasing to note that Dr. Prince disagrees with Freud in regard to suppressed sexual complexes being the sole explanation not only of dreams but of all mental abnormalities. To

quote from page 221: "A dream may be the symbolic expression of almost any thought to which strong emotional tones with their impulsive forces have been linked."

We recognize Dr. Prince at his best in this book. The ease of style and the abundance of illustrations drawn from the author's vast experience make his views readily accessible to all. Those who desire to obtain a clear idea of Dr. Prince's theories of mental life and are interested in the mechanism of thought, both normal and abnormal, will find the book of great value.

Herbert Sidney Langfeld.

Harvard University.

L'Excuse de Noble Seigneur Jaques de Bourgogne, Seigneur de Falais et de Bredam. Par Jean Calvin. Réimprimée sur l'unique exemplaire de l'édition de Genève 1548, avec une introduction par Alfred Cartier. Deuxième édition, revue et augmentée. Genève, A. Jullien. 1911. Pp. lxxviii, 54. 7.50 *fr.*

Known in Latin translation, the original French edition was discovered only a few years ago, and is here given a worthy setting. This defence of a Netherlands nobleman who had accepted the Reformed faith, addressed to the Emperor Charles V, is among the most vigorous expositions that ever came from Calvin's pen. In many ways it deserves to rank with his famous letter to Francis I, prefaced to the *Institutes* or his *Reply to Cardinal Sadoleto*. In no writing does Calvin show himself more a master of the forming French language. The value of the publication is greatly enhanced by the editor's careful biography of Jaques de Bourgogne, tracing not merely the circumstances of the publication of the *Excuse*, but the long friendship of that nobleman with Calvin and their unhappy estrangement in consequence of the dispute between Calvin and Bolsec regarding predestination.

Williston Walker.

Yale University.

The Cambridge Mediaeval History. Planned by J. B. Bury, M.A., Regius Professor of Modern History. Edited by H. M. Gwatkin, M.A., and J. P. Whitney, B.D. Vols. I and II. The Macmillan Co. 1911–13.

A striking defect in the historical writing of England and America in the past century has been the failure to produce good general histories. Save for the *History of All Nations* translated and adapted from the German under the editorship of the late John Henry Wright,

the English language has nothing that can compare in quality with the French and German universal histories; there is in English no satisfactory history of ancient, mediaeval, or modern times, and no good general history of France, Germany, Italy, or Spain. This fact alone, apart from their other merits of plan and execution, is a sufficient justification for those considerable enterprises, the *Cambridge Modern History* and the *Cambridge Mediaeval History*. It is true that neither of them is a general history in the older sense of the word. They are meant to instruct rather than to entertain; they will not while away long evenings by the fireside or be found, like Gibbon's first volume, "on every table and almost on every toilette." They are written by the co-operative method, and are subject to all the inequalities and inconveniences which such a method involves. The defects of such a procedure are obvious; its justification is that there is now no other way of treating so vast a subject in a scholarly and serviceable manner, and the result, if not a work of literature, is an indispensable work of reference. If such a series of volumes is interesting, at least in spots, so much the better, but it must in any case be comprehensive, critical, authoritative in its scholarship, clear in its presentation, and ample in its references for further inquiry. These are, however, the merits of a good encyclopaedia, and if a work of history is to be anything more, it must combine with them qualities of unity, continuity, and proportion, which are extremely difficult to attain and which have been attained in these works in less measure than their inspirer, Lord Acton, hoped for. With all due recognition of the difficulties of treating so wide a field, one could wish that the process of subdivision had not been carried quite so far, and that more regard might have been paid to the example of the various co-operative histories which assign a whole volume to a single author.

The *Mediaeval History*, planned by Lord Acton's successor, Professor Bury, and edited by Professor Gwatkin and Mr. Whitney, follows the general lines of its predecessor. The period from Constantine to the middle of the fifteenth century is treated in eight substantial volumes of twenty or more chapters each. The several chapters in a volume are ordinarily assigned to as many different specialists, and in some instances single chapters have been divided between two authors. There is no continuous narrative, but duplication is reasonably well avoided, and no significant aspect of the period is left untouched. The bibliographies are quite full, and there is a plentiful supply of maps, which are, however, of quite uneven merit and execution and are unaccompanied by explanations.

Of the volumes so far issued, the first deals with the Roman empire of the fourth and fifth centuries and with the new movements of this period in the church and among the Germanic invaders, while the second continues the story from the accession of Justinian to the death of Charlemagne. As was inevitable in a field where most of the best work has been done by Continental scholars, there are numerous German and French contributors of the type of Becker, Diehl, Hartmann, Jullian, Pfister, Ludwig Schmidt, and Seeliger, while Visigothic Spain is treated by Señor Altamira. Dr. Peisker of Graz contributes a most original and striking account of the Asiatic background of the barbarian invasions, followed by a notable discussion of the beginnings of the Slavic peoples. Among the contributions from England are the chapters on social and economic conditions by Professor Vinogradoff, on the institutions of the later empire by Professor Reid, on Roman Britain by Professor Haverfield, and on the early Anglo-Saxon period by Mr. Corbett. Dr. Roby's chapter on Roman law, though competent, is disappointing. The only American contributor, Professor Burr of Cornell, decidedly holds his own with the rest in his account of Pippin the Short. The history of the church receives attention proportionate to its importance in this period, various points of view being represented by Principal Lindsay on the triumph of Christianity, Professor Gwatkin on Arianism, Mr. C. H. Turner on early church-organization, Archdeacon Hutton on Gregory the Great, and Dom Butler on monasticism. Keltic and Germanic heathenism receives special treatment, as well as the conversion of these peoples to Christianity. Mr. W. R. Lethaby contributes a few pages on early Christian art, while the history of thought is represented in the first volume by Mr. H. F. Stewart, the biographer of Boethius, and left out of the second, where a chapter had been promised by Dr. Montague James. On the whole, the history of religion and the history of institutions come off rather better than the history of culture, but all of these subjects seem likely to receive more attention than in the *Modern History*, where the treatment is for the most part dominantly political.

In general, the new undertaking deserves a cordial welcome, as rendering conveniently accessible for the first time in English the results of a generation and more of special studies which have not only put the history of the Middle Ages upon a more secure foundation, but have broadened and deepened our appreciation of their place in the history of European civilization.

Charles H. Haskins.

Harvard University.

JOHN PENRY, THE SO-CALLED MARTYR OF CONGREGATIONALISM AS REVEALED IN THE ORIGINAL RECORD OF HIS TRIAL AND IN DOCUMENTS RELATED THERETO. CHAMPLIN BURRAGE, Librarian of Manchester College, Oxford. The University Press. 1913. Pp. 43. 2*s*. 6*d*.

This active young American student of Separatist origins in England adds a fresh monograph to his rapidly growing series of valuable investigations in his special field. He gives the original record of Penry's trial, contemporary extracts from Penry's lost treatise criticising Queen Elizabeth, his defence, and his final remarks on the day before his execution. These documents throw much new light on the charges brought against the young reformer, and the causes for which he died. Mr. Burrage's conclusion, which seems justified by his evidence, is:

"Those connected with the trial apparently treated him with perfect fairness according to the crude customs of that day . . . . Penry was condemned because he had allowed himself to *write* (and *publish*) slanderous denunciations, not because he was a Presbyterian or a Congregationalist. We formerly pitied him, because we erroneously supposed him to have been a martyr for Congregationalism—one who had been unjustly put to death for his religious beliefs. We should pity him now still more, because the words for the writing of which he was arraigned did not represent him at his best, but at his worst."

Yet it may be fair to ask further, admitting the justice of the author's conclusions as to the charges and trial, what induced Penry to express the "slanderous denunciations" for which he suffered?

WILLISTON WALKER.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

FAITH AND THE FAITH. The Bohlen Lectures, 1914. SAMUEL HART, D.D. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1914. Pp. xii, 144. 80 cents.

Faith means fidelity and trust; it is set forth in words in "the Faith." Faith is "of the very essence of religion"; the Faith is "necessary for its expression and extension." The Faith is discussed in these lectures on the intellectual side as regards God, and Jesus Christ, and the Spirit. A final chapter on "The Type of Faith" emphasizes the importance of the emotional side of religion. The theology of the book is steadfastly orthodox, without narrowness.

GEORGE HODGES.

EPISCOPAL THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL,
CAMBRIDGE.

Les Prêtres Danseurs de Rome. Étude sur la corporation sacerdotale des Saliens. Par René Cirilli. Préface de M. J. Toutain. Paris, Geuthner. 1913.

In this elaborate study M. Cirilli re-examines all the evidence relating to the Salii in the city of Rome and in the municipal towns of the Roman Empire, bringing to bear the material which he feels the excavations in Greece, Crete, and Italy itself have furnished pertinent to his subject. Against those who, like Helbig and Wissowa, see in the Salii priests of Mars, or those who, like Frazer, regard them as priests whose dances were aimed at securing the fertility of the fields, Cirilli seeks to prove that the Salii were originally guardians of talismans in the form of shields, symbols of Mars. He would furthermore regard their origin as connected with the introduction into Italy of the art of working metal, and would derive their dances from the magic dances of Cretan metal-workers, the memory of which was preserved in the legend of the Curetes. The clashing of the arms which was an essential part of the dance would be then an act of a general apotropaic nature, such as is found among many peoples. We may gladly admit that Cirilli has made his theory very probable; but it is only a theory, and the fact is that we do not know, and that probably we never shall know, the truth about the origin of the Salii.

The book is provided with a satisfactory bibliography and a convenient collection of references to the Salii in ancient literature. The appendix containing the pertinent inscriptions has one fundamental defect, for the provenance of the inscriptions is not given. It is incredible that this should be omitted, and it ought to be equally incredible that there should be no index. But an index seems too much to hope for in such a book.

Clifford H. Moore.

Harvard University.

The Book of Judges and The Book of Ruth. G. A. Cooke, D.D. The Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges. Cambridge University Press. 1913. Pp. 204+22. 2*s.* 6*d.*

The Wisdom of Jesus the Son of Sirach, or Ecclesiasticus. W. O. E. Oesterley, D.D. The Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges. Cambridge University Press. 1912. Pp. 367. 6*s.*

Among the least satisfactory volumes in the Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges has been the one on Judges. This has now been remedied by the publication of Professor Cooke's excellent commentary. There is presented here in concise and attractive

form the conclusions commonly held by modern scholars respecting Judges and Ruth, except that the author does not recognize in the Book of Ruth a polemical pamphlet directed by a prophetic writer against the narrowness and national exclusiveness of the preaching of Ezra and his priestly school. Dr. Cooke gives an admirable sketch of the primitive and crude character of the early Hebrew life in Canaan, and his comments on the text are sufficiently full to answer all the requirements of the class of readers for whom this series is prepared.

Professor Moulton has well said that Ecclesiasticus offers an excellent example of the evolution of the essay out of the proverb. Ben-Sira shows a marked advance in his method of treatment upon the older collection of Proverbs. Although his book exhibits no great originality, yet the writer of Ecclesiasticus adds to the older material, of which he makes abundant use, a wealth of independent thought which witnesses to a large amount of individuality. The mass of information which the book contains regarding Jewish religious thought and ethics, during a period for which we do not otherwise possess much information, marks it out as a work of high importance. The writer evidently intended to offer to his people a kind of text-book to which men and women might have recourse for guidance in almost every conceivable circumstance of life. He does this, however, with the primary object of setting in clear light the superior excellence of Judaism over Hellenism. In a sense, therefore, Ecclesiasticus is to be regarded as an apologetic work, inasmuch as it aims at combating the rising influence of Greek thought and culture among the Jews.

Such in brief is Dr. Oesterley's view concerning the nature of the book of which he is treating. His notes on the text are most suggestive to the Sunday School teacher (should such ever wander into the Apocrypha) and also to the Hebrew scholar. The latter will find the copious references to the various versions of value.

Maximilian Kellner.

Episcopal Theological School, Cambridge.

Light on the Four Gospels. From the Sinai Palimpsest. Agnes Smith Lewis. Williams and Norgate. 1913. Pp. xi, 226. 3*s*. 6*d*.

This volume is from an author to whom Biblical science is greatly indebted for her discovery in 1892 of the Syriac Sinai Palimpsest of the Gospels, and for her publications in the field of Semitic research. It is a popular work, reproducing in part material that

has been published previously in the Expository Times and that has also been used in public addresses.

Mrs. Lewis seeks in an attractive and untechnical way to acquaint her readers with some questions of New Testament textual criticism which have been raised by the discovery and fuller knowledge of the Old Syriac text. The section of greatest value is that comprised in chapters four to nine. Here some of the more important variant readings of the Sinai Palimpsest are given in English translation for each of the four Gospels in turn. The differences between the Syriac and the Greek are made perfectly clear in each instance to those who are unacquainted with either language. A statement is often added as to the important Versions and manuscripts which are in agreement with the Old Syriac text. The way is thus open for the reader to gain some impression as to the extent of the support given by this text to the so-called "Western" readings. Mrs. Lewis, however, is not so much interested to point this out as to vindicate the general trustworthiness of the Sinai Palimpsest, and more particularly to show that its readings can be accepted without detriment to faith. It is but natural that long devotion to this manuscript should make her an enthusiastic advocate of its excellence, and that, too, at a time when the importance of its testimony is generally recognized by New Testament scholars. In the opening chapters she argues for an early date for the Old Syriac translation of which it is a representative, and for the possible perpetuation in that version of some of the very turns of expression used by Jesus in the closely allied dialect of the Galilean Aramaic.

A discussion of controverted points is not to be expected in such a book; nor is it reasonable, perhaps, to demand that there be a more extended and adequate treatment of the textual variants of the Syriac. It is much to be regretted, however, that so little effort has been made to explain, not to say, follow, the principles which must govern in the quest for the original text of the Greek New Testament. There is more than one passage in this little volume which might lead the thoughtful reader to infer that textual criticism is, to say the least, a somewhat whimsical science. An illustration may be found in the following defence of the Syriac reading that Jesus "*was standing* and talking" with the woman of Samaria (John 4 27): "This slight detail of the narrative is found, so far as we know, in no other manuscript. But it is quite in keeping with our Lord's character that He should have forgotten His own weariness, and should have risen to His feet in order to impress more vividly on the woman those great truths which He was reveal-

ing to her. And the change of attitude may have been prompted by an innate feeling of the chivalry which was eventually to blossom out of His teaching. Standing is not the usual habit of the Jewish Rabbi when he is engaged in teaching, so it is all the more remarkable that our Lord should have shown so much courtesy to our sex in the person of one of its most degraded representatives. The little word of *qâ'em*, 'standing,' has so much significance, that we cannot suppose it to be a mere orthographical variant" (p. 147).

The book closes with two brief chapters on entirely distinct topics. The first proposes some emendations which Mrs. Lewis believes would help to make the Revised Version of the Bible a more intelligible and more consistent translation; while the last chapter is made up of a series of paragraphs aiming to show how various statements of Scripture have been confirmed by modern scientific investigation and discovery.

Warren J. Moulton.

Bangor Theological Seminary.

Jesus the Christ: Historical or Mythical? A Reply to Professor Drews' *Die Christusmythe*. T. J. Thorburn. T. & T. Clark. 1912. Pp. 311. $2.50.

In a brief introduction the author states the views of a few writers who have denied the historicity of Jesus. Then he presents the historical data in support of Jesus' existence. The concept of a suffering Messiah is held to have been no part of pre-Christian Jewish belief, and so could not have supplied the first Christians the model for their messianic faith. This they derived from historical experience. More positive testimony for Jesus' historicity is drawn from the gospels, Paul, Josephus, Roman writers, and Jewish tradition. The second part of the volume deals with the mythological data which opponents have found in the Gospels. After denying the existence of any pre-Christian Jesus-cults, Thorburn refutes the arguments which have been advanced to prove the mythical character of numerous gospel items. He arrives at three conclusions: (1) the *Christ* of Paul is identical with the Jesus of the synoptists; (2) the *Jesus* of the synoptists is a historical person; and (3) the *Jesus Christ* of primitive Christianity is no mere idea subsequently precipitated and historicized as the founder of a religion. The argument, we believe, would have gained in clearness and force had the author distinguished more sharply between the Jesus of history and the Christ of early faith.

Shirley J. Case.

University of Chicago.

A Source-Book for Ancient Church History from the Apostolic Age to the Close of the Conciliar Period. Joseph Cullen Ayer, Jr., Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the Divinity School of the Protestant Episcopal Church in Philadelphia. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1913. Pp. xxi, 707. $3.00.

Many teachers in this country have long desired to secure a book of collateral readings in the history of early Christianity. The present volume, prepared at the suggestion of the American Society of Church History, presents, in idiomatic translation, a generous selection of representative source-extracts, carefully arranged and well indexed. Save for the fact that running paragraph numbers do not appear at the top of the pages, the printing is admirable. Had the primary division of material been topical, as in Thatcher and McNeal's *Source Book for Mediaeval History*, instead of chronological, it would have been easier to remember what one reads. He who sails through these pages soon gets his sea-legs in spite of the quick succession of short and choppy waves of interest, and feels that he is making steady progress toward a clearly discerned port. The book offers a more vivid view of the manifold activities of the church under the Roman emperors than can be gained from the few dogmatic or hortatory tracts which have hitherto formed the staple of required reading. In addition to the standard pronouncements on creed and conduct, it marshals effectively much material on the actual workings of the church as an institution; for instance, paragraphs 72–78: "The Empire and the Imperial State Church." Here, as elsewhere, Professor Ayer, long a student of ecclesiastical law, has gathered regulations governing the life of the common man; but he does not show so clearly how that elusive and usually inarticulate being reacted toward the state church. American theological students do not have any idea of what the common man heard and saw when he attended the services of Cyprian, and they have the vaguest notions about the more important demands of the hierarchy on the laity. They should therefore enjoy the specific and occasionally picturesque detail here presented with adequate elucidation. The material made easily accessible puts greater variety and life into the study of the history of the ancient church. Those who prepare seminar-papers will regret that the publishers omitted the very suggestive bibliographies that prefaced each paragraph of the original manuscript; but for the average student, as for the pastor, the book will be a boon. Its unusually objective standpoint will make it also very useful in university instruction in early mediaeval history.

William Walker Rockwell.

Union Theological Seminary.

IS BOOK MUST BE
RETURNED